The Danger Zone

Back to Iraq: U.S. Military Contractors Return In Droves

May 30, 2016 | OVERSEAS INTEL, The Danger Zone

Behind the president’s directive to ‘accelerate’ the counter-ISIS campaign came a surge in the number of contractors assisting in the campaign against ISIS.

The number of private contractors working for the U.S. Defense Department in Iraq grew eight-fold over the past year, a rate that far outpaces the growing number of American troops training and advising Iraqi soldiers battling Islamic State militants.

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The sharp increase, disclosed in a recent Pentagon report to Congress, underscores the military’s reliance on civilians even for missions with relatively small troop presence.

“If you look at the size and the composition of the forces that have been deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, that’s changed markedly in the past year,” said Rick Brennan, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corp. and a retired Army officer.

As of January, 2,028 contractors were in Iraq, up from just 250 one year earlier, according to the Pentagon’s data. There are roughly 3,700 American troops there now, compared to 2,300 in January 2015.

That number of military contractors represents just a fraction of the contractors employed by the U.S. in Iraq. In addition to the 2,028 Pentagon contractors, another 5,800 are employed by other agencies, including the State Department.

In the 1980s, the U.S. military decided to hire contractors to work in support roles that had historically been done by troops. That includes jobs like food services, maintaining housing units, water purification and “all those those other things that go with maintaining troops in the field for a long time,” Brennan said. The plus-up in Iraq is likely for contractors in those types of roles.

“What’s occurred then is as you deploy more forces to theater, you have to provide increased total number of contractors,” Brennan said.

During the Iraq War, there was a little bit more than one-to-one ratio of contractors to soldiers, he said. Now in Iraq, more than 30 percent (618) of the contractors are working in maintenance and logistics jobs. Nearly 20 percent (381) are translators and 13 percent (263) are in base support positions, according to the data. Contractors are also working in security, transportation, construction, communication support, training, management and administrative roles.

Nearly 70 percent of the contractors are American citizens, 20 percent are third-country nationals and the remaining are local Iraqis. The number of contractors the Pentagon can employ in Iraq is not capped, according to Col. Steve Warren, spokesman for Operation Inherent Resolve.

Many of the contractors in Iraq and neighboring countries are from well known warzone companies like KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor Corporation, the three firms hired by the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, or LogCap. The Pentagon awards individual “task order” deals to these each time it needs to support troops overseas.

“It makes tailoring a unit much more responsive to the needs of the commander because you don’t have to try to rip people [with a trade specialty] from other installations,” Brennan said.

KBR, in a November presentation to investors, said its LogCap services work in Iraq “grew in the period with further growth possible.”

Besides the LogCap contractors, the Pentagon can award independent contracts, according to Andrew Hunter, a former Pentagon official who now director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington. In some instances, the Pentagon hires contractors already working for the government in order to speed up the process.

Even though U.S. troops withdrew fully from Iraq in 2011, many contractors stayed behind working at the American embassy or in logistical roles maintaining Iraq’s military equipment.

Congress ordered the Pentagon to provide detailed information about battlefield contractors following an incident in which private military contractors working for Blackwater USA killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square in Baghdad in September 2007.

Not all contractors in the warzone are base guards, laundry workers or chefs. The CIA and other intelligence agencies still use contractors like the former Blackwater or $2.2 billion firm DynCorp and other for paramilitary services. The number of those contractors, some who are closer to the battlefield than the military advisors, is classified and unknown to the public.

U.S. Central Command, which oversees military operations in the Middle East, has sent Congress regular updates about the number of contractors being employed in Iraq and Afghanistan since August 2008. In July 2008, just following the 2007 troop surge, there were 162,428 Pentagon-funded contractors in Iraq, according to the data.

BY: DEFENSE ONE http://www.defenseone.com/

Iraq — Afghanistan Contractor Census, FY 2nd quarter (February – April 2016)

April 26, 2016 | OVERSEAS INTEL, The Danger Zone

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

BACKGROUND: This report updates DoD contractor personnel numbers in theater and outlines DoD efforts to improve management of contractors accompanying U.S. forces. It covers DoD contractor personnel deployed in Afghanistan (Operation Freedom’s Sentinel), Iraq (Operation Inherent Resolve), and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

KEY POINTS: In 2nd quarter FY 2016, USCENTCOM reported approximately 45,000 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR. This total reflects a slight increase of approximately 1,000 from the previous quarter. A breakdown of DoD contractor personnel is provided below:

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Afghanistan Summary*

The distribution of contractors in Afghanistan by mission category are:

Logistics/Maintenance 13,706 (47.8%)
Base Support 2,532 (8.8%)
Commo Support 1,168 (4.1%)
Construction 1,777 (6.2%)
Security 2,762** (9.6%)
Training 791 (2.8%)
Translator/Interpreter 1,654 (5.8%)
Transportation 1,532 (5.4%)
Medical/Dental/Social Services 113 (.4%)
Management/Administrative 2,230 (7.8%)
Other 361 (1.3%)

Total: 28,626

 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel Contractor Posture:

o In 2nd quarter FY16 there were 28,626 DoD contractors in Afghanistan. The overall contractor footprint in Afghanistan decreased by 6.4% from 1st quarter FY16.
o Local nationals comprise 43.2% of total contractor force; 16,251 US/TCN remain to redeploy.
o Contractor footprint may increase with pending drawdown of US forces if requirements are not reduced.

Iraq Summary

The distribution of contractors in Iraq by mission category are:

Logistics/Maintenance 705 (26.9%) Base Support 388 (14.8%)
Commo Support 175 (6.7%) Construction 208 (7.9%)
Security 175 (6.7%) Training 34 (1.3%)
Translator/Interpreter 471 (18%)
Transportation 175 (6.7%)
Management/Administrative 223 (8.5%)
Other 65 (2.5%)

Total: 2,619

Operation Inherent Resolve Contractor Posture.

o As of 2nd quarter 2016, there are approximately 7,773 contractors supporting US government operations in Iraq. About 2,619 of those contractors are supporting DoD funded contracts.

General Data on DoD Private Security Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan

 Private security contractors (PSC) perform personal security, convoy security, and static security missions.

 USCENTCOM reports, as of 2nd quarter FY 2016, the following distribution of PSCs in Afghanistan:

In Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF) has primary responsibility for mobile security functions. In August 2015, President Ghani issued a decree re-authorizing the use of PSCs by U.S. and NATO forces are allowed to contract with Private Security Companies to safeguard their Military, Civilian and Contractors that conduct official and contracted tasks both on and outside of US and NATO agreed installations. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and Operation Resolute Support staff are developing policies to ensure strict adherence to Afghan and sendingstate law in the contracting and operations of these contractors. No contracts have been let under this new authorization.

Improvements to Management and Oversight of DoD Contractors

 CJTF OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) was turned over to III Corps in September 2015. CENTCOM OCSIC worked closely with the Corps G4 to build dedicated OCS personnel in the Joint Manning Document and develop a CJTF OCSIC. JS J4 engaged III Corps prior to deployment (July 2015) and provided:

o OCS overview training (July 2015), o Consulted with III Corps to define OCSIC mission, size and scope,
o Five student seats in Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) for just in time OCSIC training (August 2015)
o Sustained daily/weekly reach-back training and support (August- October 2015) In September 2015, JCASO performed an OCSIC initial operating capability (IOC) assessment and reported ‘best JTF OCSIC yet’. Given a view of a possible long-term sustainment mission, CJTF OIR will assess contractor management policies in the JOA.

 OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. Expeditionary Contracting Command-AFG (ECCA) on behalf of USARCENT continues to provide direct support contracting to USFOR-A through the Lead Service for Contracting (LSC) construct. The official transition from CJTSCC to LSC occurred in Jun 2015 with the 418th Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) earmarked as the ECC-A taking the LSC role. The 410th CSB has since taken over ECC-A responsibilities from the 418th CSB, in addition to recently assuming the Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) mission from Defense Contract Management Agency.

 Defense Standards for Security Services.

o Pursuant to Section 833 of the FY2011 NDAA, compliance with American National Standard ANSI PSC.1-2012, “Quality Management Standard for Private Security Company Operations” is required in all DoD contracts for private security services. The requirements and guidance of this standard implement all PSC relevant provisions of US law, Defense Directives and instructions, and promoted consistency with international agreements. Demonstrated compliance with this standard will facilitate identifying technically acceptable contractors and best value. This will enable expedited contract award; mitigate risk of delay of services due to contract award protests; and mitigate risk of contractor non-performance or misconduct in critical early phases of contingency operations. The United Kingdom also requires compliance with this ANSI PSC standard.

o An international (ISO) version of this standard was published by ISO in September 2015. This standard enables international acceptance of the standards in use by the United States and the United Kingdom, increasing consistency and legal compliance in the provision of all PSC services everywhere. ISO recognition will improve competition and manage risk in operational environments which will include PSCs not under the direct control of US or coalition forces. PSCs achieving independent certification to the ISO standard are being given concurrent certification to the ANSI PSC standard. A revision of the PSC DFARS allowing PSCs to demonstrate compliance with either the ANSI or the ISO is expected to be published in 3QFY16.

 Operational Contract Support (OCS) Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB). This senior executive–level governance forum, chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in March 2010, provides strategic leadership to multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize OCS. Co-Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support and Vice Director for Logistics, Joint Staff J4, the FCIB convenes quarterly or as required. On February 23, 2016, the board convened the Second Quarter FY16 Principals meeting to review and assess the following:

o OCS Gap Assessment Review
o OCS Action Plan Update
o OCS DOTMLPF Change Recommendation (DCR) Update
o OCS Human Capital Study
o OCS Common Operating Picture (COP)
o OCS Joint Lessons Learned Decision Brief
o US Army OCS Capability Status Update
o DCMA Joint Training Pilot Update

The Third Quarter FY16 OCS FCIB Principals meeting will be held on May 24, 2016.

 Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). Planning, implementation, and oversight of OCS are Commander's responsibilities and are essential to establishing a strategy for managing contractors on the battlefield as part of the DoD Total Force. JCASO provides the Combatant Commands a joint enabling capability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize OCS during peacetime, contingency operations, and post-conflict operations. JCASO is an essential part of DLA's combat support agency (CSA) role to support the mission objectives of the combatant commands, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Title 10 responsibilities, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense for OCS policy development and implementation. Examples of current JCASO engagements include:

Deployments:

o Deployed 2-member team to stand up SOJTF-OIR OCSIC, Qatar 6 Mar – 22 Apr 2016, providing guidance, assistance and training. Coordinated with SOCCENT Contracting in theater to leverage assistance opportunities.

Exercises:

o Provided OCS support and participated in XVIII ABC Warfighter Exercise including MSEL Development (19-20 Jan), Academics (1-4 Feb), and Execution 30 Mar-15 Apr) 2016.
o AFRICOMs Judicious Response 17 will include significant OCS play. OCS is one of the top two (2) overall exercise objectives and AFRICOM will include ten (10) OCS training objectives to ensure that OCS is integrated into all aspects of the staff’s planning and execution tasks.

Joint Training and Education

o CENTCOM JCASO OCS Planner Mike Rector delivered OCS training to industry study groups at the Eisenhower School (ICAF), followed by a questions and answers session.

 JCASO Planners. Sixteen (16) JCASO planners are allocated among the Geographic Combatant Commands and USSOCOM to assist commanders in identifying gaps where a contracted support capability may be required. Planners integrate contracted support into operational plans and synchronize requirements with subordinate commands, the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, other USG Agencies, and coalition partners. The planners have been instrumental in integrating OCS into Combatant Command plans. Based on demonstrated need for additional OCS planning capability in USPACOM, JCASO also established OCS planners at forward locations in USFK and USFJ.

 Operational Contract Support (OCS) Learning Framework. The Department continues to make progress on the Secretary’s and the Chairman's vision for OCS education and training. Several parallel efforts are underway to integrate OCS into a holistic learning framework that leverages the Chairman’s joint training system and includes education, individual and collective training, exercises, and lessons learned components primarily aimed at nonacquisition personnel. In support of the Framework, the Joint Staff (J4) established an Education and Training Working Group (E&T WG) with members from OSD, the Services, Defense Acquisition University, Defense Logistics Agency, and Defense Contract Management Agency. The E&T WG met on 26 February 2016 to discuss the status of each of the Framework components from a joint perspective and to solicit Service and Agency input to capture a comprehensive Department laydown of each component. Analysis of gaps and redundancies will commence after the “as is” information is collected.

o OCS in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The Joint Staff (J7) revised CJCSI 1800.01E, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)” on 29 May 2015. It now includes eleven (11) specific learning areas incorporating OCS into 3 of the 5 levels of PME/JPME (IAW 10 USC § 2151) which reaches officers in the grades of O-4 to O-9. Joint Staff (J4) OCS and Services Division (OCSSD) is completing work on Version 3.0 of the OCS Curriculum Development Guide (CDG), which offers JPME institutions guidance, options, specific OCS learning objectives, reference material and suggested content for teaching OCS based on the OPMEP learning areas. The Joint Staff (J4) continues to brief faculty of JPME schools on developments in OCS as part of the Joint Faculty Education Conference held annually and to work with schools individually, as needed. The Joint Staff (J4) is working with students at the Naval Post-Graduate School to develop OCS case studies as additional teaching tools.

o Lessons Learned. The Joint Staff (J4), with support from JCASO, developed OCS Joint Lessons Learned Procedures (JLLp) to integrate OCS lessons learned efforts across DoD components. The OCS JLLp leverage the DoD system of record for lessons learned, the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), and the Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP). The OCS JLLp includes a concept of operations and standard operating procedures for collecting, analyzing, and processing OCS lessons and best practices. The JLLp also define working relationships and responsibilities of stakeholders, including the OCS FCIB, to act upon validated lessons. In October 2015, the Joint Staff (J4) established OCS Communities of Practice (COPs) in JLLIS (#377 on the NIPRNet and #111 on the SIPRNet) to share and manage OCS lessons and best practices. In February 2016, the FCIB approved the draft OCS JLLp and designated the Joint Staff (J4) as the OCS Enterprise Lesson Manager. Final coordination of the OCS JLLp will commence in April 2016 after incorporating planned JLLIS functionality upgrades into the OCS JLLp.

o Exercises. OCSJX-16 is scheduled for 13 March – 8 April 2016 at Fort Bliss, Texas. The US Army Contracting Command is providing the exercise director. This year’s exercise brings together nearly 500 trainees from the Active and Reserve forces, the National Guard and our partners representing all Services, U.S. Army South, the 1st Armored Division, the United Kingdom, and Chile as multinational partner observer. OCSJX-16 will train and assess individual skills and unit OCS capabilities based on a decisive action and stability operations scenario in support U.S. Southern Command. The exercise links contract support integration at the Service component, Joint Task Force, and Combatant Command levels.

o The Joint Staff (J-4) is also providing OCS training expertise to U.S. Africa Command to assist them with incorporating OCS training objectives and content into JUDICIOUS RESPONSE 17 (JR-17) to be held 29 November – 9 December 2016 at various locations. JR-17 will be a command post exercise that integrates the capabilities and functions of its Service components, Combined/Joint Task Forces, the Interagency, and multi-national partners to address selected U.S. Africa Command missions.

o Collective and Staff Training. The Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance Notice (CJCSN 3500.01) provides annual guidance to all DOD Components for planning, executing, and assessing joint training for three consecutive years. It includes High Interest Training Issues (HITIs) which are CJCS special-interest items that CCDRs should consider for emphasis in their training and exercise programs. OCS considerations are reflected in the “Ethics, Values, and Leadership” HITI, the “Joint Logistics Enterprise” HITI, the Joint Operational Access HITI, and the main document as part of efforts to realize Joint Force 2020.

o Universal Joint Tasks & Joint OCS Training and Assessment Guide. The Joint Staff (J4) has completed staffing on its Joint OCS Training and Assessments (JOTA) Guide v. 1.0, which recommends tasks, standards, and measures aligned to the 4 primary OCS UJTs. The Guide assists planners in integrating OCS into joint training and exercises to help ensure realistic readiness assessments for OCS.

o Individual Training. The Joint Staff is working to update the three joint OCS computerbased courses released in 2009. The three courses were “joint training certified” in 2013 and are hosted on Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), the joint web portal for providing key distributed joint training. In May 2015, initial operational capability (IOC) was established for a new and improved course, Joint OCS Essentials for Commanders & Staff (JOECS), to reflect doctrinal changes in Joint Publication (JP) 4-10 and replace the former OCS introductory-level course. Full operational capability (FOC) is expected by the fourth quarter of FY 2016. The IOC JOECS had 1149 completions from May to March 2016 while the former introductory-level course had 1,778 completions from its inception until 11 May 2015 when it was replaced by JOECS. From their inception to 25 March 2016, the Introduction to Operational Contract Support (OCS) Planning course had 2195 completions, and the Operational Contract Support (OCS) Flag Officer-General Officer (FOGO) Essentials Course had 1232 completions.

o The Joint Staff (J4) OCSSD teaches the Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) at the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) via mobile training teams (MTTs). JOPEC was joint training certified in December 2014. JOPEC is taught at every GCC and 617 students have been trained to-date. An additional 120 students are expected to complete JOPEC by the end of FY 2016. Demand is forecasting 10 JOPECs in FY17 for an additional 300 attendees. Student feedback continues to be outstanding and interactions resulting from the JOPEC MTTs provide critical feedback for all OCS joint capability development efforts.

o On February 25, 2015 Army Logistics University (ALU) began teaching a revised Army OCS course program of instruction. The new course places greater emphasis on mission analysis, requirements development and OCS across the joint force. Due to demand, ALU hired additional instructor capability. In FY 2015, 651 personnel across the Services were trained during 13 classes and Fort Lee and 11 MTTs. In FY 2016, ALU projects 700 trainees from 12 classes at Fort Lee and 13 MTTs.

 OCS Planning. Using the guidance found in the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, the Combatant Commands continue to document and expand their OCS planning efforts and products. The Joint Staff (J4) has developed a separate manual, CJCSM 4301.01A, Planning OCS, to assist OCS planners in developing procedures and guidance that integrate, synchronize, prioritize, and focus OCS capabilities on achieving a supported commander’s operational objectives and desired effects for the various types of plans. The manual is out for O6-level staffing. Anticipated publication is 4Q FY 2016. The Joint Staff J4 also reviews Combatant Command Contingency and Operational Plans as a member of the Joint Planning Execution Community (JPEC). The most recent Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan increases the level of planning detail associated with OCS.

 OCS Process Maps and Supporting Guidance. In November 2015, the OCS process map team consisting of subject matter experts from the Joint Staff J4 OCSS Division, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Program Support (DASD (PS)) and DLA’s Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) completed 42 process maps, supporting narratives and developed an outlined for supporting sample documents, best processes and templates. The OCS process maps will be distributed to OCS practitioner and JTF’s staffs providing them with a step-by-step road map to integrate and execute key OCS task across all phases of an operation. The process maps will be incorporated into a future OCS Handbook product that is currently in development.

 OCS Reporting. Combatant Commands continue to conduct risk assessments in compliance with legislation each quarter, which inform strategic risk processes. Collaboration with DOS and USAID on risk assessments is conducted quarterly to benchmark best practices. Accuracy of OCS readiness reporting continues to mature. The Joint Staff J4-led OCS reporting working group (RWG)—with members from OSD, Services, Agencies, and CCMDs—has drafted an organizational charter and defined objectives to institutionalize OCS reporting in DoD. The gap assessment regarding tasks required to close OCS reporting gaps are being integrated into the OCS Action Plan FY17-20 revision.

 OCS Human Capital Strategy. To address OCS ICD Gap #3 requiring a human capital strategy, ODASD (Program Support), OUSD (Personnel & Readiness), and JS J4 personnel review OCS Human Capital Study progress monthly. Ongoing interviews with personnel across DoD will inform OCS manpower, personnel, and training requirements. Results will enable subsequent requirements validation and resourcing decisions.

 OCS Mission Integrator (OMI) Demonstration. The JS J4 has partnered with U.S Pacific Command (USPACOM) to conduct a three-year demonstration to assess the OMI's performance under operational conditions. The OMI is an advanced integration cell described in the Joint Concept for OCS. Additionally, the demonstration informs current and future OCS force development. Based on the OMI's success and contributions, the USPACOM J4 is working to secure resources for an enduring OMI capability beginning in FY18 POM.

The Case for Private Contractors in Northern Nigeria

February 12, 2016 | OVERSEAS INTEL, The Danger Zone

by David Pfotenhauer — The unsubstantiated rumours of the private security company STTEP (Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International) being redeployed to Nigeria have yet to generate the furore that their initial deployment did in 2015. The earlier presence of STTEP prompted the South African government to label them as ‘mercenary’ in function and nature and therefore in contravention of existing domestic and international legal mechanisms. Other commentators took a broader view and characterised their arrival in northern Nigeria as a “logical step” (and as an act of desperation) following the poor performance of the Nigerian Defence Force (NDF) in their operations against Boko Haram.

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Following the rumours of STTEP’s return, two questions need to be asked: was the deployment of a private military contractor (PMC: in this case STTEP) a dangerous strategic calculation on the part of the Jonathan administration? And secondly, what would the redeployment of a PMC in a combat orientated role mean for contingency contracting on the continent? Crucially, these questions should be examined against the failure of the training and advisory support provided to the Nigerian government by its international partners to achieve meaningful strategic success.

Fortunately, the answers to these questions can be seen in hindsight. In the first case, it is necessary to outline the broader operational and strategic priorities that prompted the previous Jonathan administration to seek private military services. These priorities influenced the decision to hire a PMC as an outcome of recurring NDF inertia at strategic, operational and tactical levels. The answer to the second question lies within a broader narrative of the desirability of private combat-orientated services on the continent, as well as the notion that the sharp end of military contractor support (Peter Singer’s tip of the spear typology) cannot be wholly removed from the existence of a global market for private military services.

Indeed, one may go as far as to suggest that the historical effectiveness of the PMC model for contingency contracting in Angola (1993 -96), Sierra Leone (1995 – 97) and now Nigeria may make it an attractive option for African governments, despite an increasing preference for behind-the-lines, non-combat advisory and training contracting models. From a strategic point of view, the Jonathan administration hired a PMC (STTEP) for its depth of expertise in high-tempo ground and air operations, and its particular institutional knowledge of combat operations in Africa (contained in STTEP’s doctrine of Composite Warfare). This is a reasonable strategic calculation.

Further, it is important to acknowledge that STTEP is a primarily Africa-centered company whose expertise, doctrine, and training regimes mirror the character of the African battlespace. It is, for all intents and purposes, an African company offering Africa-centered solutions to African security crises. It must also be stressed that STTEP’s role was purely short-term – in effect, a crisis intervention measure. In this sense, the Jonathan administration hired a PMC on the back of failures from state forces and international partners to provide an immediate and much needed military band-aid.

Importantly, it was not hired as a peace enforcer or actor facilitating conflict resolution. These (critical) functions remain the responsibility of the Nigerian government and the broader regional community. The onus remains on the government to sustainably capitalise on the gains claimed through STTEP’s role. Arguably, these traditional roles are better suited to mechanisms such as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) and its affiliated continental structures. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reported that President Jacob Zuma had suggested the use of the ACIRC to President Jonathan in January 2015, which he refused at the time.

Despite various suggestions as to why President Jonathan turned down the option of the ACIRC, the hiring of a PMC was, I would argue, a better strategic decision. It gave the NDF much needed quick-wins in a relatively short time frame, which afforded them crucial strategic breathing space. The employment of a PMC in the wake of long-term operational inertia of the NDF should therefore not be seen as either a strategic aberration, or condemned as a poor political choice for security assistance.

While PMCs have been historically painted as unethical enterprises in Africa, the contract model in Nigeria obviates this negative characterisation. Their presence in Nigeria, though kept secret at first (operational security being the most obvious reason) was at the behest of the government and, as a result, legitimate. Moreover, STTEP, as per the old Executive Outcomes (EO) model in Sierra Leone, was embedded within NDF structures for the period of their contract. They were not external/adjunct to NDF structures, and therefore synchronised their services with the broader strategic and operational objectives of the Nigerian army.

This model created the crucial unity of effort required between contracted forces and military structures. This coordination, (which EO used in both Angola and Sierra Leone) offset the damaging strategic and tactical occurrences of poor communication and overall force-disjointedness. This was very much the case in the initial outsourcing surge in Iraq (between 2003 – 06). The much cited analogy of hired guns running amok simply cannot be applied in Nigeria’s case. Despite this, accusations of criminal liability – mostly voiced by the South African government and based on legislation that is constitutionally problematic and legally ambiguous – muddy the conceptual waters of Nigeria’s decision to hire a PMC.

From an operational and tactical viewpoint, STTEP provided the NDF with immediate access to relevant doctrinal advice, and proficiency in a style of warfare with which the NDF was not operationally au fait, despite all the foreign training they were given. More critically, it had a proven and testable battlefield record. Executive Outcomes (STTEP’s arguable predecessor from an organisational and service model perspective) employed similar operational and tactical models in Angola and Sierra Leone with great success. In both instances, a precise and timely economy of force, coupled with high levels of mechanised mobility supported by armour, artillery and gunships, rapid insertion of stopper groups and an effective human intelligence (HUMINT) capability proved to be a winning formula.

Beyond the operational and tactical expertise that their involvement brought, the use of STTEP compensated, to a degree, for the organisational deficiencies that bedevilled the NDF in its long-running campaign against Boko Haram. These ranged from systemic corruption within the military, to poor doctrinal advice, desertion, a flagging espirit de corps, inadequate training, incorrect unit structures, poor tactical use of equipment, and human rights abuses. As an aside, and at the risk of being pedantic, one needs to see these military shortcomings as common motivators to seek private military services as stop-gap interventions (but not long-term solutions) to critical security failures on the part of government forces.

As to the second issue, STTEP’s hiring and consequent strategic value may signal that despite the mainstream Western market for contingency contracting largely steering clear of direct combat operations, Africa is a niche market for contracted combat services. This should not be seen as anachronistic, but as a by-product of the continent’s continuing struggle with traditional and non-traditional drivers of instability. Given the role that PMCs such as STTEP occupy in this market, it would be strategically myopic to view the demand for such services as a solely predatory phenomenon stemming from state failure, or as a key driver of conflict.

While destructive outcomes have been seen in the past, and certainly demand robust engagement, the fundamental policy challenge here is to rigorously delineate and identify service providers within a niche market offering valuable and strategically appropriate services, from those who function in an unethical, predatory manner. PMCs such as STTEP occupy the former. STTEP’s embedment with the NDF is emblematic of a model of contracted military services founded on the principle of synchronicity with broader, government-led strategic objectives. This acts as an important legitimising function. Beyond this model, which has resurfaced on the back of a significant – and long-standing – state failure to deal with security threats, mainstream contingency contracting on the continent will probably remain as advisory and training services.

Within this space, the US currently forms the single largest provider of this type of contingency contracting on the continent through its AFRICOM affiliated AFRICAP and ACOTA mechanisms. In spite of this, it is reasonable and justifiable to hypothesise that STTEP’s organisational and contracting model will continue to be strategically successful, despite the criticism of its Western detractors. The decision of Nigeria to opt for short-term, PMC support has resuscitated – if even only for a brief period – discussions on the desirability and role of private combat services in Africa. It has shown that despite the global market largely eschewing direct combat involvement, the strategic relevance and value of these services remain an enduring feature of the African security environment.

http://www.africandefence.net/

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The Danger Zone

Back to Iraq: U.S. Military Contractors Return In Droves

Iraq — Afghanistan Contractor Census, FY 2nd quarter (February – April 2016)

Total: 28,626

Total: 2,619

The Case for Private Contractors in Northern Nigeria

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