OVERSEAS INTEL

Blackwater founder and former Navy SEAL Erik Prince speaks on Hillary Clinton

November 4, 2016 | OVERSEAS INTEL

Professional Overseas Contractors

Blackwater founder and former Navy SEAL Erik Prince told Breitbart News Daily on SiriusXM that according to one of his “well-placed sources” in the New York Police Department, “The NYPD wanted to do a press conference announcing the warrants and the additional arrests they were making” in the Anthony Weiner investigation, but received “huge pushback” from the Justice Department.

Prince began by saying he had no problem believing reports that the FBI was highly confident multiple foreign agencies hacked Hillary Clinton’s private email server.

Continue Reading ▼

“I mean, it’s not like the foreign intelligence agencies leave a thank-you note after they’ve hacked and stolen your data,” Prince said to SiriusXM host Alex Marlow.

Prince claimed he had insider knowledge of the investigation that could help explain why FBI Director James Comey had to announce he was reopening the investigation into Clinton’s email server last week.

“Because of Weinergate and the sexting scandal, the NYPD started investigating it. Through a subpoena, through a warrant, they searched his laptop, and sure enough, found those 650,000 emails. They found way more stuff than just more information pertaining to the inappropriate sexting the guy was doing,” Prince claimed.

“They found State Department emails. They found a lot of other really damning criminal information, including money laundering, including the fact that Hillary went to this sex island with convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein. Bill Clinton went there more than 20 times. Hillary Clinton went there at least six times,” he said.

“The amount of garbage that they found in these emails, of criminal activity by Hillary, by her immediate circle, and even by other Democratic members of Congress was so disgusting they gave it to the FBI, and they said, ‘We’re going to go public with this if you don’t reopen the investigation and you don’t do the right thing with timely indictments,’” Prince explained.

“I believe – I know, and this is from a very well-placed source of mine at 1PP, One Police Plaza in New York – the NYPD wanted to do a press conference announcing the warrants and the additional arrests they were making in this investigation, and they’ve gotten huge pushback, to the point of coercion, from the Justice Department, with the Justice Department threatening to charge someone that had been unrelated in the accidental heart attack death of Eric Garner almost two years ago. That’s the level of pushback the Obama Justice Department is doing against actually seeking justice in the email and other related criminal matters,” Prince said.

“There’s five different parts of the FBI conducting investigations into these things, with constant downdrafts from the Obama Justice Department. So in the, I hope, unlikely and very unfortunate event that Hillary Clinton is elected president, we will have a constitutional crisis that we have not seen since, I believe, 1860,” Prince declared.

Marlow asked Prince to clarify these revelations.

“NYPD was the first one to look at that laptop,” Prince elaborated. “Weiner and Huma Abedin, his wife – the closest adviser of Hillary Clinton for 20 years – have both flipped. They are cooperating with the government. They both have – they see potential jail time of many years for their crimes, for Huma Abedin sending and receiving and even storing hundreds of thousands of messages from the State Department server and from Hillary Clinton’s own homebrew server, which contained classified information. Weiner faces all kinds of exposure for the inappropriate sexting that was going on and for other information that they found.”

“So NYPD first gets that computer. They see how disgusting it is. They keep a copy of everything, and they pass a copy on to the FBI, which finally pushes the FBI off their chairs, making Comey reopen that investigation, which was indicated in the letter last week. The point being, NYPD has all the information, and they will pursue justice within their rights if the FBI doesn’t,” Prince contended.

“There is all kinds of criminal culpability through all the emails they’ve seen of that 650,000, including money laundering, underage sex, pay-for-play, and, of course, plenty of proof of inappropriate handling, sending/receiving of classified information, up to SAP level Special Access Programs,” he stated.

“So the plot thickens. NYPD was pushing because, as an article quoted one of the chiefs – that’s the level just below commissioner – he said as a parent, as a father with daughters, he could not let that level of evil continue,” Prince said.

He noted that the FBI can investigate these matters, “but they can’t convene a grand jury. They can’t file charges.”

“The prosecutors, the Justice Department has to do that,” he explained. “Now, as I understand it, Preet Bharara, the Manhattan prosecutor, has gotten ahold of some of this. From what I hear, he’s a stand-up guy, and hopefully he does the right thing.”

Marlow agreed that Bharara’s “sterling reputation” as a determined prosecutor was “bad news for the Clintons.”

Prince agreed, but said, “If people are willing to bend or break the law and don’t really care about the Constitution or due process – if you’re willing to use Stalinist tactics against someone – who knows what level of pressure” could be brought to bear against even the most tenacious law enforcement officials?

“The point being, fortunately, it’s not just the FBI; [there are] five different offices that are in the hunt for justice, but the NYPD has it as well,” Prince said, citing the Wall Street Journal reporting that has “exposed downdraft, back pressure from the Justice Department” against both the FBI and NYPD, in an effort to “keep the sunlight and the disinfecting effects of the truth and transparency from shining on this great evil that has gone on, and is slowly being exposed.”

“The Justice Department is trying to run out the clock, to elect Hillary Clinton, to prevent any real justice from being done,” he warned.

As for the mayor of New York City, Prince said he has heard that “de Blasio wants to stay away from this.”

“The evidence is so bad, the email content is so bad, that I think even he wants to stay away from it, which is really telling,” he said.

Prince reported that the other legislators involved in the case “have not been named yet,” and urged the NYPD to hold a press conference and name them.

“I wish they’d do it today,” he said. “These are the unusual sliding-door moments of history, that people can stand up and be counted, and make a real difference, and to save a Republic, save a Constitution that we actually need and love, that our forefathers fought and died for. For any cop that is aware of this level of wrongdoing, and they have veterans in their family, or deceased veterans in their family, they owe it to them to stand up, to stand and be counted today, and shine the light of truth on this great evil.”

“From what I understand, up to the commissioner or at least the chief level in NYPD, they wanted to have a press conference, and DOJ, Washington people, political appointees have been exerting all kinds of undue pressure on them to back down,” he added.

Marlow suggested that some of those involved in keeping the details quiet might want to avoid accusations of politicizing the case and seeking to influence the presidential election.

“Sure, that’s it. That’s the argument for it,” Prince agreed. “But the fact is, you know that if the Left had emails pointing to Donald Trump visiting, multiple times, an island with underage sex slaves basically, emails, you know they’d be talking about it. They’d be shouting it from the rooftops.”

“This kind of evil, this kind of true dirt on Hillary Clinton – look, you don’t have to make any judgments. Just release the emails,” he urged. “Just dump them. Let them out there. Let people see the light of truth.”

Prince dismissed the claims of people like Clinton campaign CEO John Podesta and DNC chair Donna Brazile that some of the damaging emails already released by WikiLeaks were fabricated, noting that “forensic analysis done shows that, indeed, they are not fabricated; they are really legitimate.”

“This is stuff coming right off a hard drive that was owned by Weiner and his wife Huma Abedin, Hillary’s closest adviser for the last 20 years,” he said of the new bombshells. “This is not from some hacker or anybody else. This is a laptop seized from a warrant in a criminal investigation.”

Prince confirmed that based on his information, Abedin is most likely looking at jail time, unless she cuts a deal with prosecutors.

“There’s a minimum of obstruction of justice and all kinds of unlawful handling of classified information,” he said. “Because remember, this laptop was in the possession of Weiner, who did not have a security clearance. And many, many of those emails were from her Yahoo account, which had State Department emails forwarded to them, so she could easier print these messages, scan them, and send them on to Hillary. That’s the carelessness that Hillary and her staff had for the classified information that the intelligence community risks life and limb to collect in challenged, opposed areas around the world.”

“That’s not who you want in the White House,” Prince declared.

Iraq – Afghanistan Contractor Census, 4th quarter (August – Oct 2016)

October 26, 2016 | OVERSEAS INTEL

BACKGROUND: This report updates DoD contractor personnel numbers and outlines DoD efforts to improve management of contractors accompanying U.S. forces. It covers DoD contractor personnel deployed in Afghanistan (Operation Freedom’s Sentinel), Iraq (Operation Inherent Resolve), and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

KEY POINTS: In 4th quarter FY 2016, USCENTCOM reported approximately 42,600 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR. This total reflects a decrease of approximately 100 from the previous quarter. A breakdown of DoD contractor personnel is provided below

Continue Reading ▼

Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq) Summary

The distribution of contractors in Iraq by mission category are:

Logistics/Maintenance 957 (32%)
Base Support 463 (15.5%)
Commo Support 150 (5%)
Construction 329 (11%)
Security 239 (8%)
Training 21 (.7%)
Translator/Interpreter 418 (14%)
Transportation 194 (6.5%)
Management/Administrative 151 (5%)
Other 60 (2%)

Total: 2,992

Operation Inherent Resolve Contractor Posture.

o As of 4th quarter FY 2016, there were approximately 7,700 contractors supporting US government operations in Iraq. About 2,992 of those contractors are in support of DoDfunded contracts.

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (Afghanistan) Summary*

The distribution of contractors in Afghanistan by mission category are:

Logistics/Maintenance 11,018 (46.6%)
Base Support 2,302 (9.2%)
Commo Support 942 (3.7%)
Construction 1,607 (6.4%)
Security 3,053** (12.1%)
Training 889 (3.5%)
Translator/Interpreter 1,643 (6.5%)
Transportation 1,461 (5.8%)
Medical/Dental/Social Services 105 (.4%)
Management/Administrative 1,824 (7.3%)
Other 397 (1.5%)

Total: 25,197

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel Contractor Posture:

o In 4th quarter FY16 there were 25,197 DoD contractors in Afghanistan. The overall contractor footprint in Afghanistan decreased by 4.9% from 3rd quarter FY16.

o Local nationals comprise 40.6% of total contractor force; 14,958 US/TCN remain to redeploy.

o A constant Force Management Level (FML) is leading to a relatively stable number of contractors. Contractor footprint may increase with pending drawdown of FML if requirements are not reduced.

As of 4th quarter FY 2016, USCENTCOM reports the following distribution of PSCs in Afghanistan:

In Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF) has primary responsibility for security functions outside of U.S. and NATO facilities and static security functions at some shared military facilities. The APPF is an organization under the Ministry of Interior and the US Government engages APPF support through Allied Cross Servicing Agreements. Since August 2015, U.S. and NATO forces are permitted to contract with Private Security Companies to safeguard their Military, Civilians and Contractors that conduct official and contracted tasks both on and outside of US and NATO agreed installations. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and Operation Resolute Support staff are developing contract vehicles to enable use of these PSCs while remaining in strict adherence to Afghan law. No contracts have been let under this new authorization.

USCENTCOM OCS Integration Cell (OCSIC) (FORWARD) assisted with the Services Acquisition Workshop (SAW) and in designating a Functional Services Manager (FSM) for the AOR-wide Security Support Services acquisition. The OCSIC hosted a team from OSD to discuss data and how the current systems and associated policy could be adjusted to provide more actionable information to decision makers. Other significant accomplishments include: ensured acquisition portfolio continuity throughout the CJTF Relief In Place between the Army's III and XVIII Airborne Corps; established goals and objectives to give component OCSICs a clear path to success; completed a theater Contractor Management Plan; provided input to Whole of Government working group; and collected data for OCS posture planning exercise.

CJTF OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR). The CJTF headquarters has rotated from III Corps to XVIII Airborne Corps (ABC). Extensive OCS training was conducted for the XVIII ABN Corps team prior to their deployment in order to prepare them to assume their OCS synchronization responsibilities. RIP/TOA occurred between incoming and outgoing CJTF OIR OCSIC, with JCASO Mission Support Team representatives confirming the XVIII ABC OCSIC was prepared to assume its OCS mission. The 408th CSB continues to acts as Lead Service for Contracting (LSC) for this CJOA on behalf of ARCENT.

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS). The USFOR-A OCSIC continues to be sourced primarily through the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) program in support of its mission of synchronizing contract support on behalf of the JTF. The use of civilians has provided continuity to USFOR-A as the National Support Element has transitioned between the 10th MTN DIV and 1st CAV DIV. Expeditionary Contracting Command-AFG (ECC-A) on behalf of USARCENT continues to provide direct theater support contracting to USFOR-A through the Lead Service for Contracting (LSC) construct. Through different iterations of downsizing, ECC-A has downsized commensurate to the mission. ECC-A continues to be sourced by a US Army Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) with the latest RIP/TOA occurring between the 410th and the 419th CSB. The 419th will continue to act as the LSC until the next CSB is identified and deployed.

IMPROVEMENTS TO MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF DOD CONTRACTORS

Operational Contract Support (OCS) Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB). This senior executive-level governance forum, chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in March 2010, provides strategic leadership to multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize OCS. Co-Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support and Vice Director for Logistics, Joint Staff J4, the FCIB convenes quarterly or as required. Key initiatives reviewed by the Board in 4th quarter FY16 include: DLA Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) Capability, DoD OCS policy and Joint doctrine planned revisions and status of efforts to develop a Joint OCS Doctrine, Organization Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) Change Recommendation Request (DCR). This joint OCS DCR, currently under development, will be submitted for Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) review and approval in FY17. It will define DoD solutions address critical OCS capability gaps. The next quarterly OCS FCIB meeting will be held on November 22, 2016.

FY17-20 DoD OCS Action Plan. On September 27, 2016, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support), published the DoD FY17-20 OCS Action Plan. This updated plan, endorsed by the OCS FCIB, includes 36 key strategic tasks; outlines 14 key tasks to be realigned and addressed in the new Joint OCS DCR; a new Joint Staff J4 sponsored annex with 64 sub-tasks across three capability gaps and new tasks to close a “requirements development” gap based on feedback from the 2015 OCS Senior Leader Summit. This is the third iteration of the Department’s roadmap for OCS capability integration.

U.S. Marine Corps OCS Update. During 4th quarter FY16, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps completed 3 significant actions to institutionalize OCS: 1) Defined OCS as an essential Warfighting capability by adding it onto the Marine Corps Task list (MCTL). The addition of OCS to the MCTL provides Marine Corps units the foundation and ability to establish mission essential tasks (METs) to measure and report OCS mission readiness. 2) Published a Marine Corps Order on the manning, equipping and training of the OCS capability. 3) Developed an OCS career progression plan and reclassified two existing Military Occupational Specialties to establish an OCS Specialist and OCS Officer as a new professional job series with OCS specific responsibilities to include education and training requirements.

Defense Standards for Security Services.

o Pursuant to Section 833 of the FY2011 NDAA, compliance with American National Standard ANSI PSC.1-2012, “Quality Management Standard for Private Security Company Operations” is required in all DoD contracts for private security services. The requirements and guidance of this standard implement all PSC relevant provisions of US law, Defense Directives and instructions, and promote consistency with international agreements. Evidence of compliance with this standard will facilitate identifying technically acceptable/best value contractors; expedite contract award; mitigate risk of delay of services due to contract award protests; and mitigate risk of contractor non-performance or misconduct in critical early phases of contingency operations. The United Kingdom also requires compliance with this ANSI PSC standard. This standard is not beginning its ANSI required 5-year review and revision.

o An international (ISO) version of this standard was published by ISO in September 2015 as ISO 18788-2015. This standard enables acceptance of the standards in use by the United States and the United Kingdom, in countries where the use of an American National Standard is not feasible. The ISO version of the standard improves competition and manages risk in operational environments which will include PSCs not under the direct control of US or coalition forces. PSCs achieving independent certification to the ISO standard are being given concurrent certification to the ANSI PSC standard. DFARS 52.225-7039 recognized the ISO standard as an acceptable alternative to the ANSI standard.

o 32 PSCs from 8 different countries have achieved independent third party certification to one or both of these standards. Another 19 PSCs from 11 countries are known to have begun the certification process.

Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). Planning, implementation, and oversight of OCS are Commanders' responsibilities and are essential to establishing a strategy for managing contractors on the battlefield as part of the DoD Total Force. JCASO provides the Combatant Commands a joint enabling capability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize OCS during peacetime, contingency operations, and post-conflict operations. JCASO is an essential part of DLA's combat support agency (CSA) role to support the mission objectives of the combatant commands, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Title 10 responsibilities, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense for OCS policy development and implementation. 4QFY16 JCASO engagements include:

Deployments:

o Deployed 2-member team during the CJTF OIR RIP/TOA for three weeks in August 2016 to provide OCS guidance, assistance, and training as the XVIII Airborne Corps assumed responsibilities from III Corps.

Exercises:

o Provided OCS support for nine (9) joint exercises (OCSJX-17, AUSTERE CHALLENGE, INTERNAL LOOK, VIGILANT SHIELD, INTEGRATED ADVANCE, KEY RESOLVE, PANAMAX, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN and JUDICIOUS RESPONSE). Support includes: participation in planning events, development of training objectives & MSELs, academic instruction and exercise execution.

JCASO OCS Planners. Sixteen (16) JCASO OCS planners are allocated among the Geographic Combatant Commands and USSOCOM to assist commanders in identifying gaps where a contracted support capability may be required. Planners integrate contracted support into operational plans and synchronize requirements with subordinate commands, the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, other USG Agencies, and coalition partners. The planners have been instrumental in integrating OCS into Combatant Command plans as well as training and exercises. Based on demonstrated need for additional OCS planning capability in USPACOM, JCASO also established OCS planners at forward locations in USFK and USFJ.

Operational Contract Support (OCS) Learning Framework. The Department continues to make progress on the Secretary’s and the Chairman's vision for OCS education and training. Several parallel efforts are integrating OCS into a holistic learning framework (education, individual and collective training, exercises, and lessons learned) that leverages the Chairman’s joint training system and is aimed primarily at non-acquisition personnel.

o U.S. Army. The new TRADOC Capability Manager office for PCS (TCM-OCS) achieved initial operational capability on 1 August 2016.

o OCS in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The Joint Staff (J7) revised CJCSI 1800.01E, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)” on 29 May 2015 to include 11 specific OCS learning areas for three of the five PME/JPME levels (IAW 10 USC § 2151) which reach officers in the grades of O-4 to O-9. Joint Staff (J4) OCS Division (OCSD) is completing work on Version 3.0 of the OCS Curriculum Development Guide (CDG), which offers JPME institutions guidance and suggested content based on the OPMEP learning areas. The Joint Staff (J4) participates annually in the Joint Faculty Education Conference and engages with the Joint Logistics Faculty Development Working Group to highlight OCS developments. Efforts are also underway with the Naval PostGraduate School to develop OCS case studies as additional teaching tools.

o Lessons Learned. The Joint Staff (J4), in collaboration with DLA JCASO, developed a Joint OCS Lessons Learned (JOLL) guide to integrate OCS lessons learned efforts across DoD components. The JOLL guide leverages the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) and the Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP). The JOLL includes procedures for collecting, analyzing, and processing OCS lessons and best practices; and defines relationships and responsibilities of stakeholders to act upon validated lessons. In October 2015, the Joint Staff (J4) established OCS Communities of Practice (COPs) in JLLIS to share and manage OCS lessons and best practices. In February 2016, the FCIB approved the draft JOLL guide and designated the Joint Staff (J4) as the OCS Enterprise Lesson Manager. The JOLL guide will be completed and distributed in October.

o Exercises. OCS Joint Exercise-16, 13 March – 8 April 2016 at Fort Bliss, Texas, brought together 500 trainees from the Active and Reserve forces, the National Guard, all Services, U.S. Army South, the 1st Armored Division, the United Kingdom, Chile and Brazil as multinational partner observers. It trained and assessed individual skills and unit OCS capabilities based on a decisive action and stability operations scenario in support U.S. Southern Command. The Joint Staff (J-4) is providing OCS training expertise to U.S. Africa Command to assist with incorporating OCS training objectives and content into JUDICIOUS RESPONSE 17 (JR-17) in late Fall 2016. JR-17 is a command post exercise that integrates the capabilities and functions of its Army Service component, Combined/Joint Task Forces formed by the 82nd AB and 2nd MEB, the Interagency, and multi-national partners to address selected U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) missions. The J-4 developed and deployed a collective training module, a four-day “OCS Equities during Crisis Action Planning (CAP)” to more than 40 individuals in support of JR-17. The J4 is also incorporating OCS into AGILE-17, a biennial, J4-led, logistics-focused wargame series held in CONUS to operationalize and refine logistics concepts in support of leadership and strategy development.

o Collective and Staff Training. The Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance Notice (CJCSN 3500.01) provides annual guidance to all DOD Components for planning, executing, and assessing joint training. It includes High Interest Training Issues (HITIs), which are specialinterest items that CCDRs should consider for emphasis in their training and exercise programs. OCS requirements are specifically included in the logistics HITI of the 2017- 2020 Guidance on the Chairman’s desk for signature.

o Universal Joint Tasks & Joint OCS Training and Assessment Guide. The Joint Staff (J4) published the Joint OCS Training and Assessments (JOTA) Guide v. 1.0 on 3 May 2016. It recommends tasks, standards, and measures aligned to the four primary OCS UJTs and assists planners in integrating OCS into joint training and exercises to help ensure realistic readiness assessments for OCS.

o Individual Training. In May 2015, the Joint OCS Essentials for Commanders & Staff (JOECS) course was established on the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) web portal. The course reflects doctrinal changes in Joint Publication (JP) 4-10 and will be redesigned in FY17 as a two part introductory level online course. The Joint Staff (J4) OCSD sponsored Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) is taught at every geographic combatant commands (GCCs) via mobile training teams (MTTs). During FY16 total of 741 students completed the joint certified course. In FY17, due to demand, the Joint Staff (J4) is forecasting 10 course offerings with a total capacity of 300 students. Feedback continues to be outstanding and interactions resulting from the JOPEC MTTs provide critical feedback for all OCS joint capability development efforts. The Joint Staff J4 continues to explore courses of action to for institutionalize or integrate JOPEC into an existing DoD professional military education institution. In FY16 the Army Logistics University (ALU) trained more than 840 students on contract support integration and contractor management functions, marking the most productive year to date. In addition, the Army's Command and General Staff College updated its curriculum to establish OCS as a double elective course. ALU also trains approximately 1,200 contracting officer representatives annually via resident and MTT courses.

OCS Planning. Using the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, the Combatant Commands continue to document and expand their OCS planning efforts. The Joint Staff (J4) has developed a separate manual, CJCSM 4301.01A, Planning OCS, to assist OCS planners by providing tools, techniques, and guidance for integrating OCS into established planning processes. Staffing is complete. The Joint Staff J4 also reviews combatant command contingency and operational plans as a member of the Joint Planning Execution Community (JPEC). The most recent Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan increases the level of planning detail associated with OCS.

OCS Reporting. The Joint Staff J4-led OCS reporting working group (RWG)—with members from OSD, Services, Agencies, and CCMDs—has identified best practices to improve OCS reporting. Benchmarks include identifying CCMD requirements and sources for OCS capabilities, integrating OCS into Service Universal Task Lists, informing Service and Agency development and reporting on OCS Enablers, and synchronizing collaboration. Implementation of best practices will enable visibility of OCS capabilities, improve OCS Readiness and Risk reporting, and facilitate global integration in planning and reporting OCS.

OCS Human Capital Strategy. OCS Human Capital study recommendations are under development by the RAND Corporation. Final report out briefs to DoD Senior Leaders and stake holder engagement sessions are planned and the final report completion date is 2nd Qtr FY17.

OCS Mission Integrator (OMI) Demonstration. The JS J4 partnered with U.S Pacific Command (USPACOM) to conduct a three-year demonstration to assess the OMI's performance under operational conditions. The OMI is an advanced integration cell described in the OCS Joint Concept and informs current and future OCS force development. Based on the OMI's success and contributions, the USPACOM J4 is working to secure resources in the FY 18 Program Objective Memorandum process to establish an enduring OMI capability.

Towards a Second Contractors’ War in Iraq?

October 24, 2016 | OVERSEAS INTEL

The retreat of American forces from Iraq in 2011 and relative security stability in following years have questioned again the status and role of foreign private security companies in the new context. Both Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have conducted a massive recruiting policy, as per 2014 the total number of employees exceeded 600’000. From another perspective, the American Department of State – that still used more than 5’000 private contractors for security services and other American or foreign civil companies, especially in oil industry, continued to utilize PMSC.

Continue Reading ▼

CENTCOM AOR (Central Command’s Area of Responsibility) have continued to work with companies like DynCorp International, Vectrus Systems Corp, Constellis Group and so on, contracts ranging often up to hundreds of millions of dollars, for different specific operations: technical and logistical support, training, maintenance, security. However, Iraqi government’s policy after 2011 was to try exerting effectively its security attributions; the negative image attached to PMSC in previous years imposed less visibility and activity (of PMSC) outside highly specialised domains of action.

However, as tragically proved in June 2014 by Mosul’s fall, real Iraqi military potential was not only exaggerated but disastrous. Lack of experience and motivation concerning both troops and officers, cumulative to recent discoveries of massive funds defalcation within military and security institutions, largely spread corruption, have all resulted in a catastrophic situation regarding real capability of Iraqi military structures, despite training programs carried out by the United States, NATO or different European states, before and after 2011. The fall of Iraqi military and security forces after 2014, in terms of image and efficacy, the necessity to block Islamic State’s offensive towards main city and other regions, as well as the project meant to regain territories occupied by militant jihadi structures, have determined the apparition of parallel structures that would assume the tasks of defense and protection. Firstly, there are Shi’a militias created by Shi’a political forces, that recruit massively and are supported by Iran. They have supported official Iraqi troops and sometimes have conducted operations exclusively/with Peshmerga troops, in order to repel the Islamic State or even retake territories like Tikrit.

The reticence of United States and European powers to directly involve, on the field, against Daesh, has reopened the discussion on using PMSC as alternative option to support Iraqi forces on the ground, since operations against Daesh require experience and equipment that the Iraqi army does not possess. Consequently, DoD and other American officials have considered the idea of an increased re-implication in Iraq, not directly but through a relaunch of PMSCs system. Without the ability to mobilize like in previous decade, “America’s Second Contractors’ War” Iraq is discussed intensively. If American participation in the form of financed PMSCs is privileged, it is this time integrated in a larger frame, i.e. the “private Muslim Expeditionary Force”, comprising former members of military and security services from Arab and Muslim states, instrumentalized as ground force against the Islamic State.

Until now, such an organized structure has not been implemented, due to both Iraqi opposition and the difficulty in overcoming numerous rivalries and particular policies of the Arab states. Furthermore, as legitimacy and authority of the Iraqi state was fragile during previous decade, the massive reactivation of PMSCs raises a series of practical and juridical problems. Which authority should assume decisions and attribution of actions? The Iraqi one, leadership of the company, United States, another foreign state authority or a unified command center? Then, taking into consideration recent history marked by abuses, excesses, breach of national Iraqi jurisdiction, etc., the issue of legality regarding contractor’s status and responsibility is raised. Finally, what should be the role of regular military forces in the context of reactivated military operations carried out by PMSCs? How compatible are the two types of structure, is it possible to conduct joint missions and especially, what is the financial status of regular troops when compared to contractors, whose resources are far superior? Motivation is strictly dependent on received retribution especially in nowadays Iraq, as fidelity to nation and state becomes relatively fragile. Perpetuation and accentuation of ethnical, sectarian, tribal fidelity, encouraged by the fact that even the Islamic State claims to be the protector of Sunnis and forces a sectarian narrative on the Iraqi society, limits the authority of Iraqi state. A military and security support granted through reactivation of PMSCs could be efficient on short term in countering the Sunni insurrection, but it contains implicitly the seeds of pronounced political instability. A foreign intervention would certify security limits and incapacity of the Iraqi state and would force it to manage the complex situation of foreign troops on its soil, financial consequences it involves and the possible reactivation of armed confrontation between population and contractors.

As new threats arise and the PMSCs are already in place in the Middle East, despite their documented abuse on human rights and the negative stress on the local judiciary in the countries they operate, their role as private security providers will be preserved. On a larger scale, from corporate perspective, the continuous presence in hostile environments of the PMSCs grant them an undisputed role in military and reconstruction operations and now they are part of the extremely influential military-industrial complex with tight connections to some of the highest senior army officers and intelligence directors on the globe. Their methods are adapting very quickly to the new threats and vulnerabilities of the new way of waging war. Nonetheless, in the endeavor to rebuild a country and create a climate of sustainability in the strategic sectors, their approach is inflicting harm and loss. This also had an effect on the task of reestablishing from scratch the Iraqi army, the funds designated for training new security forces that should have been absorbed by the Iraqi government were regurgitated by the PMSCs back into the US economy or in off-shore private accounts. The immense impact that these organizations had on foreign policy of powerful countries in the last decade will not fade off. Their know-how is spreading and the modus operandi is getting better as they also invest in their image as lawful actors in the security industry.

BY: Ecaterina MAȚOI — SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

« Previous 1 … 141 142 143 144 145 … 302 Next »

Top ↑