Private Forces in Congo: Drones, Minerals and the Fight Against M23

CONGO — The September 17 ambush of a contractor team in South Kivu exposed a private security operation that had largely remained outside public view.

The team was working within an operation linked to Erik Prince and Vectus Global when it came under attack while traveling between locations. About 20 people were killed or wounded, according to Reuters. The dead included at least seven Congolese personnel and former New Zealand Special Air Service soldier Justin Conaglen. Former U.S. Special Forces soldier and retired UFC fighter Tim Kennedy survived three gunshot wounds to the leg and was later treated at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center.

The identity of the attackers has not been officially established. Sources cited by Reuters suspected forces supporting the M23 rebellion and said a surveillance drone may have been tracked back to the team, but those details remain unconfirmed.

What is clear is why a foreign contractor team was operating in one of the world’s most dangerous conflict zones. The Democratic Republic of Congo is relying on private military and security contractors to address two connected problems: an army struggling to contain M23 and a government struggling to control the mineral wealth that helps finance armed competition.

Those missions—security and revenue enforcement—are increasingly becoming part of the same fight.

Why Congo Is Hiring Private Contractors

Kinshasa is not turning to contractors for one simple reason. It is buying capabilities that the state either lacks, cannot deploy quickly enough or has struggled to coordinate effectively.

The eastern Congo battlefield demands specialized personnel for aviation, drone operations, intelligence, logistics, training, communications and protective security. At the same time, the government wants to reduce mineral smuggling, improve tax collection and regain control over revenue moving through areas contested by armed groups.

Private firms offer a government the ability to assemble technical teams faster than a conventional military partnership normally allows. They can bring pilots, drone operators, mechanics, trainers and security specialists under commercial agreements without waiting for another country to deploy uniformed forces.

That speed comes with a serious risk: a narrowly defined support contract can move closer to combat as the security situation deteriorates.

The Military Capability Gap

The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, known as the FARDC, have faced persistent problems with command and control, logistics, pay, training and coordination. Those weaknesses became unmistakable during M23’s rapid advance and the fall of Goma in January 2025.

Before that collapse, Congo had hired nearly 300 foreign contractors, many of them Romanian. Reuters reported that one company, Congo Protection, was associated with training, while Agemira RDC provided logistics and other support. Some foreign personnel also operated sophisticated drones.

When M23 entered Goma, the contractor force surrendered and crossed into Rwanda for repatriation. The episode showed both the appeal and the limits of private military support. Contractors could provide technical skills, but they could not compensate for a disorganized defense, fractured command relationships or the loss of air and drone access.

The contractor presence did not disappear after Goma. A later United Nations Group of Experts report said Congo Protection had ceased operating and that the agreement involving Congo Aviation—the renamed successor to Agemira—ended in July 2025. The Congolese government then contracted Algerian CH-4 drone pilots directly. The same report documented foreign military contractors from South America in Kisangani and around Walikale, including Salvadoran personnel deployed alongside the FARDC.

The names and nationalities changed, but the requirement remained: Congo still needed people who could operate aircraft and drones, train units, move equipment and reinforce positions in a technically demanding war.

The Mineral Revenue Mission

The contractor story is also a mining story.

Congo holds enormous reserves of copper, cobalt, coltan, gold, tin and other strategic minerals. Yet the government loses significant revenue through informal trade, corruption, cross-border smuggling and armed-group control of production and transport routes.

In April 2025, Reuters reported that Erik Prince had reached an agreement with Congo’s Finance Ministry. The reported mission was to improve the collection of mining taxes and reduce the smuggling of minerals across Congo’s borders. Initial work was expected to focus away from the front line, including in the copper- and cobalt-producing south, with advisers and commodity-inspection specialists supporting revenue enforcement.

At that stage, sources told Reuters there were no plans to deploy the contractors into active conflict zones.

That distinction did not last.

Mineral sites, transport corridors, customs systems and armed control are deeply connected in eastern Congo. M23 and other armed groups can tax mining and trade, control roads and border crossings, and use territorial gains to increase their political and economic leverage. For Kinshasa, securing mineral revenue therefore becomes a security mission as well as a financial one.

From Tax Enforcement to Frontline Drone Support

By February 2026, the reported scope of Prince’s Congo operation had expanded.

Reuters reported that a Vectus Global-linked private security team had been sent to support Congolese forces around Uvira, a strategic city in South Kivu. The team provided drone support to Congolese special operations forces and other army units. Personnel were temporarily moved from the mining-revenue mission, with the possibility of returning to that work later.

That deployment marked the first publicly reported frontline involvement by Prince’s current Congo operation. It also demonstrated how quickly a commercial mandate can change in an active war.

A team recruited to help a government protect revenue and disrupt smuggling may possess the same surveillance, aviation, logistics and security capabilities needed on the battlefield. Once a strategic town is threatened, the line between economic-security support and military support can narrow rapidly.

The September ambush in South Kivu now provides the clearest evidence of that shift. The Vectus-linked team was no longer operating only in offices, at customs points or around distant mining operations. Its personnel were moving through contested territory in an environment where hostile forces could combine human intelligence, drones and direct fire.

Vectus has not publicly detailed the team’s mandate or force size. The U.S. State Department told Reuters that it had no Congo contract with Prince or his companies. This was a Congolese government operation, not a disclosed U.S. government deployment.

Where Tim Kennedy Fits

Kennedy’s presence attracted attention because of his public profile as a former Green Beret and UFC fighter. Available reporting indicates that he was doing private contracting work and traveling with a Vectus-linked element when the team was attacked.

His exact role has not been made public. There is no reliable evidence that Kennedy personally collected mining taxes, guarded a specific mine or worked under a disclosed U.S. government contract. The most accurate description is that he was part of a contractor team operating within Prince’s expanding Congo mission.

That distinction matters. A high-profile individual can become the center of a story, but the larger issue is the structure around him: who issued the task, which company held the agreement, what the rules for the mission allowed and how a revenue-security operation came to include movement near an active front.

Contractors Are Not Automatically Mercenaries

The words contractor and mercenary are often used interchangeably in reporting about Congo, but they are not legally identical.

The International Committee of the Red Cross defines private military and security companies broadly as private businesses providing military or security services. Those services can include armed protection, convoy security, training, intelligence support, weapons-system operation and maintenance.

Whether an individual qualifies as a mercenary under international humanitarian law depends on a narrow, cumulative legal test. Nationality, residence, formal membership in armed forces, direct participation in hostilities and motivation all matter. Most employees of private military and security companies do not automatically meet every part of that definition.

Their legal status is also not determined by a job title. Contractors are generally civilians unless they are incorporated into state armed forces or belong to an organized armed group. A civilian contractor can temporarily lose protection from attack while directly participating in hostilities. Operating a weapons system during combat, supplying tactical intelligence for an attack or defending a military position may affect that analysis.

For that reason, private military and security contractor is the more accurate general term unless the facts support a specific legal classification.

The Risks Behind the Contract

Congo’s experience reveals several risks that extend well beyond one company or one ambush.

Mission creep. A contract can begin with training, logistics or tax enforcement and later place personnel in contested territory. Contractors need to know what authorizes that change and whether their insurance, medical support and legal protections still apply.

Fragmented command. The presence of FARDC units, special forces, local armed groups, foreign advisers, drone teams and separate contractors can create overlapping chains of command. The failure to share information or establish clear authority can become deadly.

Technical visibility. Drones provide valuable surveillance but can also expose operators. Electronic emissions, flight patterns and the recovery or tracking of an aircraft may reveal a team’s position.

Accountability. Governments cannot outsource their obligations under international humanitarian law. Contracts need clear rules on use of force, detention, reporting, civilian protection and investigation of alleged violations.

Extraction and medical support. A contractor moving through South Kivu needs more than a local point of contact. The agreement should define casualty evacuation, medical coverage, recovery after separation, detention response and evacuation if a city or airfield falls.

What Contractors Should Verify Before Accepting Congo Work

The demand for specialist personnel in Congo is real, but so is the need for rigorous due diligence. Before accepting a position, a contractor should be able to verify:

• the legal identity of the employer and every subcontractor;
• the government agency or commercial client authorizing the work;
• the written scope of work and the process for changing it;
• the operational and tactical chains of command;
• rules for the use of force and the contractor’s legal status;
• the locations where the contractor may be deployed;
• weapons, drone or aviation responsibilities;
• medical evacuation, insurance and disability coverage;
• detention, captivity and emergency-extraction procedures;
• payment terms, sanctions screening and human-rights safeguards.

“Congo illustrates the central risk in modern private contracting: the mission written at the start of a contract may not be the mission contractors eventually face,” Professional Overseas Contractors said. “Revenue protection, drone support and battlefield movement can become part of the same operating environment when state security is weak and front lines move quickly.”

The Bottom Line

Private contractors are in Congo because the government needs capabilities it has struggled to generate on its own—and because control of territory, military power and mineral revenue cannot be separated in the country’s east.

Earlier foreign teams trained troops, maintained aircraft, operated drones and provided logistics. Prince’s Vectus-linked operation reportedly began with mining-tax enforcement and anti-smuggling work before expanding into drone-supported assistance near the front. The South Kivu ambush shows how far that progression can go.

For Kinshasa, contractors offer speed, technical expertise and flexibility. For the people hired to perform the work, Congo offers a harder lesson: in a fluid war, the distance between a commercial support contract and a combat mission may be much shorter than the paperwork suggests.