The re-vetting drive, first reported by the Washington Post, mainly affects a village militia known as the Afghan Local Police, or ALP, which is being trained by American special operations troops. U.S. special forces also mentor Afghan special forces and commando units, which underwent a rescreening last month, according to U.S. officials.

The training suspension, expected to last about a month, involves about 1,000 newly recruited members of the ALP, said Col. Thomas Collins, a spokesman for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. NATO's training of the far larger Afghan national army and police force, which now total about 350,000 personnel, will continue, he said, as will joint military operations between Western and Afghan troops.

Lt. Col. Todd Harrell, a spokesman for a U.S. special operations task force in Afghanistan, said that he knew of only three attacks on coalition troops by local police. "We haven't seen a huge insider threat in the [special operations forces] community, but we can't ignore it," he said.

The Afghan Local Police initiative has been hailed by U.S. officials as the most effective means of fighting the insurgency in rural communities where the regular army and police are spread too thin or not present at all. American officials want the force to nearly double in size from its current strength. But critics say the force is prone to abuse of Afghan civilians, with some of its members implicated in beatings, torture and abductions of villagers, as well as extortion.

The small special-operations teams recruit, arm and train police in rural villages that are often far from other U.S. forces, potentially leaving them more vulnerable to insider shootings.

Such attacks have been a source of growing tension between Afghan and Western officials. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization force says about one-quarter of the attacks can be attributed to the Taliban, either via infiltration or the insurgents prevailing on those already serving in the police or army to open fire on NATO troops. It blames other attacks on personal disputes inflamed by cultural differences, fatigue and combat stress.

The issue of insider shootings also fueled an ongoing clash between Karzai and the NATO force over a raid mounted by the coalition on Saturday after an assailant in an Afghan army uniform opened fire on Australian troops, killing three.

The Afghan leader claimed the NATO raid killed two Afghans and resulted in the improper detention of nine others. He also asserted that it had been carried out without the knowledge of authorities in Oruzgan province, violating an agreement between his government and the NATO force.

In another sign of a disconnect between the Karzai government and the NATO force over insider attacks, some senior Afghan officials directly involved in the ALP program professed to know nothing of the announced training suspension.

"The matter is under discussion," said Gen. Ali Shah Ahmadzai, the chief of the ALP program, which operates under the auspices of the Interior Ministry. "Re-vetting may take place, but training will not be halted."

The RFP, issued on June 7, 2012, provided for award of a fixed-price contract for security services at Forward Operating Base Lindsey, Afghanistan, for a 7-month base period and two 3-month option periods. Protest at 5. Offerors were informed that award would be made to the offeror providing the lowest-priced, technically acceptable offer. Proposals were evaluated on a pass-fail basis for technical capability, pricing, eligibility requirements, and past performance. Id. at 6-7. As relevant here, under the eligibility requirements evaluation factor, offerors were required to be affirmatively determined to be responsible in accordance with the standards of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 9 and the solicitation.

The Army received seven proposals, and in June awarded the contract to Olive Group. EOD received a written debriefing that informed the firm that, although EOD’s proposal was otherwise technically acceptable and offered the lowest price, it was determined to be not responsible. Id. at 10.

On July 5, EOD protested to our Office challenging the award to Olive Group and requesting that the Army suspend contract performance in accordance with the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA). On July 13, the Army advised our Office that it would reevaluate EOD’s responsibility and eligibility for award, and that, if the reevaluation results in a determination that EOD is eligible for award, the Army would “proceed accordingly.” In light of the Army’s proposed corrective action, we dismissed EOD’s protest as academic on July 16.

On July 25, EOD learned that the Army had authorized Olive Group to begin transitioning activities for contract performance, and was informed that EOD should have received official notice that it had again been found nonresponsible. Protest at 11. On July 31, EOD again protested to our Office objecting to the nonresponsibility determination, as well as the Army’s implementation of the corrective action and authorization for Olive Group to perform the contract. On August 4, the Army requested that EOD respond to specific concerns raised about EOD’s responsibility. On August 14, EOD filed a supplemental protest, arguing that the agency improperly re-awarded the contract to Olive Group and/or authorized contract performance before completing its reevaluation of OED’s responsibility.

The Army requests that we dismiss EOD’s protest as premature, stating that the agency has not yet completed its reevaluation of EOD’s responsibility. With respect to Olive Group’s performance of the contract, the Army contends that the agency was not required to continue to suspend contract performance because the CICA stay expired when GAO dismissed its protest. The Army also explains that it began to transition the contract to Olive Group in order to avoid a lapse of services.

We agree with the Army that where, as here, the agency has not yet made a new finding concerning EOD’s responsibility, EOD’s protest of the agency’s nonresponsibility determination is premature. In the event that the Army concludes that EOD is nonresponsible, the protester may re-file its protest, subject to our timeliness rules.

With respect to EOD’s argument that FAR § 9.105-2(a) requires the Army to complete its determination of EOD’s responsibility before awarding the contract to Olive Group or authorizing performance, this section indeed requires that “[w]hen an offer on which an award would otherwise be made is rejected because the prospective contractor is found to be nonresponsible, the contracting officer shall make . . . a determination of responsibility, which shall state the basis for the determination.” Here, the contracting officer in fact found EOD to be nonresponsible prior to awarding the contract to Olive Group. Although the Army’s corrective action involves a reevaluation of EOD’s responsibility, this does not implicate the agency’s compliance with FAR § 9.105-2(a) prior to awarding the contract to Olive Group.

The protest is dismissed.

Lynn H. Gibson
General Counsel

credit: http://www.gao.gov