AdvanFort has paid $400,000 as bail for the guards. The Indian coastguard detained anti-piracy ship Seaman Guard Ohio on October 12 last year. Later that month, 33 people, including 14 Estonian anti-piracy armed guards, were imprisoned as a result of a preliminary investigation into the vessels alleged illegal entry into Indian waters and several other violations.

Meanwhile, the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) has voiced concerns over what it sees as a worrying trend which has seen various government authorities are criminalizing maritime security operatives.

Across piracy afflicted areas, both in the Indian Ocean and off West Africa, there are increasing concerns that innocent maritime security operatives are being targeted, wrongly arrested and criminalized, states SAMI in a statement released on April 1.

It is deplorable that such individuals are being made to suffer the indignity, uncertainty and distress of arrest and incarceration, especially as the maritime security industry has been at the forefront of efforts to protect seafarers and world trade from piracy.

SAMI CEO Peter Cook says, “We are deeply concerned and strongly condemn this creeping trend of criminalization. Maritime security professionals should not be used as makeweights in political disputes, nor be seen as scapegoats in commercial quarrels. Whether they are former marines, soldiers or police – maritime security operatives are skilled and experienced professionals who should be afforded respect, credit and appreciation for the vital role they have played in tackling piracy.”

The maritime security industry has done all possible to become ever more transparent, accountable and to fit into the global shipping structure. Whether through the development of standards, such as ISO/PAS28007, Rules for the Use of Force or embracing standardized contracts, all this has been done with the goal of delivering excellent service for clients and the wider maritime industry.

Given this positive evolution it is deemed vital that all relevant parties are willing and able to work together to ensure that just as seafarers are protected, maritime security operatives must be afforded the same status, safeguards and recognition.

SAMI is working with relevant stakeholders to promote the need for maritime security operatives to be better protected and supported in the line of duty.

The Budget also reflects the Administration’s efforts to constrain OCO spending in the years beyond 2013. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) established year-by-year caps on discretionary spending for agencies’ base budgets through 2021, reducing the 10-year budget deficit by about $1 trillion. However, the BCA did not limit OCO funding.

Leaving OCO funding unconstrained could allow future Administrations and Congresses to use it as a convenient vehicle to evade the fiscal discipline that the BCA caps require elsewhere in the Budget. With the end of our military presence in Iraq, and as troops continue to draw down in Afghanistan, the Budget proposes a binding cap on OCO spending, as well. From 2013 through 2021, the Budget limits OCO appropriations to $450 billion. Given the need for ample flexibility in budgeting for overseas contingencies, this is a multi-year total cap, rather than
a series of year-by-year caps, and future Congresses may adjust it in the event of a national emergency requiring additional OCO spending.

Transitions from Military to Civilian led Missions

The Budget funded several key efforts in the transition from military to civilian-led missions, including:

• Supporting a smaller number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, down from about 100,000 at the beginning of 2012 to about 68,000 at the beginning of 2013.

• Supporting the continued development and professionalization of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), enabling the ANSF to take increasing responsibility for the security of Afghanistan.

• Laying the groundwork to expand the civilian footprint in Afghanistan as U.S. forces draw down, while focusing civilian assistance on foundational investments in economic growth, reconciliation and reintegration, and capacity building.

• Reducing Iraq-related costs dramatically, reflecting the withdrawal of U.S. troops completed in December 2011.

• Strengthening the State Department’s capacity to manage over 400 essential activities that it has taken over from DOD at Embassy Baghdad and three regional consulates in Iraq.

• Operating police and criminal justice hub facilities and security cooperation sites to continue enhancing Iraqi security forces and civilian ministries.

Reduces Defense Spending in Line with Troop Withdrawals.

The Budget reflects a significant decrease in the OCO request for DOD, from $115.3 billion enacted in 2012 to $88.5 billion requested in 2013. This reflects the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and a 30 percent decline in the number of troops deployed to Afghanistan. Nearly all of these DOD funds support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which is primarily conducted in Afghanistan. For OEF, the Budget funds military operations, incremental personnel costs, force protection, repair and replacement
of damaged equipment, activities to counter and defeat improvised explosive devices, intelligence activities, support for coalition partners, and the training, equipping, and sustaining of the ANSF. To support implementation of the Nation’s new defense strategy, the Budget funds, within the OCO request, the portion of the Army and Marine Corps end strength that DOD will remove from the force within the next five years. This end strength supports current operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but will not be required as troops withdraw.

The Budget provides $2.9 billion to support DOD’s Iraq-related costs, including repair and replacement of equipment leaving the country, replenishment of munitions previously expended in combat, and the operation of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). This is a reduction of about $7 billion from the 2012 enacted level for Iraq. Under the aegis of the U.S. diplomatic mission to Iraq, OSC-I is the cornerstone of the U.S.-Iraqi strategic security partnership and serves as the hub of both security assistance and security cooperation activities, including cooperation on counterterrorism, counterproliferation, maritime security, and air defense.

Provides Department of State and USAID Funding for Civilian-Led Missions.

The Budget reflects the OCO costs associated with Department of State and USAID activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Overall, the 2013 request for OCO represents a decrease of  $2.9 billion from the 2012 enacted level, and reflects a more conservative OCO definition that avoids the risk of inadequate base funding for enduring activities once OCO funding under the proposed cap is exhausted. These 2013 OCO costs are limited to certain near-term operational, security and development components of assistance programs related to stabilization and counterinsurgency operations, protection of civilian personnel, and oversight activities of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan. In Iraq, these temporary operations and assistance programs are necessary to sustain a civilian-led mission; strengthen the capacity of the Iraqi government through police training, criminal justice programs, and military assistance; and ensure the Department and USAID have the necessary resources to support and secure the diplomatic mission. For Afghanistan and Pakistan, unique challenges require near-term stabilization and development assistance to support a responsible security transition in Afghanistan and support Pakistan’s counterinsurgency programs. In Afghanistan, OCO funding will provide the initial infrastructure to maintain the diplomatic platform and security posture as Afghan forces take greater responsibility for security operations.