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Afghanistan Summary

The distribution of contractors in Afghanistan by mission category are:

Base Support: 5,239  (10%)
Commo Support: 1,947 ( 4%)
Construction: 5,222 (10%)
Logistics/Maintenance: 17,914 (35%)
Security: 3,177 ( 6%)
Training: 1,209 ( 2%)
Translator/Interpreter: 3,920 ( 8%)
Transportation: 4,657 ( 9%)
Medical/Dental/Social Services: 253 ( 1%)
Management/Administrative: 4,323 ( 8%)
Other*: 3,628 ( 7%)
Total:  51,489   

*Includes Defense Logistics Agency, Army Materiel Command, Air Force External and Systems Support contracts, Special Operations Command and INSCOM.

• OEF Contractor Posture Highlights:
  • In 3rd quarter FY14 there were approximately 51.5K DoD contractors in Afghanistan.  The overall contractor footprint in Afghanistan decreased by 16.2% from 2nd quarter FY14.
  • New US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Fragmentary Orders directed specific contractor reductions for LOGCAP and other portfolio owners.
  • There will continue to be substantial decline in the contractor population throughout the fiscal year, as a result of base closures and reduced requirements.

General Data on DoD Private Security Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan 

• Private security contractors (PSC) perform personal security, convoy security, and static security missions.

• USCENTCOM reports, as of 3rd quarter FY 2014, the following distribution of PSCs in Afghanistan:

• In Afghanistan, the mobile security functions of the APPF are being transferred to the Ministry of Interior under a convoy protection brigade. Site protection previously under APPF is also under transition. Contracting and payment protocols are still under development.

Improvements to Management and Oversight of DoD Contractors 

• Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC). The USFOR-A OCSIC (formerly the OCS Drawdown Cell) was established in August 2012 with a mission to manage the programmatic drawdown of contracts, the contractor workforce and associated equipment in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A).  Through the efforts of its Program Management Integration and Regional Teams, the OCSIC has influenced requirements reduction in the CJOA-A resulting in a decrease of boots on ground contractors.  Lessons learned from implementation of the OCSIC are being used to inform future doctrine (JP 4-10) on the OCS Integration Cell concept.

• CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC).  C-JTSCC has centralized oversight and authority to ensure all contracts executed in Afghanistan are visible and in compliance with contracting policy and procedures.  In coordination with the OCSDC, C-JTSCC is evaluating local vendor capability to perform critically needed services previously provided by LOGCAP, but on a much smaller scale.  This will ensure support to the warfighter continues while simultaneously reducing the number of US and other country national contractors.
• JP 4-10 (Operational Contract Support).  The Joint Staff J4 has updated JP 4-10 Operational Contract Supportwhich serves as the doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing OCS integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations.  This update to OCS doctrinehas a publication date of July 2014.
• Defense Standards for Security Services. 

o   Business and operational standards for PSCs (which were required by Section 833 of the FY2011 NDAA) are now complete and were validated by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in early March 2012.  The associated conformity assessment to enable third party certification was published in April 2012.  A maturity model, allowing companies and contract management to assess the degree of conformity with the standard, was approved by ANSI in January 2012.  Under sponsorship by DoD, the ANSI standard is now being developed as an international standard to be published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).

o   On May 22, 2012, DoD issued procedures, guidance and information (PGI) to the DFARS requiring compliance with the ANSI PSC standard for combat operations and other contingency operations. Standards and provision for third party certification in Section 833 of the FY 2011 NDAA will facilitate identifying technically acceptable contractors and best value.  This will enable expedited contract award; mitigate risk of delay of services due to contract award protests; and mitigate risk of contractor non-performance or misconduct in critical early phases of contingency operations. Conformity assessment standards and the associated maturity model also provide valuable tools for DoD contract oversight.

o   The United Kingdom has adopted the PSC ANSI standards as their national standard ensuring continuity between the key allies.

• Operational Contract Support (OCS) Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB).

This senior executive –level governance forum was chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) in March 2010 to provide strategic leadership to multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize OCS.  Co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support [DASD (PS)] and Joint Staff, Vice Director J-4, the FCIB convenes quarterly (or as required)).  On June 27, 2014, the USD (AT&L) approved revision of the Board’s charter to strengthen its ability to address enterprise-wide OCS issues.   Key topics in 3rd quarter FY14 reviewed by the Board included:

o   OCS Joint Proponent Assessment

o   Deployable Civilian Requirements for Future Contingencies

o   OCS Integration Cell (OCSIC) – Afghanistan Update

o   OCS Knowledge Integration & Solutions (KIS) Working Group Update

• Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO).  Planning, implementation, and oversight of OCS are Commander's responsibilities and are essential to establishing a strategy for managing contractors on the battlefield as part of the DoD Total Force.  JCASO provides the Combatant Commands a joint enabling capability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize OCS during peacetime, contingency operations, and post-conflict operations.  JCASO is an essential part of DLA's combat support agency (CSA) role to support the mission objectives of the combatant commands, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Title 10 responsibilities, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense for OCS policy and joint doctrine development and implementation.  Examples of current JCASO engagements include:

o   Deploying teams for 6-month rotations to support the OCS Integration Cell (OCSIC)  and provide expertise in the drawdown efforts;

o   Leading and managing the economic development initiative (i.e., local procurements) in the Central Asian States  in support of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) strategy in the USCENTCOM AOR;

o   Establishing the Afghanistan Contract Transition Workgroup (ACTW) to facilitate the interagency coordination for planning and transitioning OCS from DoD to DOS; and

o   Participating in joint exercises in 2014 (e.g., PANAMAX, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN) to integrate OCS in training and assess the effectiveness of OCS plans.

o   Assessing the JCASO mission and organization to validate support effectiveness and alignment with DOD OCS Action Plan 2014-2017.

o   Developing the way ahead for collecting and advancing OCS joint lessons learned.

o   Participating in GAO interviews to share information on JCASO enabling capability relative to OCS lessons learned and OCS planning and execution in USAFRICOM.

o   Developing a manpower strategy to fulfill a demand for OCS-skills at the combatant commands and Service components. 

• JCASO Contingency Contracting Office (CCO):   The JCASO CCO provides a joint contingency contracting capability by extending and leveraging DLA’s extensive contracting capabilities while simultaneously complementing the Services’ capacities.  It furthers best practices through a programmatic approach, and is expected to focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contract support.   The CCO responds to demand signals from Combatant Commands and deployed forces, such as the USCENTCOM Central Asia States (CAS) local sourcing procurement initiative and the DLA-E/A and AFRICOM initiative to help leverage existing DLA contracts and develop new contract solutions that address AFRICOM’s evolving mission.  

JCASO Planners.  Seventeen (17) JCASO planners are allocated among the Geographic Combatant Commands to assist the commander in identifying gaps where contractor support capability may be required.  Planners integrate contractor support into operational plans and synchronize requirements with subordinate commands, the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, other USG Agencies, and coalition partners.  The planners have been instrumental in integrating OCS into Combatant Command plans.  Based on demonstrated need for additional OCS planning capability in USPACOM, JCASO recently established new planners at forward locations in USFK and USFJ. 

• SPOT Configuration Control Board (CCB). ODASD(PS), as the functional sponsor for SPOT, co-chairs a quarterly CCB.  This Board evaluates proposed enhancements to SPOT and prioritizes implementation to ensure consistency within funding parameters.  Membership includes participants from across the DoD OCS community, DOS, and U.S. Agency for International Development.

• Operational Contract Support (OCS) Learning Framework.  The Department continues to make progress on the Secretary’s and the Chairman's vision for OCS education and training. Several parallel efforts are underway to incorporate OCS into a holistic learning framework that includes education, individual and collective training, exercises, and lessons learned primarily aimed at non-acquisition personnel.
  • OCS in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). As reported, OCS has been a Chairman’s JPME Special Area of Emphasis each year since 2009.  A 2012 study on OCS education and training observed a general lack of uniformity and depth in OCS content. To rectify this, Joint Staff (J4) OCS and Services Division (OCSSD) developed an OCS Curriculum Development Guide (CDG) to provide specific OCS learning objectives to help JPME faculty create and integrate effective OCS learning into all five JPME levels.  Version 2.0 of the CDG, which was completed in October 2012, included authoritative reference material, was distributed to JPME institutions in December 2012.  The OCS CDG incorporates distance learning through three Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) OCS courses. The Joint Staff (J4) briefed the faculty of the JPME schools on the FY2013 NDAA language requiring OCS as part of JPME in June 2013 at the Joint Faculty Education Conference. At this point, JPME faculty need time to incorporate OCS into their curricula. The Joint Staff (J4) is reviewing the Joint Combined Warfare School curriculum to make specific recommendations on OCS content needed to meet the CDG’s intent.
  • Lessons Learned. The Department has submitted a comprehensive lessons learned report to the House Armed Services Committee.  For tactical and operational lessons learned, the Joint Staff (J4), OCSSD, is the focal point for documenting and processing lessons through the Joint Lessons Learned Program.
  • Exercises.  The first ever OCS Joint Exercise (OCSJX-14) was held in January 2014 at Ft. Bliss, Texas.  The exercise trained over 500 participants on the OCS tasks for Contract Support Integration, Contracting Support, and Contractor Management. The OCSJX-14 scenario was based on a complex catastrophe in the US NORTHCOM area of responsibility. The training audience included OCS staff members from USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH, US Army Expeditionary Contracting Command's 412^th Contract Support Brigade, US Air Force and Navy contracting personnel.  Other key DOD stakeholders that participated were; FEMA, USACE, DLA JCASO, DASD-PS, DPAP and NGB. Planning for OCSJX-15 at USPACOM is underway, and OCSJX-16 is tentatively planned for USAFRICOM

• Collective and Staff Training. The Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance Notice (CJCSN 3500.01) provides annual guidance to all DOD Components for planning, executing, and assessing joint training for three consecutive years. It includes High Interest Training Issues (HITIs) which are CJCS special-interest items that CCDRs should consider for emphasis in their training and exercise programs.  OCS will be part of the Joint Logistics Enterprise HITI in this year’s notice.  In December 2013, the Joint Staff (J4) released the Joint Metrics and Readiness (JMR) Guide to assist planners in integrating OCS into joint training and exercises to help ensure realistic readiness assessments for OCS and compliance with Joint Training Guidance.

• Individual Training.  DoD created three joint OCS courses in a computer-based training format in 2009.  The three courses were “joint training certified” in 2013 and are hosted on JKO, the joint community’s web portal for providing key joint training.  As of 4 September 2013, 608 personnel have completed these joint certified OCS courses.  In addition to the JKO courses and Contracting Officer’s Representative training, the Joint Staff (J4) OCSSD is teaching a Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) at the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) via mobile training teams (MTTs).  The initial JOPEC pilot was held from 16-25 July 2013 at Fort Lee, VA, and has since been taught at every GCC, and will be taught at the National Capital Region in July 2014. This cycle will continue in FY15.
• ODASD(PS), the Joint Staff J4, and Headquarters DA are working to develop a OCS multi-service course from an existing Army course at the Army Logistics University.  The course roll out projection date is fourth quarter FY15.

• OCS Planning.  On October 18, 2012, the Joint Staff published the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03 Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.  The CJCSM 3130.03 sets forth administrative instructions for joint operation plan formats. Specific to OCS planning, CJCSM 3130.03 details where OCS requirements will be identified and by whom.  The Joint Staff (J4) is developing a separate manual, CJCSM 4301, OCS Planning, to assist OCS planners in developing procedures and guidance that integrate, synchronize, prioritize, and focus OCS capabilities on achieving a supported commander’s operational objectives and desired effects for various types of plans, including contingency plans.
• OCS Joint Concept.  JROC Memorandum 159-13, 7 October 2013, approved the OCS Joint Concept.  This concept envisions that contracted support for military operations will be an interdependent capability of Joint Force 2020 (JF 2020).  This concept addresses how JF 2020 can operationalize OCS to optimize contracted support capabilities of the total force partners to achieve operational effects across the range of military operations within acceptable and manageable risk levels.  It builds upon ongoing efforts to institutionalize OCS in the present force and proposes a full spectrum doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and personnel capability solution framework to deliver more responsive and accountable OCS.  The OCS Joint Concept implementation tasks were incorporated into the OCS Action Plan by the FCIB in February 2014.

Notice that the President did not say that our mission in Afghanistan will end by 2014, only that it will cease to be a "combat" mission and become a "support" mission. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney has since confirmed that President Obama never said US troops would be completely withdrawn by the end of 2014.

Fact 2: There is currently no end date for the war in Afghanistan.

Nowhere in the President's June 2011 speech did he mention a deadline for the full withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, and no date for full withdrawal has been specified since then. In fact, the Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was struck between the United States and Afghanistan in June 2012, provides for a US military presence after 2014, although the magnitude of the presence was not specified.

On November 15, 2012, it was reported that Afghanistan and the United States had begun negotiations for a bilateral security agreement, which will govern the US military presence in Afghanistan post-2014, including how many troops are left in Afghanistan, and for how long.

Fact 3: There is no set plan for removing the remaining 68,000 troops left in Afghanistan.

Not only are there currently twice as many US troops in Afghanistan today as there were when President Obama took office, but the administration has yet to outline a specific plan for removing the 68,000 troops that remain, except that most of them will be removed by the end of 2014. A decision about a scheduled for the removal of these troops will not be made until after a decision is made about the number of residual troops the US will leave in Afghanistan post-2014. However, it has been reported that General John Allen wants to keep over 60,000 US troops until the fall of 2013.

Three options were being considered in March 2012:

1. The drawdown plan said to be favored by Vice President Joe Biden would drawdown troops rapidly, to perhaps 20,000, by the end of 2013.
2. A more gradual drawdown plan calls for removing 10,000 troops by the end of December 2012, leaving 58,000 troops. An additional 10,000 to 20,000 would be removed by June 2013, leaving between 48,000 and 38,000 troops in Afghanistan, still more than were in the country when President Obama took office.
3. Military commanders are said to favor delaying further cuts until the end of 2013, including Lt. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, who was the second-in-command of US forces in Afghanistan until June 2012 and is now the Director of the Joint Staff.

Fact 4: Reports indicate that the Pentagon wants to keep between 6,000 and 20,000 US troops in Afghanistan until at least 2024.

On November 12, 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told reporters that the Obama administration would come to a decision within the next few weeks about the magnitude of the US post-2014 military presence in Afghanistan. Panetta would not comment on the troop levels being considered. Since then, it has been reported that General John Allen, head of the ISAF, has submitted three plans for an enduring US presence in Afghanistan:

1. With 6,000 troops, the focus of the US mission would be on counterterrorism missions, and logistical and training support for Afghan forces would be limited;
2. With 10,000 troops, the US could expand training and logistical support from the 6,000 troop plan;
3. With 20,000 troops, US convential forces could be used to patrol certain areas.

All of these options include troop commitments smaller than the 25,000 troops the Pentagon is said to have favored since Obama's drawdown announcement.

However, just days after General Allen's recommendations made news, the Wall Street Journal reported that President Obama requested three additional proposals in which troop levels did not exceed 10,000. The plans sumbitted by the Pentagon included:

1. A 3,000 troop option, which Pentagon officials strongly warned against;
2. A 6,000 troop option, assumed to be the same as the 6,000 troop option described above;
3. A 9,000 troop option, assumed to be similiar to the 10,000 troop option above.

Out of these three options, the Pentagon is said to favor the 9,000 troop option, while the White House is said to favor the 6,000 troop option.

Keep in mind that there were only 34,000 troops there when Obama took office. If 20,000 troops are kept in Afghanistan after 2014, that means that the net withdrawal would be a mere 14,000 troops. Furthermore, before 2007, troop levels were at roughly 20,000 or less. So leaving 20,000 troops in Afghanistan would be to merely return to 2006 troop levels. Leaving 9,000 or 10,000 troops would be a return to 2003 troop levels.

If the Pentagon gets its way, the US will be at war in Afghanistan for at least 12 additional years--that's one more year than we've been at war to this point. That means that we wouldn't even be at the half-way mark today, let alone nearing the end.

Fact 5: The "support" mission will not necessarily be small, nor will it be free of combat missions.

A "support" mission sure sounds more reassuring than a combat mission, right? Sounds like only a few troops will remain behind to support the Afghan security forces?

Any close reading of the US public position on its post-2014 mission in Afghanistan immediately dispells such consoling thoughts. Just look at the plans General John Allen has proposed for the US enduring presence, listed above. Each of the Pentagon's proposals include a counterinsurgency element. In fact, the 6,000 troop plan, which the White House is said to favor, prioritizes direct counterinsurgency missions over logistical support and training for the Afghan security forces, even though it is supposedly for the latter reason that US officials claim an enduring presence is necessary. Meanwhile, the plan involving the largest amount of troops adds a patrol capacity, which is clearly a combat, not a support, capacity. It is likely that a combat capacity is emphasized in the Pentagon's plans due to a recognition that the Afghan security forces, even after a decade of training, are far from ready to take over security for the country.

Further, the US "support" mission in Iraq serves as an example and a warning for the continued US military presence in Afghanistan. The combat mission in Iraq supposedly ended in August 2010, at which point troop levels were brought down to 50,000. In October 2011, over a year later, there were still about 45,000 troops left in Iraq. Furthermore, these supposedly non-combat troops would engage in combat missions and were described as having a "combat capacity" by administration officials, including former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in which they engage in "targeted counterterrorism operations" and work and fight alongside Iraqi security forces. In light of this, "support" seems to be nothing more than a euphemism for extended combat.

Per a previous agreement between the US and Iraqi governments, all US troops were supposed to leave Iraq at the end of 2011. That didn't stop the Obama administration from trying to pressure the Iraqi government to extend the deadline, allowing the US to leave up to 10,000 troops indefinitely. Fortunately, this plan has been abandoned, and all but about 150 US troops attached to the US Embassy left on time. But a similar fight over keeping to a deadline for withdrawal may erupt in the future over Afghanistan--whenever a deadline is, in fact, established.

Fact 6: Obama's "surge" is not over.

In September 2012, it was widely reported that Obama's "troop surge" in Afghanistan was over, leaving 68,000 troops in the country. But when President Obama took office, there were only roughly 34,000 US troops in Afghanistan. In two "surges", Obama added to this figure over 66,000 additional troops. By reducing the US troop presence by 33,000, his drawdown plan has removed only half the number of troops that he sent to Afghanistan, not all.

Fact 7: There are less than 100 al Qaeda left in Afghanistan--but there are over 600,000 Afghan and international forces there to fight them.

In June 2010, Leon Panetta said that there were less than 100 members of al Qaeda left in Afghanistan. According to the latest Brookings Institute Afghanistan Index, there are about 108,000 international troops in Afghanistan under NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom; 344,108 Afghan Security Forces; 90,000 private Defense Department contractors; and 2,000 private contractors training the Afghan Army. Additionally, there are 150,000 Pakistani troops on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. That's a grand total of 694,108 versus 100. Seems a bit overkill.

Fact 8: The lack of a timetable for withdrawal is a key obstacle in peace negotiations with the Taliban.

Taliban spokesmen have made it quite clear that peace requires a willingness by the US to leave; but the US military has done just the opposite through its negotiations with the Afghan government to keep tens of thousands of US troops in Afghanistan indefinitely.

Fact 9: There is elite support for an expedited withdrawal.

Elite groups ranging from the Afghanistan Study Group, which was endorsed by a large number of national security and Middle East experts, to the New York Timeshave come out in support of an accelerated US military withdrawal from--and oppose an extended military stay in--Afghanistan.

Congress has also expressed support for a quicker withdrawal. On November 30, 2011, the US Senate adopted a measure by voice vote in favor of an accelerated US military withdrawl from Afghanistan. In May 2012, 90 Members of Congress joined Rep. Barbara Lee in calling upon President Obama to expedite the withdrawal. And in November 2012, the Senate voted 62-33 in favor of a measure that calls upon President Obama to continue withdrawing US troops at a steady pace, to end all regular US combat missions in Afghanistan no later than December 31, 2014, and to "take all possible steps" to end such operations earlier.

Fact 10: There is popular support for ending the war now.

Although polls of American public opinion on US withdrawal from Afghanistan tend to conflate the withdrawal of all "combat" troops with the withdrawal of all troops, majorities are still shown to oppose an indefinite US military presence in Afghanistan. A March 2012 Gallop poll reported 50% of Americans in favor of withdrawing all US troops before 2014, with an additional 24% favoring a full withdrawal by the end of 2014. An October 2012 Pew poll found an even greater majority in favor of a quick withdrawal: 60% of Americans said they wanted US troops removed from Afghanistan as soon as possible, while only 35% support leaving US troops there "until the situation stabalizes."

What is perhaps most interesting about some of these polls is that they seem to reflect a general confusion over President Obama's plan for withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Pew poll, for example, reported that 73% of Democrats supported a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan instead of waiting. Yet, 66% of Democrats say that President Obama is handling the removal of US troops "about right."

Also interestingly, the Pew poll reported 25% of Republicans said that President Obama is removing troops too slowly.