When ISIS first attacked, the Iraqi army folded, quickly providing ISIS with five heavy divisions of US weaponry (tanks, howitzers, armored vehicles and even helicopters) and three logistic support units’ worth of equipment and munitions.
The Kurds, once a lean and strong fighting force that routinely rebuffed Saddam’s forces, now find themselves outgunned, under-equipped, and overwhelmed. But they do fight, and they fight bravely. The Kurds’ biggest problem is the US State Department blocking them from selling their oil and from buying serious weaponry to protect their stronghold and act as a stabilizing force in the region.

Unfortunately, the DOD has mastered the most expensive ways to wage war, adding only very expensive options to the president’s quiver. Flying off of an aircraft carrier in the north end of the Persian Gulf may be a great demonstration of carrier air power suitable for a high tempo war, but the costs will quickly become staggering, far higher than they need be for what will quickly become a counter-insurgency effort.

As I explain in my book, “Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror,” the private sector has long provided nations around the world with innovative solutions to national defense problems in a variety of ways, from the kinetic to the background logistical support necessary to keep militaries humming. If the old Blackwater team were still together, I have high confidence that a multi-brigade-size unit of veteran American contractors or a multi-national force could be rapidly assembled and deployed to be that necessary ground combat team. The professionals would be hired for their combat skills in armor, artillery, small unit tactics, special operations, logistics, and whatever else may be needed. A competent professional force of volunteers would serve as the pointy end of the spear and would serve to strengthen friendly but skittish indigenous forces.

The American people are clearly war-fatigued. Defeat was already snatched from the jaws of victory by the rapid pullout of US forces in 2009. Afghanistan will likely go the same way after never truly defeating the Taliban. Now the danger of a half-baked solution in Iraq is that if ISIS isn’t rightly annihilated, they will portray their survival as a victory over the forces of civilization; thus, there is no room for half-measures. The longer ISIS festers, the more chances it has for recruitment and the danger of the eventual return of radical jihadists to their western homelands. If the Administration cannot rally the political nerve or funding to send adequate active duty ground forces to answer the call, let the private sector finish the job.

Post submitted by Erik Prince at Frontier Services Group

But instead of Mr Carroll, a former member of the elite Navy SEAL Team Six, being disciplined, Mr Richter was the one sent home. U.S. Embassy officials in Baghdad told him he had to end his investigation and leave Iraq because he was disrupting the security options Blackwater was providing for diplomatic staff, the New York Times reports.

ust over two weeks later, Blackwater contractors opened fire in Baghdad's Nisour Square, allegedly killing 17 civilians and wounding 20 others. The incident caused massive outrage among the Iraqi public and is believed to be one reason Iraqi leaders refused to agree to allow U.S. troops to stay in the country past 2011.

Mr Richter claims: 'Mr. Carroll’s statement was made in a low, even tone of voice, his head was slightly lowered; his eyes were fixed on mine. I took Mr. Carroll’s threat seriously. We were in a combat zone where things can happen quite unexpectedly, especially when issues involve potentially negative impacts on a lucrative security contract.'

Mr Carroll has not commented publicly on the allegations. Despite his abbreviated visit to Iraq, Mr Richter's report paints a damning picture of Blackwater, which was paid more than $1billion to guard American diplomats.

He comments in his report that 'Blackwater contractors saw themselves as "above the law" and actually believed that they "ran the place."'

Mr Ritcher details a pattern of drunken partying by Blackwater contractors, including with female visitors.

In one incident, he describes four guards drunkenly commandeered a $180,000 armored vehicle to drive to a party and then crashed it into a blast barrier.

Contractors kept their weapons in their personal quarters, despite rules against it, and carried all manner of automatic weapons, machine guns and rocket launchers - even when the contractors were not certified to use them, according to the report.

Blackwater guards were also alleged to frequently run Iraqi civilian cars off the road and fire into neighborhoods, sometimes even killing civilians, Mr Richter alleges.

Mr Richter's review also found the company's security operations lacking. The contractor often reduced or otherwise changed the number of men assigned to a protective detail without getting permission from the State Department.

They also over-billed the State Department and falsified records, Richter alleges.

A Blackwater-affiliated contractor also allegedly mistreated migrants it hired to work in its security compound, offering them low wages and squalid conditions for housing - including packing three men in a tiny room with no bed.

The company was also accused of badly mismanaging a cafeteria on its compound, providing unsanitary and substandard food. Conditions were so bad, a U.S. military officer wrote a letter to the State Department saying it should be shut down.

Blackwater was sold in 2010 and the new owners changed its name to Academi. A spokeswoman for Academi, based in Virginia, declined to comment.

Iraqi officials had demanded to try to Blackwater guards alleged to have committed the 2007 Nisour Square massacre in Iraqi courts. However, in 2008, the U.S. government indicted 14 security contractors on charges related to the shooting.

In 2009, a federal judge threw out all charges.  However, an appeals court allowed the charges to go forward. The case is still pending.