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Guns for Hire: Private Military Companies and their Status Under International Humanitarian Law

June 5, 2015 | Humanitarian & Aid, OVERSEAS INTEL, The Danger Zone

However out of the common road seems to be, currently new security or military assistance providers rise up in the private sector. Private military companies (PMCs) are becoming a worldwide well-known occurrence. These quite new entities perform tasks in uncommonly blurred situations where the action of pointing out the boundaries between legal and illegal is a demanding job.

The new business branch of security provided by private companies is responsible for handling large amounts of weapons and military equipment. It offers its services in support of military operations enrolling former militaries as civilians to carry out passive or defensive security.

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Often addressed as mercenaries, they do not fall under the international humanitarian law definition for this category of personnel and modern-day PMCs prefer to refer to their staff as security contractors or private military contractors. The definition of mercenary under international law is so exclusive that it is difficult to outline who would actually qualify as a mercenary. A repeatedly and notorious quotation belongs to Geoffrey Best and fully explains this inconvenience: “any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot - and his lawyer with him”. The initial point was the statement that “these private military companies act in a void, virtually free from legal restraints”.

BRIEF SCOPE OF THE INDUSTRY

March 31, 2004. City of Fallujah. Iraq. Four employees of the US-owned private military company Blackwater are ambushed and killed by an angry Iraqi crowd, their corpses incinerated and mutilated, and then hung sinisterly from a bridge. As a response, because the city of Fallujah was like a painful thorn for the US forces since their arrival in Iraq, the following assault that involved both participation of US forces and Blackwater contractors on Fallujah in April 2004, using a total disproportionate means of attack, have resulted in raising questions about the connection between the military and these contractors and the exactness of addressing them as civilian contractors. Second example refers to the participation of employees of the private military company CACI in the mistreatment of inmates at the Iraqi Abu Ghraib detention facility and the attention drawn by the tasks these contractors are performing, as well as to their accountability for human rights abuses they may commit.

These two incidents draw the public opinion attention on the feeling of mightiness hese PMCs have about themselves. Held under the auspices of the United Nations, an assembly of specialist on the subject of PMCs industry pointed out, into a report, that all these armed entities maneuvers in a field of activity valued at US$100 billion. Therefore, this fellowship represents a compelling strength that will not dissipate all at once. PMCs play a worldwide substantial role, frequently with strategic effect on both the process and consequences of conflicts.

As for the types of services they provide, Peter Singer separates PMCs into three business sectors: 1. “military provider firms supplying direct, tactical military assistance that can include serving in front-line combat; 2. military consulting firms that provide strategic advice and training; 3. military support forms that provide logistics, maintenance and intelligence services to armed forces”.From instructing military personnel in former Yugoslavia, in collaboration with regular armed forces, raising encampments for dislocated individuals in Macedonia, helping US Central Intelligence Agency in South America in its fight against drugs and protecting oil pipe lines and diamond mines in Africa to a wide variety of tasks performed in Iraq and more recently in Afghanistan, private military companies have been implicated in an extensive range of missions and expanded their tentacles all around the globe. “In Angola, for example, domestic laws require extraction companies to bring their own security forces, many of which may end up engaged in battles with local rebel groups”. Governments may use, also, private military companies in order to elude some imposed constraints, like it is, for instances the number of regulate army troops being sent in missions abroad.

In Afghanistan, although the RSM (Resolute Support Mission) presence is twisting down, “the increase in the contractors to troop ratio is yet another indication that although the vast majority of troops are leaving Afghanistan, a private army will remain in the country for years.” A brief analysis of these numbers (figure 1), from 2010 to 2015, proves that, indeed RSM troops are, slowly but surely, being replaced by a subcontracted private army. As resulting from the analysis, even if the troops are leaving Afghanistan their tasks are taken over by the private military companies, proven by the exponential increasing ratios. A comment is, also, needed to be done. The number of private contractors represents only those employed by U.S. companies, but not necessarily Americans. These figures only count those contractors employed by the U.S. Department of Defense. Taking into account that many other institutions or private companies use these contractors, too, the ratios are even higher or even more disproportionate. Using private military companies may have some possible advantages like rapid deployment, the mitigation of public opinion on use of regular armed forces or they can act like a counter weight to local armed forces in countries where the political institutions have no, or no longer, a real authority. Also, outsourcing some military services, like logistics or maintenance, can be justified by a desire of seeking efficiency and allowing the regulate military forces to focus on the main, more important, combat missions.

Real or not, these advantages are counter balanced by some important disadvantages. Private military companies’ employees are rather motivated by financial gain then by a sense of duty and they do not follow a military hierarchy.

CONTRACTORS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

The root for the mercenaries’ status finds its place of birth within the Protocol Additional I (adopted on 8th of June 1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Also, their status is defined in two other international conventions: first comes the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries adopted on 04th of December 1989 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/44/34, entered into force on 20th of October 2001 and, secondly, Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, entered into force on 22nd of April 1985. Since the mercenary conventions appropriate delimitation for mercenary term that is comparable to that established in Article 47 of Protocol I, I shall use that definition.

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A mercenary is any person who:

a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict

b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities

c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; Figures reported on the RSM official website on the same placemats as the total figures of RSM troops (see below notes 11 to 16). Ian S. Livingston, Michael O’Hanlon: “Afghanistan index”, Brookings Institute, 10th of February 2015.

d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; Figure reported on November 15, 2010 on International Security Assistance Force official website. See it at (last visited on 25th of April 2015).

e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.”

One is possible to be framed as mercenary, if, cumulatively, fall under all these six conditions. This definition is simply too restrictive and infeasible. It’s an undisputable reality that nowadays international conflicts are supported by many countries around the world. And, also, take into account that there is not only a probability, but certitude that the majority of these private security companies’ employees are nationals of a party to the conflict - subparagraph (d). So, after all, Geoffrey Best was right in his statement about the huge opportunity of driving through the stipulations of this definition. Figure reported on December 04, 2012 on International Security Assistance Force official website. See it at (last visited on 25th of April 2015). Figure reported on December 01, 2013 on International Security Assistance Force official website. See it at (last visited on 25th of April 2015). Figure reported on November 07, 2014 on International Security Assistance Force official website. See it at (last visited on 25th of April 2015).

Analyzing the status of private military companies' employees usually stops with framing them if they qualify as mercenaries. But this assessment doesn’t answer the question of how private military companies’ employees are allowed to behave in conflict situations. If it’s tried to regulate the PMCs status, it is imperious to deliberate upon whether their employees are civilians or combatants.

Combatants are “members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains), that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities”. Being a combatant exempts one from any criminal charges (such as killing an enemy), as long as his behavior doesn’t break international humanitarian law norms and, furthermore, grants him prisoner of war status.

Since PMCs employees are not members of the regular armed forces, the conclusion is that they cannot be assimilated to combatants, so they do not benefit of a prisoner of war status, fact specifically mentioned in the Protocol I to Geneva Conventions, first paragraph of article 47.

From international humanitarian law point of view, somebody can be a combatant or a civilian. Therefore PMCs employees may be assimilated with civilians. But a civilian is defined as “any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons” defining combatants. But many PMCs employees take direct part in hostilities while others, although they do not directly take part in hostilities, they bring a certain advantage to the war effort, depriving them, even more, of a possible civil status. But nobody is allowed to breach the norms of international humanitarian law and, so, these civilian contractors may be trialed under their national jurisdiction and in accordance with the national norms on mercenarism (if that certain state has specific norms incriminating mercenarism).

With the increasing use of private military companies’ personnel around the world, now more than ever it’s necessary to regulate their activity.

There is much confusion over human rights mistreatments executed by private military companies. All these non-state entities must be accountable for violations of human rights and is, also, necessary to show the responsibility of individuals under international humanitarian law. One option for building human rights legally stringent for private military companies is to concept them as institutionalized agencies. Another way is to write human rights stipulations promptly into contracts assumed with these PMCs. These solutions do not necessarily represent the law as it stands now, but rather reflect the direction in which the law should go.

Another idea would be to create a convention that would specify the minimum control standards, such as a new system of granting the functioning license that would include an exact list of the activities performed by a specific PMC.

CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Being motivated by their own profit, it seems that private military companies will remain an integrate part of the security environment in the predictable future and it is an unquestionable need of improving the regulations, either by national or international measures. It’s understandable why they will always have pretenders for employment, since after the end of The Cold War and the completion of the world’s bipolarity, once the armies start reducing their personnel, there is a large amount of specialized military work force, especially former special operations fighters that found themselves in harsh financial situation.

These private military companies operate in extremely obscure circumstances where the border between a legal behavior and an illegal combat conduct is difficult to be identified.

Individuals carrying and using weapons or fulfill other essential military functions, under any circumstances they cannot be framed as civilians. Those individuals carrying weapons can permutate in an effortless manner from a defensive to an offensive posture and can perpetrate human rights violations. They cannot be assessed to combatants or supporting the combatants under international humanitarian law either, since they are not part of the armed forces or in the chain of command, and often belong to a large number of different nationalities. PMCs employees cannot, mostly, be considered to be mercenaries in the sense given by the definition of mercenaries as stipulated in the international conventions.

Private military and security companies operate in a legal vacuum: they pose a threat t ocivilians and to international human rights law and this happen when PMCs stop taking orders and start taking over. Once the military’s stretchiness it’s increasing more and more, day by day, the more governments are going to hand over many of their functions to outsourced armies, because for some war is big business and this fact is accepted by some governments and the need to have a clear definition for this category of personnel raises, in order to distinguish them from other categories existing nowadays within a modern battlefield.

Sources include:

1. http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles /2013/05/10/US-Troops-Replaced-by-anOutsourced-Army-in-Afghanistan#page1
2. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/mosl ive/article-1360216/How-make-killing-KabulWestern-security-crisis-Afghanistan.html
3. http://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_arc hive/2010-11-15-ISAF-Placemat.pdf
4. http://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_arc hive/2011-12-08-ISAF-Placemat.pdf
5. http://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_arc hive/2012-12-04-ISAF-Placemat.pdf
6. http://www.nato.int/isaf/placemats_arc hive/2013-12-01-ISAF-Placemat.pdf
7. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ assets/pdf/pdf_2014_11/20141111_141107- ISAF-Placemat-final.pdf
8. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ assets/pdf/pdf_2015_02/20150227_1502- RSM-Placemat.pdf

Why Afghanistan will not become the next Iraq

June 3, 2015 | The Danger Zone

As the Iraq crisis deepens, some commentators have taken to inaccurately comparing it to the situation in Afghanistan. Predictions have been made that, a few years after the withdrawal of international forces, Afghan security forces would crumble in the face of the insurgency and the Taliban would retake most of the southern and eastern provinces.

Then supposedly, the Pakistani Taliban would merge with the Afghan Taliban and together would announce an Islamic State under the leadership of the already declared commander of the faithful, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Subsequently, al-Qaeda and other global jihadist organisations would come back to their old bases in Afghanistan.

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Such predictions are cited by some as a warning to the US against withdrawing from Afghanistan, in light of US President Barack Obama's plans to pull US troops out by the end of 2016.

There are problems, however, with both the comparison and the implied solution - i.e. US troops staying in Afghanistan. Indeed, conditions in the two countries bear some similarities. There are insurgencies in both countries rising up against foreign intervention and an unpopular government. Another is a political divide along ethnic or sectarian lines that has set the ground for the insurgency to attract those excluded from the political process. The third similarity is geopolitics: Both countries are surrounded by neighbours and regional actors who support one side or another in the conflict.

However, there are underlying factors that make the situations in the two countries significantly different and an Iraqi-style scenario in Afghanistan unlikely.

Definable historical patterns

The first factor is history. Iraq's current conflict is too recent to be broken into definable historical patterns. That means there is a risk that the situation might evolve into more chaos. By contrast, the current conflict in Afghanistan is now well into its fourth decade and it can be divided into distinct periods and fairly definable patterns. Earlier periods saw wild, comprehensive, high-intensity conflict. Now it is much more geographically confined, and far lower in intensity.

Starting with the Saur Revolution that brought a communist cabal to power, ushered in the Soviet invasion of the late 1970s and later provoked a popular jihad against the invaders in the 1980s, to the bitter infighting among the mujahideen or fighters in the 1990s, through the Taliban's civil war to the current insurgency, the conflict has gradually become less lethal.

For example, more than 25,000 people were reportedly killed in a single event in the Herat uprising in 1979. For the past 13 years, the conflict has killed between 50,000 and 60,000 people. By contrast, Iraq's death toll has reached well over 200,000 people since the US invasion in 2003, according to the Costs of War project.

From an Afghan point of view, Iraq now appears to be at the same point as when the Taliban - like the Islamic State today in Iraq - rose against the corrupt and powerless government of the mujahideen whose warlords and commanders had regularly oppressed the population.

Afghanistan will not be taken over by the Taliban again, as the current situation in the country is very different from the mujahideen's rule in the 1990s. In this sense, if the Taliban try an offensive, the general Afghan population will not see them as saviours from chaos once again and will not concede to their rule. In fact, most indicators point in the other direction. Afghanistan has seen a significant socio-economic and political transformation since the 1990s: an improved economy, growing urbanisation, improved governance, and greater access to health care, schools and universities for the general population.

Different divides

The second factor making Afghanistan different from Iraq is the fault lines of the conflict. In Iraq, sectarianism is probably the key driver of conflict. The rampant pro-Shia chauvinism of the Baghdad government has provoked anti-government sentiment within the Sunni population, which has created a supportive environment for militant groups, such as the recently renamed Islamic State.

Afghanistan, by contrast, has no such politically relevant sectarian divide that could be exploited by Sunni extremists. Instead, Afghanistan is susceptible to ethnic divisions, but these are much less potent than Iraq's sectarianism.

In Iraq, the Islamic State group is driven by a deeply sectarian ideology - with a regional slant - that makes it far more violent; it also sees itself as part of a broader, ideological struggle, not confined to Iraqi or Syrian borders. The Taliban, on other hand, although Sunni, strive to shun sectarian and ethnic overtones from their discourse, promoting a more political and patriotic narrative for the cause. When there were sectarian attacks in late 2011 - the twin bombing of Ashura commemorations in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif, which killed about 60 people, the Taliban swiftly condemned it.

Because of the absence of the sectarian factor, there is a potential for the Taliban's political grievances to be addressed far more easily through political accommodation as opposed to the agenda of the Islamic State group.

Geopolitical differences

The third factor is geopolitics. Like Iraq, Afghanistan is flanked by largely unhelpful neighbours and regional actors vying for a stake in its affairs. Iraq, however, lies exactly in the heart of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for regional influence exacerbated by sectarian tendencies in both nations. Afghanistan, too, is seen as another theatre of rivalry between the two, but not as relevant or important to either as Iraq is.

It seems that the more chaotic and internationally unmonitored a conflict becomes, the more regional actors get a chance to get involved. There is no indication of a waning in Saudi or Iranian regional ambitions in the wars in Syria and Iraq and there is no international action that might stop them. This heated, open regional struggle finds good proxies in Iraq.

In Afghanistan, one could argue that it is the wider Pakistan-Indian conflict - rather than, say Pakistan and Iran - that has helped drive the war, although it is only Pakistan which provides safe haven and support to the Taliban.

The conflict in Afghanistan has become much more restrained recently, which does not allow much room for outside intervention. Furthermore, the strong disinclination of both the government in Kabul and of the Taliban to be seen as puppets of regional actors keeps in check any ambitions regional players might have. Apart from these internal dynamics, the whole region, including Pakistan, is fearful of destabilising the country again. Particularly, bringing back Taliban rule benefits no country in the region.

Geography has one more consequence. Unlike Iraq, which enjoys open routes for foreign militants from the region, especially from Syria, to cross into the country, accessibility for foreign militants who want to enter Afghanistan is limited. The lack of easy routes into Afghanistan, combined with the Taliban keeping a fairly effective monopoly over the insurgency, makes it difficult for a surge of foreign fighters in Afghanistan taking over and controlling the militant group. With lesser leverage for the regional players, and the difficulty of foreign militants crossing into Afghanistan, the conflict should continue to remain a political struggle with reasonably defined goals, one where the insurgents could be accommodated through a political settlement - should there be genuine willingness on both sides.

A potential surge of extremists bent on taking large swathes of Afghanistan and plunging the country into chaos looks unlikely. Therefore Afghanistan is not comparable with Iraq. This would be the case even if there were no consensus government formed in Kabul in the aftermath of the presidential elections. A prolonged conflict as a result of such a scenario will still remain limited in its impact and lethality, and confined within a political framework. Even then, a Taliban takeover would be impossible.

Article by: Borhan Osman is a researcher and analyst with the Afghanistan Analysts Network in Kabul. Follow him on Twitter: @Borhan

Iraq — Afghanistan Contractor Census, FY 2nd quarter (Feb – Apr 2015)

May 22, 2015 | OVERSEAS INTEL, The Danger Zone

BACKGROUND: This report updates DoD contractor personnel numbers in theater and outlines DoD efforts to improve management of contractors accompanying U.S. forces. It covers DoD contractor personnel deployed in Afghanistan (Operation Freedom’s Sentinel) and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

KEY POINTS: In 2nd quarter FY 2015, USCENTCOM reported approximately 45,400 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR. This total reflects a decrease of approximately 9.3K from the previous quarter. A breakdown of DoD contractor personnel is provided below

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Afghanistan Summary

The distribution of contractors in Afghanistan by mission category are:

Base Support: 4,069 (13%)
Commo Support 2,419 ( 8%)
Construction: 1,707 (6%)
Logistics/Maintenance 11,194 (36%)
Security 1,525 (5%)
Training 863 ( 3%)
Translator/Interpreter 1,732 ( 6%)
Transportation 3,171 (10%)
Medical/Dental/Social Services 111 ( .3%)
Management/Administrative 3,819 (12%)
Other 210 ( .7%)

Total: 30,820

OEF Contractor Posture Highlights:

o In 2nd quarter FY15 there were approximately 30.8K DoD contractors in Afghanistan. The overall contractor footprint in Afghanistan decreased by 22.2% from 1st quarter FY15.
o The reduction of the US and TCN contractor population in Afghanistan continues to meet targeted goals.
o Fewer operating locations are leading to reduced contracted support

Iraq

• Operation Inherent Resolve Contractor Posture.

o As of 2nd quarter 2015, there are approximately 6,300 contractors supporting US government operations in Iraq. About 600 of those contractors are supporting DoD funded contracts primarily performing translator/interpreter, transportation, logistics, and maintenance functions.

General Data on DoD Private Security Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan

• Private security contractors (PSC) perform personal security, convoy security, and static security missions.

• USCENTCOM reports, as of 2nd quarter FY 2015, the following distribution of PSCs in Afghanistan:

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• In Afghanistan, the mobile security functions are the responsibility of the Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF). Under an agreement between USFOR-A/ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Defense Department will temporarily use contractors for static security

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Improvements to Management and Oversight of DoD Contractors

• Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC). The USFOR-A OCSIC (formerly the OCS Drawdown Cell) was established in August 2012 with a mission to manage the programmatic drawdown of contracts, the contractor workforce and associated equipment in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A). Through the efforts of its Program Management Integration and Regional Teams, the OCSIC influenced requirements reduction in the CJOA-A resulting in a decrease of boots on ground contractors. Lessons learned from implementation of the OCSIC informed recent revision of doctrine (JP 4-10) on the OCS Integration Cell. The OCSIC continues to review and coordinate government furnished life support (GFLS) requests, track and report contractor numbers and contractor managed government owned (CMGO) equipment, and review and assess contracts and contracted support across multiple portfolios/functional areas.

• CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC). C-JTSCC has centralized oversight and authority to ensure all contracts executed in Afghanistan are visible and in compliance with contracting policy and procedures. In coordination with the OCSIC, CJTSCC is evaluating local vendor capability to perform critically needed services previously provided by LOGCAP, but on a much smaller scale. This will ensure support to the warfighter continues while simultaneously reducing the number of US and other country national contractors. Army personnel, to include the Senior Contracting Official (SCO) completed their deployment in March. These personnel will fulfill USARCENT’s role as the Lead Service for Contracting (LSC) and support the transition from a C-JTSCC to a LSC o/a June 2015.

• JP 4-10 (Operational Contract Support). The Joint Staff J4 has updated JP 4-10 Operational Contract Support, which serves as the doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing OCS integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations. This update to OCS doctrine was published on 16 July 2014.

• Defense Standards for Security Services.

o Pursuant to Section 833 of the FY2011 NDAA, compliance with American National Standard ANSI PSC.1-2012, “Quality Management Standard for Private Security Company Operations” is required in all DoD contracts for private security services. The requirements and guidance of this standard implement all PSC relevant provisions of US law, Defense Directives and instructions, and promoted consistency with international agreements. Demonstrated compliance with this standard will facilitate identifying technically acceptable contractors and best value. This will enable expedited contract award; mitigate risk of delay of services due to contract award protests; and mitigate risk of contractor non-performance or misconduct in critical early phases of contingency operations. The United Kingdom also requires compliance with this ANSI PSC standard.

o In March, 2014, an international (ISO) version of this standard was approved by ISO for pre-publication review. This standard will enable international acceptance of the standards in use by the United States and the United Kingdom, increasing consistency and legal compliance in the provision of all PSC services everywhere. This will improve competition and manage risk associated with operational environments which will include PSCs not under the direct control of US or coalition forces. Final approval by ISO and release for publication is expected in June 2015.

• Operational Contract Support (OCS) Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB). This senior executive–level governance forum was chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in March 2010 to provide strategic leadership to multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize OCS. Co-Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support and Vice Director for Logistics, Joint Staff J4, the FCIB convenes quarterly or as required. On February 24, 2015, the FCIB convened the Second Quarter FY15 Principals meeting. The Board received the following information briefs:

o Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE U.S. Army Lead Service for Contracting Update

o Joint Staff J4 Staff Assistance Visit to USAFRICOM

o OCS Joint Exercise 2015 o Joint Proponent Assessment Working Group Update

o USTRANSCOM Contractor Vetting Program The Third Quarter FY15 OCS FCIB Principals meeting will be held on May 19, 2015.

• Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO).

Planning, implementation, and oversight of OCS are Commander's responsibilities and are essential to establishing a strategy for managing contractors on the battlefield as part of the DoD Total Force. JCASO provides the Combatant Commands a joint enabling capability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize OCS during peacetime, contingency operations, and post-conflict operations. JCASO is an essential part of DLA's combat support agency (CSA) role to support the mission objectives of the combatant commands, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Title 10 responsibilities, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense for OCS policy development and implementation. Examples of current JCASO engagements include:

o Deploying teams for 6-month rotations to support the OCS Integration Cell (OCSIC) and provide expertise in the drawdown efforts;

o Leading and managing the economic development initiative (i.e., local procurements) in the Central Asian States in support of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) strategy in the USCENTCOM AOR, and in Africa in support of USAFRICOM;

o Establishing the Afghanistan Contract Transition Workgroup (ACTW) to facilitate the interagency coordination for planning and transitioning OCS from DoD to DOS;

o Participating in joint exercises (e.g., OCS Joint Exercise and AUSTERE CHALLENGE) to integrate OCS in training and assess the effectiveness of OCS plans;

o Assessing the JCASO mission and organization to validate support effectiveness and alignment with the DOD OCS Action Plan 2014-2017;

o Supporting ARCENT in establishing and developing an OCS cell, related policy, processes and products;

o Providing OCS support as requested or directed to CCMDs, Service components, and others, including HA/DR such as Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE;

o Developing the CONOPS and SOP for collecting and advancing OCS joint lessons learned;

o Assessing OCS integration with partners external to DoD to identify gaps and propose concepts or solutions for improvement to better align with JF 2020;

o Working with OCS peers to draft procedures and policy for joint planning to identify how OCS transitions from contingency operations to steady state and redeployment;

o Delivering the OCS module in the Joint Logistics Course at the Army Logistics University;

o Participating in GAO interviews to share information on JCASO’s enabling capability relative to OCS lessons learned, and OCS planning and execution in USAFRICOM;

o Developing a manpower strategy to fulfill a demand for OCS skills at the combatant commands and Service components.

• JCASO Contingency Contracting and Local Procurement: JCASO provides a joint contingency contracting capability by extending and leveraging DLA’s extensive contracting capabilities while simultaneously complementing the Services’ capacities. It furthers best practices through a programmatic approach, and is expected to focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contract support. JCASO also leads and manages the economic development initiatives (i.e., local procurement) to build partnership capacity with the whole-of-government and industries. JCASO responds to demand signals from Combatant Commands and deployed forces, such as providing contingency contracting support in Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE, the USCENTCOM Central Asia States (CAS) local sourcing procurement initiative, and the DLA-E/A and USAFRICOM initiative to help leverage existing DLA contracts and develop new contract solutions that address USAFRICOM’s evolving mission.

• JCASO Planners. Seventeen (17) JCASO planners are allocated among the Geographic Combatant Commands to assist commanders in identifying gaps where a contracted support capability may be required. Planners integrate contracted support into operational plans and synchronize requirements with subordinate commands, the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, other USG Agencies, and coalition partners. The planners have been instrumental in integrating OCS into Combatant Command plans. Based on demonstrated need for additional OCS planning capability in USPACOM, JCASO also established OCS planners at forward locations in USFK and USFJ.

• SPOT Configuration Control Board (CCB). ODASD(PS), as the functional sponsor for SPOT, co-chairs a quarterly CCB. This Board evaluates proposed enhancements to SPOT and prioritizes implementation to ensure consistency within funding parameters. Membership includes participants from across the DoD OCS community, DOS, and U.S. Agency for International Development.

• Operational Contract Support (OCS) Learning Framework. The Department continues to make progress on the Secretary’s and the Chairman's vision for OCS education and training. Several parallel efforts are underway to incorporate OCS into a holistic learning framework that includes education, individual and collective training, exercises, and lessons learned primarily aimed at non-acquisition personnel.

o OCS in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The Joint Staff (J7) has revised CJCSI 1800.01E, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)”. It now includes learning areas incorporating OCS into 3 of the 5 levels of PME/JPME (IAW 10 USC § 2151): Intermediate / JPME-I; Senior / JPME-II; and CAPSTONE. It is expected to be promulgated in January 2015. Further, as part of the process for accreditation of joint education (PAJE) visits, the Joint Staff J7’s Joint Education Division queries JPME institutions on their inclusion of OCS in curricula. Joint Staff (J4) OCS and Services Division (OCSSD) has begun work on Version 3.0 of the OCS Curriculum Development Guide (CDG) to fully integrate the OPMEP changes and offer JPME institutions guidance and options for teaching OCS. The Joint Staff (J4) continues to brief faculty of JPME schools on developments in OCS as part of the Joint Faculty Education Conference held annually. The Joint Staff (J4) has worked with the Joint Combined Warfare School of the Joint Forces Staff College for specific inclusion of OCS topics in their curriculum as they concentrate on joint planning with a throughput of 1200 students per year. Beginning in 2015, JCWS will dedicate 1 hour to OCS during the 2 week introductory phase of the course and then continue to “pull the OCS thread” throughout the rest of the 8 weeks of Campaign Planning, Contingency Planning and Crisis Action Planning.

o Lessons Learned. The Department is working to address the findings from the forthcoming Government Accountability Office’s report on lessons learned. The Joint Staff (J4), OCSSD is also working with the JCASO to document and implement an OCS Lessons Learned Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for collecting, analyzing, and processing OCS lessons at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. The CONOPS and SOP will use and leverage DOD’s official system of record for lessons learned, the Joint Lessons Learned Information System.

o Exercises. The second OCS Joint Exercise (OCSJX-15) was two-phased and took place at Ft. Bliss, Texas and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii between 10 March and 12 April. The exercise trained over 1,100 participants on the OCS tasks for Contract Support Integration, Contracting Support, and Contractor Management. The OCSJX-15 scenario was based on the TALISMAN SABRE scenario in the USPACOM area of responsibility. The training audience included OCS staff members from USPACOM, USPACAF, US Army Expeditionary Contracting Command's 412th Contract Support Brigade, US Air Force and Navy contracting personnel. Other key DOD stakeholders that participated were: USACE, DLA JCASO, DASD-PS, and DPAP. Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom also participated. Planning for OCSJX-16 in USAFRICOM has already begun.

o Collective and Staff Training. The Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance Notice (CJCSN 3500.01) provides annual guidance to all DOD Components for planning, executing, and assessing joint training for three consecutive years. It includes High Interest Training Issues (HITIs) which are CJCS special-interest items that CCDRs should consider for emphasis in their training and exercise programs. OCS considerations are reflected in the “Ethics, Values, and Leadership” HITI, the “Joint Logistics Enterprise” HITI, and the main document as part of efforts to realize Joint Force 2020. The Joint Staff (J4) is in the final staffing of revised Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs) for OCS, which incorporate lessons learned from OCSJX-14 and new doctrine on OCS from Joint Publication 4-10 (16 July 2014). The updated UJTs will be published in a revised Joint Metrics and Readiness (JMR) Guide in 2015. The Guide assists planners in integrating OCS into joint training and exercises to help ensure realistic readiness assessments for OCS.

o Individual Training. ODASD (PS) and OCSSD are working together to update the three joint OCS computer-based courses initiated in 2009. The three courses were “joint training certified” in 2013 and are hosted on JKO, the joint community’s web portal for providing key joint training. As of 30 September 2014, 1623 personnel have completed these joint certified OCS courses. In addition to the JKO courses and Contracting Officer’s Representative training, the Joint Staff (J4) OCSSD is teaching a Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) at the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) via mobile training teams (MTTs). JOPEC has since been taught at every GCC in FY 2014, a cycle that will continue in FY 2015. 294 students have been trained to-date. An additional 150 students are expected to complete JOPEC in FY 2015. JOPEC received its joint certification on 15 December 2014.The JS J4 is seeking to permanently establish JOPEC at a JPME institution or a joint training center.

o On February 25, 2015 Army Logistics University (ALU) began utilizing a revised Army OCS course program of instruction. Approved by the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in January 2014, the new course places greater emphasis on mission analysis, requirements development and OCS across the joint force. TRADOC recently examined the Army’s OCS course curriculum as part of ALU’s accreditation review, and the course earned high marks from evaluators. In addition, ALU has hired two additional instructors, with plans to hire more in the near future.

• OCS Planning. Using the guidance found in the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03 Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, the Combatant Commands continue to document and expand their OCS planning efforts and products. The Joint Staff (J4) is developing a separate manual, CJCSM 4301.01A, Planning OCS, to assist OCS planners in developing procedures and guidance that integrate, synchronize, prioritize, and focus OCS capabilities on achieving a supported commander’s operational objectives and desired effects for the various types of plans. The Joint Staff J4 is actively involved in the review of Combatant Command Contingency and Operational Plans, as a member of the Joint Planning Execution Community (JPEC).

• OCS Joint Concept. JROC Memorandum 159-13, approved the OCS Joint Concept, and JROCM 060-14 approved implementation thereof as part of the OCS Action Plan. This concept envisions that contracted support for military operations will be an interdependent capability of Joint Force 2020 (JF 2020). This concept addresses how JF 2020 can operationalize OCS to optimize contracted support capabilities of the total force partners to achieve operational effects across the range of military operations within acceptable and manageable risk levels. It builds upon ongoing efforts to institutionalize OCS in the present force and proposes a full spectrum doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and personnel capability solution framework to deliver more responsive and accountable OCS. The OCS Joint Concept implementation tasks were incorporated into the OCS Action Plan by the FCIB in February 2014. The OCS Mission Integrator (OMI) is the key solution element of the OCS JC. The OMI will provide combatant commanders, joint task forces and components unprecedented capability to integrate OCS across joint functions and into contracting efforts to optimize Total Force capabilities. The JS J4 has partnered with U.S Pacific Command (USPACOM) to conduct a three-year demonstration to assess the OMI’s performance under operational conditions. The demonstration started in June 2014 and is progressing through the initial training and integration phase. The initial phase of the demonstration will culminate with successful completion of OCJX 15 in April and Talisman Sabre 15 in July 2015.

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