"He's winning Afghans over with the assumption that he's close to [Donald] Trump," said one well-informed Afghan, adding that many of Prince's ideas feed into frustration with and within the Afghan military, particularly given its high casualty rate.

But Prince also sparked what Ghani, in a statement Thursday, condemned as "a debate" within the country over "adding new foreign and unaccountable elements to our fight."

"Under no circumstances," the statement said, will Afghanistan "allow the counterterrorism fight to become a private, for-profit business."

At the Pentagon, the head of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. Joseph Votel, told reporters that "I absolutely do not agree" with Prince's contention that he could win the war more quickly and for less money with a few thousand hired guns.

In addition to such a plan violating signed agreements with the Afghan government, Votel said, "the most significant downside is that we turn our national interest over to contractors." Quoting earlier comments by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, Votel said, "I don't think this is a very good strategy."

What has given new life to the plan is a widespread belief in Kabul and Washington that Prince has a willing audience in President Trump, who is known to be frustrated with the cost and slow progress of the strategy he adopted a year ago — a belief buttressed by the White House's refusal to reject the idea out of hand.

"We are constantly assessing our strategies, and are open to new approaches that would help us achieve our strategic objectives," a spokesperson for the National Security Council said Thursday in response to questions about whether Prince's proposal was under consideration.

The spokesperson, who cited White House ground rules in refusing to be named, also noted that Trump said this summer that he was "not reviewing an Erik Prince plan." That comment, in an August interview with Reuters, came the day after Trump national security adviser John Bolton, asked the same question, told ABC News that "I'm always open to new ideas."

Administration officials, and several people familiar with U.S. and Afghan government thinking who spoke on the condition of anonymity about sensitive policymaking, said there was no firm indication that Trump, while clearly impatient about a war he once vowed to quickly win, is prepared to jump ship. But several noted they would not be surprised to wake up one morning to a presidential tweet saying the opposite.

Prince's appearance in Afghanistan, along with interviews he has given over the past several weeks, coincided with a perception that the war, again, is going badly. Taliban fighters scored several at least temporary victories over the summer, and Votel acknowledged Thursday that Afghan military casualties had increased over last year.

Clearly sensing vulnerability in Ghani, whose term expires next year, a Prince spokesman, Marc Cohen, on Thursday called him "corrupt, inept," and said his government was bilking the American taxpayer "to the tune of $62 billion per year while standing by as Afghans continue to get slaughtered."

Prince, now in Washington to drum up backing for his plan, concluded during his recent trip to Kabul that Ghani's "support is dwindling and he's increasingly isolated," Cohen said.

Responding in kind, Qadir Shah, spokesman for Ghani's National Security Council, accused Prince of having a "colonialist type of arrogance" and called him "a war profiteer who stands to make $10 billion a year from such a plan."

"There is consensus amongst our political leadership and people that it's a terrible idea," Shah said. "It will never happen."

Prince, the brother of U.S. Education Secretary Betsy DeVos and a substantial contributor to Trump's presidential campaign, is a former Navy SEAL who has made a controversial career out of providing security for hire to the United States and others. Since severing his ties to Blackwater — the company he founded that was accused of heavy-handed practices, including the killing of civilians, while under U.S. contract in Iraq — Prince has cycled through several iterations of the same business and now runs a Hong Kong-based company called Frontier Services.

Making his home at least part time in the United Arab Emirates, he has also been a figure of note in special counsel Robert Mueller III's investigation of Russian election interference, after The Washington Post reported last year that he held a UAE-arranged meeting with a representative of President Vladimir Putin in the Seychelles in January 2017. Prince later testified that the meeting was a chance encounter and that he was not representing Trump in any way.

Prince first brought his proposal to the White House early last year, reportedly with the backing of Trump's then-adviser Stephen Bannon. It was quickly rejected by Mattis and then-national security adviser H.R. McMaster, who were pushing for a plan, ultimately approved by Trump, to increase U.S. forces.

Trump "was close to making a decision in our favor last year" and was reluctant about the McMaster strategy, Prince said in an August interview with The Hill. "And so now that the anniversary [of the new strategy] is coming up yet again . . . the question is, does [Trump] default to the same failed policies of the last 17 years, or does he exercise civilian leadership of the military and go to a sustainable path?"

Bannon is now gone from the White House, but so is McMaster and former secretary of state Rex Tillerson, who joined Mattis in trying to shut the door permanently on Prince.

Prince's appearance last week in Afghanistan came as the new top U.S. officer there, Gen. Austin "Scott" Miller, began carrying out an informal review of the U.S. mission. The Pentagon is not expected to recommend major changes to the strategy adopted last year, which moderately increased the number of U.S. troops to more than 14,000, loosened restrictions on airstrikes and called for a stricter stance toward neighboring Pakistan's alleged support for terrorism and provision of sanctuaries to the Taliban.

In recent months, the administration has pressed for reconciliation with the Taliban, sending senior officials to meet with their representatives in Qatar and appointing veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, as its special envoy tasked with jump-starting talks between the militants and the Afghan government.

Among others during his visit, according to several officials and informed individuals in Kabul, Prince met with Ghani's current and former intelligence chiefs, the current interior minister and his deputy, as well as a number of senior officials, some of whom left government in disputes with Ghani.

In a lengthy interview last week on Afghanistan's Tolo TV, Prince sharply criticized U.S. strategy, particularly the frequent rotation of American units, as well as what he described as the use of conventional tactics against an unconventional enemy and the lack of dependable air cover. Instead, he outlined a contractor force of about 6,000, drawn from former U.S. and European special forces, 3,600 of whom would be designated as "adjuncts" to Afghan units on the ground, serving under Afghan rules of engagement.

If the contractors did something wrong, he said, they should be prosecuted under American military law. Prince took sharp exception to the Tolo interviewer's description of the contractors as "mercenaries," saying they would not count as such under an unspecified "United Nations definition."

Prince has put the cost of his plan, which he has said would leave about 2,000 U.S. Special Operations troops on the ground and utilize contractor aircraft, at about $5 billion a year. Within six months, he told Tolo, "you would have a very different situation on the ground. I will commit to that."

Lamothe reported from Kabul. The Washington Post's Syed Salhuddin in Kabul and Missy Ryan in Washington contributed to this report.

https://www.stripes.com | Stars & Stripes

What happened next isn’t entirely clear. But the conversation ended with a bang and Woods dropped to the floor with a gunshot wound in his torso.

Woods filed a lawsuit this summer in Illinois’ Cook County circuit court, claiming that “horseplay with a loaded firearm” caused him serious and permanent injuries and pain. The suit alleges that Barrett and his employer, Triple Canopy, were negligent. Woods is seeking more than $100,000.

Triple Canopy’s lawyers say that the company and Barrett were under the Army’s “operational control,” which grants them protection under federal laws, including one that shields the military from state civil suits arising out of wartime activities. However, Woods wants to sue at the state level, where courts wouldn’t consider Triple Canopy’s arguments under federal law.

In August, Woods’ case went to federal court to decide whether he can sue at the state level. Woods’ lawyers have argued that Triple Canopy’s interpretation of federal law shielding the company and Barrett is too broad and doesn’t protect against claims of simple negligence.

Triple Canopy is part of Constellis, formerly Blackwater, which is also named in Woods’ lawsuit. A status hearing will be held next month.

An Army investigation obtained by Stars and Stripes provides more details of the incident, minus names. Court documents Woods filed about the same time included an unredacted section identifying him and Barrett.

The shooting, which officials believe was a negligent discharge, occurred Dec. 19, 2016, on Bagram’s Camp Alpha, an area of the base largely reserved for special operations personnel.

Woods, Barrett and two others — an enlisted soldier and a contractor — were on shift inside the camp’s Base Defense Operations Center, or BDOC, a hub for monitoring security systems, camera feeds and radio traffic.

Investigators found no evidence of foul play, and Woods and Barrett were said to get along like brothers. But witness accounts suggest the shooting was the result of carelessness following high jinks by those charged with overseeing the base’s security.

‘Culture of complacency’

The shooting came at a grim time on the sprawling U.S. base, as officials faced questions about a suicide bombing weeks earlier, the first to strike the heart of the heavily fortified base. Five Americans were killed and 17 others were wounded in the blast near a Veterans Day gathering.

An Army inquiry into the attack found officials had struggled for months against a “pervasive ‘culture of complacency’ and indiscipline … that permeated the forward operating base,” which at the time was home to over 15,000 troops, contractors and civilians.

Woods’ initial lawsuit seized upon that complacency, citing Barrett’s actions as part of larger security lapses at the base.

“After an inordinate delay in the furnishing of weapons necessary for the provision of static security … in protection of the air base, U.S military personnel and others at Bagram Air Field, the Defendant Triple Canopy and/or the Constellis Defendants failed to provide the necessary and proper training, instruction and/or guidance concerning firearm use and safety … specifically including the Defendant Barrett.”

Woods had arrived there in August 2016 as a platoon leader in Bandit Troop, 1st Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment. A West Point graduate and son of a retired Air Force fighter pilot, he’d joined the unit earlier that year after completing Ranger School.

Barrett began working the afternoon security shift sometime after training in October 2016 at a Triple Canopy facility in Moyock, N.C., said the second contractor, an employee of the same firm.

Earlier in the day, the infantry officer and the former Marine grunt had been debating the “21-foot rule,” a theory about the range from which a knife-wielding assailant can fatally attack someone before the victim can draw and fire a holstered sidearm.

Woods demonstrated rapidly closing such a distance in the office, which measured about 23 feet, advancing on Barrett. The contractor stepped aside without drawing on him.

Debates and boasts about shooting were common, Barrett said, but they were not testing the theory when Woods was shot, he said.

Rather, the Marine vet had bragged that he could shoot better because of the superiority of his Glock 17 — his off-duty weapon while a stateside police officer — compared to the soldier’s Beretta M9, he said.

The lieutenant asked him to hand it over.

‘Piercing gunshot’

Though it held a loaded 17-round magazine, Barrett’s gun should have had an empty chamber. It’s common safety practice to clear a firearm before handing it off.

For the semiautomatic Glock, that would mean dropping the magazine out, locking back the slide and inspecting the chamber and magazine to ensure no round is present.

Barrett recounted performing these steps in a different order, starting by drawing back the slide. This could have chambered a round, making the handgun ready to fire with a pull of the trigger, which is where a Glock’s safety lever is located. The M9’s safety is near its hammer.

Next, while removing the magazine, Barrett said he fumbled the weapon. He and Woods reached out to catch it. Barrett recalled grabbing the magazine in one hand, pistol in the other. He didn’t recall hearing the shot.

“Woods fell into him in almost a hug and (slid) down to the floor,” the investigators wrote, based on Barrett’s sworn statement. “He then noticed blood and asked if (Woods) was hit.”

The next moments were a blur as the other men in the room leapt up to help. More people arrived. Someone ran for a medic.

Barrett opened the soldier’s shirt and held a plastic sheet protector over his chest wound, he said. Woods was rushed to a clinic, then to the base hospital. He underwent surgery and was medically evacuated before dawn for further treatment in Germany.

The enlisted soldier and the second contractor weren’t sure later what their colleagues had been discussing right before the shooting. They’d been facing away, doing paperwork and watching TVs and security camera feeds, until hearing what the soldier called a “piercing gunshot.”

After Woods was carried away, the second contractor gathered the firearm, casing and spent round for evidence. The magazine was in the Glock, he said. Another witness recalled him clearing it and ejecting a second round from the chamber, which suggests the magazine was in the gun when it was fired.

Clearly upset, Barrett asked to speak to Woods and blamed himself for the mishap when speaking to investigators that evening. Officials later barred him from all coalition bases in Afghanistan.

Questioned at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center days afterward, Woods had no memory of the shooting, but said it had probably been an accident and that Barrett “was a good guy and means well.”

Eighteen months later, he filed suit.

[email protected]

Twitter: @chadgarland