Afghanistan Summary

The distribution of contractors in Afghanistan by mission category are:

Base Support:  6,834 (11%)
Commo Support:  2,451 ( 4%)
Construction: 7,877 (13%)
Logistics/Maintenance: 20,568 (33%)
Security: 5,591 ( 9%)
Training: 1,788 ( 3%)
Translator/Interpreter: 4,889 ( 8%)
Transportation: 5,064 ( 8%)
Medical/Dental/Social Services: 283 ( 1%)
Management/Administrative: 5,316 ( 9%)
Other*:  791 ( 1%)

Total: 61,452         

*Includes Defense Logistics Agency, Army Materiel Command, Air Force External and Systems Support contracts, Special Operations Command and INSCOM.

• OEF Contractor Posture Highlights:
  • In 2nd quarter FY14 there were approximately 61.5K DoD contractors in Afghanistan.  The overall contractor footprint in Afghanistan decreased by 21.4% from 1st quarter FY14.
  • The contractor to military ratio in Afghanistan is 1.34 to 1 (based on 46K military as of March 5, 2014).
  • New US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Fragmentary Orders direct specific contractor reductions.
  • There will continue to be substantial decline in the contractor population throughout the fiscal year, as a result of base closures and reduced requirements.

General Data on DoD Private Security Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan 

• Private security contractors (PSC) perform personal security, convoy security, and static security missions.
• USCENTCOM reports, as of 2nd quarter FY 2014, the following distribution of PSCs in Afghanistan:

• In Afghanistan, a bridging strategy negotiated between the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and USFOR-A is currently at risk due to a decision by the Afghan Government to dissolve and reorganize the APPF.

Improvements to Management and Oversight of DoD Contractors 

• Operational Contract Support Drawdown Cell (OCSDC). The USFOR-A OCSDC was established in August 2012 with a mission to manage the programmatic drawdown of contracts, the contractor workforce and associated equipment in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A).  Through the efforts of its Program Management Integration and Regional Teams, the OCSDC has influenced requirements reduction in the CJOA-A resulting in a decrease of boots on ground contractors.  Lessons learned from implementation of the OCSDC are being used to inform future doctrine (JP 4-10) on the OCS Integration Cell concept.

• CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC).  C-JTSCC has centralized oversight and authority to ensure all contracts executed in Afghanistan are visible and in compliance with contracting policy and procedures.  In coordination with the OCSDC, C-JTSCC is evaluating local vendor capability to perform critically needed services previously provided by LOGCAP, but on a much smaller scale.  This will ensure support to the warfighter continues while simultaneously reducing the number of US and other country national contractors.
• JP 4-10 (Operational Contract Support).  The Joint Staff J4 is revising JP 4-10 Operational Contract Supportwhich serves as the doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing OCS integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations.  The joint working group meeting is scheduled for April 8-9 with a target publication date of June 2014.
• Defense Standards for Security Services. 

o   Business and operational standards for PSCs (which were required by Section 833 of the FY2011 NDAA) are now complete and were validated by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in early March 2012.  The associated conformity assessment to enable third party certification was published in April 2012.  A maturity model, allowing companies and contract management to assess the degree of conformity with the standard, was approved by ANSI in January 2012.  Under sponsorship by DoD, the ANSI standard is now being developed as an international standard to be published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).

o   On May 22, 2012, DoD issued procedures, guidance and information (PGI) to the DFARS requiring compliance with the ANSI PSC standard for combat operations and other contingency operations. Standards and provision for third party certification in Section 833 of the FY 2011 NDAA will facilitate identifying technically acceptable contractors and best value.  This will enable expedited contract award; mitigate risk of delay of services due to contract award protests; and mitigate risk of contractor non-performance or misconduct in critical early phases of contingency operations. Conformity assessment standards and the associated maturity model also provide valuable tools for DoD contract oversight.

o   The United Kingdom has adopted the PSC ANSI standards as their national standard ensuring continuity between the key allies.

• Operational Contract Support (OCS) Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB).

This senior executive-level governance forum was chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) in March 2010 to provide strategic leadership to multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize OCS.  Co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support) [DASD(PS)] and Joint Staff, Vice Director J-4, the FCIB convenes quarterly (or as required) to address strategic issues impacting current and future contingency operations.  Key topics in 2Q FY14 reviewed by the Board included:

o   Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) International Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) Transition

o   Air Force CCAS Implementation Status Update

o   Joint Staff J-4 Update

DCMA International presented its DCMA CCAS Transition Concept, in which DCMA will: plan for continued execution of current delegations ending prior to September 2015; identify contracts that continue beyond September 2015 and transition them to appropriate service. SAF/AQC provided an update on Air Force CCAS transition actions, focusing on the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) milestones.  Joint Staff J-4 provided an update on their efforts to:  1) engage with HASC professional staffers on OCS Joint Exercise 2014 lessons learned; 2) evaluate and shape OCS requirements in all operations plans; 3) update the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on OCS Joint Concept implementation; 4) evaluate the OCS Mission Integrator pilot capability at PACOM; 4) publish Joint Publication 4-10 by June 2014.

The 3^rd Quarter FCIB Principals level meeting will be held on May 20, 2014, in the Secretary of the Army Conference Center.

• Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO).  Planning, implementation, and oversight of OCS are Commander's responsibilities and are essential to establishing a strategy for managing contractors on the battlefield as part of the DoD Total Force.  JCASO provides the Combatant Commands a joint enabling capability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize OCS during peacetime, contingency operations, and post-conflict operations.  JCASO is an essential part of DLA's combat support agency (CSA) role to support the mission objectives of the combatant commands, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Title 10 responsibilities, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense for OCS policy and joint doctrine development and implementation.  Examples of  JCASO engagements include:

o   Deploying teams for 6-month rotations to support the OCSDC and provide expertise in the drawdown efforts;

o   Leading and managing the economic development initiative (i.e., local procurements) in the Central Asian States  in support of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) strategy in the USCENTCOM AOR;

o   Leading and managing the Afghanistan Contract Transition Workgroup (ACTW) to facilitate the interagency coordination for planning and transitioning OCS from DoD to DOS; and

o   Participating in joint exercises in 2014 (e.g., PANAMAX, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN) to integrate OCS in training and assess the effectiveness of OCS plans. 

• JCASO Contingency Contracting Office (CCO):   The JCASO CCO provides a joint contingency contracting capability by extending and leveraging DLA’s extensive contracting capabilities while simultaneously complementing the Services’ capacities.  It furthers best practices through a programmatic approach, and is expected to focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contract support.   The CCO responds to demand signals from Combatant Commands and deployed forces, such as the USCENTCOM Central Asia States (CAS) local sourcing procurement initiative and the DLA-E/A and AFRICOM initiative to help leverage existing DLA contracts and develop new contract solutions that address AFRICOM’s evolving mission.  

• JCASO Planners.  Seventeen (17) JCASO planners are allocated among the Geographic Combatant Commands to assist the commander in identifying gaps where contractor support capability may be required.  Planners integrate contractor support into operational plans and synchronize requirements with subordinate commands, the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, other USG Agencies, and coalition partners.  The planners have been instrumental in integrating OCS into Combatant Command plans.  Based on demonstrated need for additional OCS planning capability in USPACOM, JCASO recently established new planners at forward locations in USFK and USFJ. 

• SPOT Configuration Control Board (CCB). ODASD(PS), as the functional sponsor for SPOT, co-chairs a quarterly CCB.  This Board evaluates proposed enhancements to SPOT and prioritizes implementation to ensure consistency within funding parameters.  Membership includes participants from across the DoD OCS community, DOS, and U.S. Agency for International Development.

• Operational Contract Support (OCS) Learning Framework.  The Department continues to make progress on the Secretary’s and the Chairman's vision for OCS education and training. Several parallel efforts are underway to incorporate OCS into a holistic learning framework that includes education, individual and collective training, exercises, and lessons learned primarily aimed at non-acquisition personnel.

• OCS in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). As reported, OCS has been a Chairman’s JPME Special Area of Emphasis each year since 2009.  A 2012 study on OCS education and training observed a general lack of uniformity and depth in OCS content. To rectify this, Joint Staff (J4) OCS and Services Division (OCSSD) developed an OCS Curriculum Development Guide (CDG) to provide specific OCS learning objectives to help JPME faculty create and integrate effective OCS learning into all five JPME levels.  Version 2.0 of the CDG, which was completed in October 2012, included authoritative reference material, was distributed to JPME institutions in December 2012.  The OCS CDG incorporates distance learning through three Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) OCS courses. The Joint Staff (J4) briefed the faculty of the JPME schools on the FY2013 NDAA language requiring OCS as part of JPME in June 2013 at the Joint Faculty Education Conference. At this point, JPME faculty need time to incorporate OCS into their curricula. The Joint Staff (J4) is reviewing the Joint Combined Warfare School curriculum to make specific recommendations on OCS content needed to meet the CDG’s intent.

• Lessons Learned. The Department has submitted a comprehensive lessons learned report to the House Armed Services Committee.  For tactical and operational lessons learned, the Joint Staff (J4), OCSSD, is the focal point for documenting and processing lessons through the Joint Lessons Learned Program.

Exercises.  The first ever OCS Joint Exercise (OCSJX-14) was held in January 2014 at Ft. Bliss, Texas.  The exercise trained attendees on the OCS tasks for Contract Support Integration, Contracting Support and Contractor Management. The OCSJX-14 scenario was based on a complex catastrophe in the US NORTHCOM area of responsibility. The training audiences were OCS staff members from USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH, US Army Expeditionary Contracting Command's 412^th Contract Support Brigade, US Air Force and Navy contracting personnel.  Other key DOD stakeholders that participated were; FEMA, USACE, DLA JCASO, DASD-PS, DPAP and NGB.  Planning for the FY-15 exercise is underway and is tentatively planned for the USPACOM AOR.

• Collective and Staff Training. The Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance Notice (CJCSN 3500.01) provides annual guidance to all DOD Components for planning, executing, and assessing joint training for three consecutive years. It includes High Interest Training Issues (HITIs) which are CJCS special-interest items that CCDRs should consider for emphasis in their training and exercise programs.  OCS will be part of the Joint Logistics Enterprise HITI in this year’s notice.  In December 2013, the Joint Staff (J4) released the Joint Metrics and Readiness (JMR) Guide to assist planners in integrating OCS into joint training and exercises to help ensure realistic readiness assessments for OCS and compliance with Joint Training Guidance.

• Individual Training.  DoD created three joint OCS courses in a computer-based training format in 2009.  The three courses were “joint training certified” in 2013 and are hosted on JKO, the joint community’s web portal for providing key joint training.  As of 4 September 2013, 608 personnel have completed these joint certified OCS courses.  In addition to the JKO courses and Contracting Officer’s Representative training, the Joint Staff (J4) OCSSD is teaching a Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) at the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) via mobile training teams (MTTs).  The initial JOPEC pilot was held from 16-25 July 2013 at Fort Lee, VA, staff from AFRICOM and EUCOM and their respective Service components were trained in November 2013, and NORTHCOM and their Service components in December 2013.  The planned course rollout at GCCs and their Service components for 2014 follows:

─      PACOM: 2nd QTR FY 14

─      CENTCOM, SOCOM, &SOUTHCOM: 3rd QTR FY 14

─      USFK (U.S. Forces Korea) & USFJ (U.S. Forces Japan): 3rd QTR FY 14

─      National Capital Region: 3^rd QTR FY14 (Tentative)

o   ODASD(PS), the Joint Staff J4, and Headquarters DA are working to develop a OCS multi-service course from an existing Army course at the Army Logistics University.  The course roll out projection date is fourth quarter FY15.

• OCS Planning.  On October 18, 2012, the Joint Staff published the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03 Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.  The CJCSM 3130.03 sets forth administrative instructions for joint operation plan formats. Specific to OCS planning, CJCSM 3130.03 details where OCS requirements will be identified and by whom.  The Joint Staff (J4) is developing a separate manual, CJCSM 4301, OCS Planning, to assist OCS planners in developing procedures and guidance that integrate, synchronize, prioritize, and focus OCS capabilities on achieving a supported commander’s operational objectives and desired effects for various types of plans, including contingency plans.

OCS Joint Concept.  JROC Memorandum 159-13, 7 October 2013, approved the OCS Joint Concept.  This concept envisions that contracted support for military operations will be an interdependent capability of Joint Force 2020 (JF 2020).  This concept addresses how JF 2020 can operationalize OCS to optimize contracted support capabilities of the total force partners to achieve operational effects across the range of military operations within acceptable and manageable risk levels. It builds upon ongoing efforts to institutionalize OCS in the present force and proposes a full spectrum doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and personnel capability solution framework to deliver more responsive and accountable OCS. The OCS Joint Concept will be implemented through the inclusion of concept implementation tasks in the OCS Action Plan. In April 2014 the JS J4 will update the JROC on the status for implementing the Joint Concept.

For the past decade or so, when people thought of private military contractors (PMCs) they typically thought of land-force outfits like the Academi formerly known as Blackwater and its founder Erik Prince. During this same period, the word “piracy” generally brought to mind skiffs plying the waters of the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea. Others have written elsewhere on this site that some of the more interesting uses of PMCs during this timeframe have in fact been in combating (or attempting to combat) the now-diminished pirate scourge off East Africa in the form of private maritime security companies (PMSCs). Yet historically one of the greatest epicenters of piracy has been in the waters of South and Southeast Asia. If the region, already home to PMSCs operating in a variety of capacities and more than one-third of the world’s seaborne-oil trade, faces a resurgence of piracy, it may see a similar growth in PMSCs. This article will touch briefly on the historic precedents, preconditions encouraging the presence of PMSCs, and regional factors affecting their utility.

Precedents and Prevalence

South and Southeast Asia have long been home to private and quasi-private security arrangements. Cdr. Chris Rawley, U.S. Navy Reserve, notes that “historically, the line between privateering and piracy has been a thin one. From the 15th to the 19th century, pirates were often employed as a political tool by the Malay states to resist colonization by disrupting trade of the British and Dutch. Conversely, in the mid-1800s, the British East India Company’s private armies protected shipping in Malacca from pirates.”

The history of Singapore’s founding and growth under British rule is itself closely tied to this blurred public-private partnership. When the British arrived at Malaysian Singapore and sought local allies to protect their trade and investment, the recently displaced Temenggong, sea lord of the orang laut sea people, who themselves were noted for their marauding maritime prowess, presented himself as an acceptable solution. The Temenggongs thus served as part local officials, pressured to resettle their power base to neighboring Johor, and part maritime security contractors for hire, serving British counter-piracy operations in the early 1800s and port security for Singapore.

In recent years, PMSCs have provided a range of services in South and Southeast Asia. According to The Diplomat’s Zachary Keck, “PMCs operating in Southeast Asia have primarily been focused on providing maritime security to clients, particularly in combating piracy. This has been especially true in narrow chokepoints like the Malacca Straits” and has included companies such as Background Asia and Counter Terrorism International (CTI).

In addition to providing these escort vessels and transit/cargo security aboard merchant vessels, PMSCs have worked extensively on port security (Gray Page, Pilgrim Elite, and the Glenn Defense Marine Asia group now know for the ‘Fat Leonard’ scandal), training and maritime hardening efforts (Trident Group), crisis response, and fisheries protection in countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) (Hart). PMSC experts James Bridger and Claude Berube remark that in contrast with Africa, the companies in South and Southeast Asia place a greater focus on port vs transit security, due in part to the prevalence of at-berth and in-port crime, as well as training, vessel hardening, and security planning.

Preconditions

What conditions have given rise to this most recent cast of companies? In Carolin Liss’s 2011 book Oceans of Crime, she attributes the rise of PMSCs in South and Southeast Asia to several factors including states divesting former functions and the changed security landscape. This includes relatively more powerful transnational actors, both those interested in stability such as multinational corporations and multilateral institutions and those, such as terrorist organizations, interested in the opposite. Another element of the changed landscape facilitating PMCs’ rise is to Liss the disappearance of the Cold War struggle between the United States and Soviet Union, and the attendant opportunities for training of regional security forces. Further, post-Cold War terrorism heightened the focus of governments and the shipping industry on maritime security, as the threat joined piracy as a perceived regional risk to maritime assets, although it has so far failed to be nearly as impactful.

In general PMSCs may find a market whenever the threats to maritime assets – be they from criminals, separatists, or environmental, corporate, or territorial disputes – appear to outweigh states’ capacities to safeguard those assets. The perception of corruption or distrust of the competency and fairness of states’ protective functions will similarly further the reception for external services.

How do these threat measures stack up in South and Southeast Asia? The first thing to note is the wide variance among the nations and waters of the region – as can be expected from such an diverse expanse generalities are hard to come by, so the following is a survey rather than a summation of the area.

With regards to the historical scourge of piracy, a recent report by the insurance firm Allianz made headlines for describing a 700 percent rise in actual and attempted attacks occurring in Indonesian waters in a 5-year span, from 15 in 2009 to 106 in 2013,9 although most of these were robberies at berth or at anchor. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB)’s April 2014 update notes that Indonesian “Pirates / robbers are normally armed with guns, knives and, or machetes…attacking vessels during the night.” Derived from IMB statistics, the Allianz report also notes that in 2013 South Asia’s 26 incidents and Southeast Asia’s 128 combined to far outstrip Africa’s total of 89 incidents, with only seven of the latter considered acts of Somali piracy.

While privation is often portrayed as a leading spur for illicit maritime activities, analyst Karsten von Hoesslin contends that groups operating in Southeast Asia exhibit “more sophistication and structural coordination, reflecting the existence of organizations that go well beyond opportunistic marauders seeking to merely compensate for economic hardship.” In 2012 von Hoesslin noted such syndicates active in the Philippines, conducting kidnapping and robbery (K&R) operations, with robbery and hijacking organizations plentiful in Indonesia’s Anambas Islands and Riau Islands Archipelago.

On the other hand, IMB’s April 2014 update demonstrates the fluid nature of piracy, stating only three years later that “attacks have dropped significantly in the vicinity off Anambas / Natuna / Mangkai islands / Subi Besar / Merundung area” and “dropped substantially” in the Strait of Malacca since 2005, although no such improvement is noted for the Singapore Straits. The year 2005 is significant as the year that Gerakan Aceh Merdaka (GAM) separatists and previous perpetrators of maritime assaults at the entrance to the Malacca Strait signed a post-Tsunami peace accord with the Indonesian government.

The assets most at risk in Southeast Asia are in general not the more than 60,000 tankers and container vessels that ply the waters but tugs and other small vessels with low freeboards. Nonetheless, Erek Sanchez, a maritime security contractor, notes that insurance companies now require nearly all merchant vessels to “have a security team aboard or have a proven static anti-boarding mechanism that satisfies the requirements set by the insurance company,” meaning there is plenty of business to be had.

Adding to PMSCs’ potential in the region is the lack of enthusiasm for joint patrols by multinational forces in and around Indonesian waters due to sensitivity of competing territorial claims. While understandable from a sovereignty perspective, vessels must as a result rely on the prospect of the strengthening of individual naval forces or seek additional protection.

Although the majority of attacks in the region – whether at sea, at anchor, or in port – are short-run robberies, when hijackings do occur they are often inside jobs. An interesting variant on hijackings occurs in the Sulu Sea between rival fishing companies who “attempt to deplete the maritime assets and platforms of their competitors.” This points to another factor that might increase the region’s potential for PMSCs – that of maritime resource competition.

According to Rawley, “Poorly managed fisheries and maritime crime in SE Asia are inextricably linked. In the 1990s, over-fishing partially caused the loss of livelihood of coastal communities that contributed to the surge in piracy near Malacca. Southeast Asian countries that cannot afford adequate coast guards might reach out to NGOs or PMCs for fisheries enforcement patrols in their territorial waters.”

Taken together, the sustained incidence of piracy and robbery, especially near Indonesian waters, along with resource competition between companies, states, and fishermen indicates that there will be a ready market for PMSCs in the region for some time to come. In Part 2 I will look at factors that might lessen the need for or hinder the operations of PMSCs in South and Southeast Asia, as well as provide a brief outlook on their future uses in the region.

LT Scott Cheney-Peters is the founder and vice president of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a graduate of Georgetown University and the U.S. Naval War College, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council.