A newly surfaced federal lawsuit is reigniting one of the most controversial allegations to emerge from the war in Yemen—that a team of American military veterans was recruited to carry out targeted assassinations on behalf of the United Arab Emirates.
At the center of the case is Anssaf Ali Mayo, a Yemeni politician who claims he was the target of a December 2015 assassination attempt in Aden. His lawsuit alleges that a privately run U.S. team—made up of former elite operators—was deployed to eliminate political figures under the guise of counterterrorism.
According to court filings, the American team was handed a “23-man hit list” shortly after arriving in Yemen. The list reportedly included names and photographs of individuals identified as targets.
The lawsuit claims the list was provided by a uniformed Emirati officer, suggesting direct state involvement. Earlier investigative reporting—most notably by BuzzFeed News—described a nearly identical detail: a set of “23 cards,” each containing a face, name, and limited intelligence on the target.
While the exact circumstances of the handoff differ between accounts, the consistency of the “23 targets” claim across sources has become a focal point of the case.
The Team Behind the Operation
The lawsuit names several former U.S. servicemen, including Abraham Golan, Isaac Gilmore, and Dale Comstock. The group is alleged to have operated under a private entity known as Spear Operations Group.
According to the complaint, the operation was structured as a paid contract, with the team receiving roughly $1.5 million per month, plus bonuses tied to successful killings.
Golan has previously been quoted in media reports acknowledging the existence of a “targeted assassination program” in Yemen, though the legal implications of those statements remain unresolved.
The Attempt in Aden
The first mission, according to the lawsuit, targeted Mayo at a political party office in Aden. The plan allegedly involved detonating explosives to kill everyone inside, followed by small-arms fire to eliminate survivors.
Mayo survived the attack and later fled the country.
His legal team argues the operation was not a lawful military action but an attempted extrajudicial killing—potentially constituting a war crime under international law.
A War Within a War
The allegations unfold against the backdrop of Yemen’s complex civil war, where regional powers—including the UAE—have conducted counterterrorism operations against extremist groups.
The UAE has denied wrongdoing, maintaining that its actions in Yemen were conducted legally and in coordination with allied governments. Officials have consistently framed their role as part of broader counterterrorism efforts, not political repression.
However, human rights organizations and investigative reports have long raised concerns about the use of proxy forces, secret detention sites, and targeted killings in southern Yemen.
Legal and Strategic Implications
The lawsuit, filed in a U.S. federal court, raises serious legal questions:
Can U.S. citizens be held liable for participating in foreign-directed assassination programs?
Did the operation violate U.S. laws governing military services abroad?
Were the targets legitimate combatants—or political opponents?
If proven, the case could expose a gray zone in modern warfare: the outsourcing of lethal operations to private actors operating across national lines.
It also underscores a broader trend in global conflict—the increasing role of private military contractors in missions that blur the line between warfare, intelligence, and covert action.
What Comes Next
For now, the allegations remain just that—claims laid out in a civil complaint, not yet tested in court. The defendants are expected to challenge both the facts and the jurisdiction of the case.
But regardless of the legal outcome, the story has already reopened a deeper conversation about accountability in modern conflict—particularly when state power, private contractors, and covert operations intersect.
In Yemen, where the lines of war have long been blurred, this lawsuit suggests there may have been another layer entirely: a shadow campaign where names were handed over, and missions began before the world ever knew they existed.
When Andrew Milburn launched The Mozart Group in early 2022, the mission was straightforward—bring Western military experience into Ukraine and help train forces preparing for a rapidly escalating war. Built as a small team of veterans, the group entered Ukraine just weeks after the invasion, operating in areas where time, structure, and safety were all limited.
The organization quickly gained attention. Western media framed it as a counterbalance to Russia’s Wagner Group, highlighting its focus on training, evacuations, and support rather than combat. Teams moved between Kyiv and the eastern مناطق, working directly with Ukrainian units that often had only days to prepare before returning to the front. The work was fast, compressed, and conducted close enough to the battlefield that traditional distinctions between training zones and combat zones didn’t really exist.
Despite its visibility, the Mozart Group remained a small operation. At its peak, it consisted of only a few dozen personnel, with each team requiring significant funding to sustain movement, equipment, and operations. Unlike established defense contractors, it lacked long-term contracts or institutional backing, relying instead on private funding and a loosely structured support network.
That structure became one of its biggest weaknesses. The organization operated as a limited liability company while also receiving support through a nonprofit effort, creating confusion about how it was funded and managed. Internally, disagreements between leadership began to grow, eventually escalating into legal disputes between Milburn and co-founder Andrew Bain. The conflict exposed deeper issues—unclear authority, financial strain, and a lack of cohesion behind the scenes.
By early 2023, those internal problems overtook the mission. Funding declined, operations slowed, and leadership disputes made it increasingly difficult to maintain focus. The group ultimately shut down less than a year after it began, not because of failure in the field, but because the structure supporting it could not hold together.
The Mozart Group’s short run in Ukraine highlights a larger shift in how contractor-style operations function in modern conflicts. Unlike Iraq or Afghanistan, Ukraine offers no stable framework for private support. Instead, it demands small, adaptable teams operating in real time, often without the backing or structure needed to sustain long-term operations.
Its rise showed how quickly experienced personnel can make an impact. Its fall showed how difficult it is to maintain that impact without a solid foundation behind it.
IRAN — The U.S. Department of Defense is urgently searching for private contractors capable of delivering prefabricated, hardened shelter systems to protect American personnel as operations against Iran intensify. The request, issued through a “sources sought” notice, highlights the Pentagon’s need for transportable bunkers designed to withstand blast, fragmentation, and ballistic threats.
Contractors are being asked to submit delivery timelines for 3, 15, and 30 days, signaling a strong push for rapid deployment. The shelters must be ready-made and capable of immediate transport to the Aqaba Air Cargo Terminal in Jordan, a key logistics hub supporting U.S. operations in the region.
This move comes as recent attacks—including drone and missile strikes—have exposed vulnerabilities in existing infrastructure, much of which still relies on outdated T-wall barriers and temporary structures. Defense officials and analysts note that many current shelters offer limited protection against modern threats, particularly top-down drone attacks and ballistic missiles.
The notice itself does not guarantee a contract award but is designed to assess industry capability. However, it clearly reflects a broader shift toward faster procurement and improved force protection, as the Pentagon looks to quickly adapt to evolving battlefield threats across the Middle East.
