DoD Contractor Personnel in the USCENTCOM AOR

*2,567 Armed Private Security Contractor Personnel

o Contractor Posture: Approximately 30,561 DoD contractors supported operations in Afghanistan during 2 nd quarter FY19, an increase of 4% from 1st quarter FY19. Local Nationals comprise 19.8% of total contractor force; 24,492 US/TCN remain to redeploy.

o A total of 2,567 Private Security Contractors (PSCs) personnel were supporting USCENTCOM operations in Afghanistan as of 2nd quarter FY19.

DoD PSC Personnel in Afghanistan

*These numbers include most subcontractors and service contractors hired by prime contractors under DoD contracts.

 USCENTCOM Vendor Vetting. In accordance with the FY15 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 841, Never Contract with the Enemy, General Votel, former Commander USCENTCOM, designated two companies, and associated entities, as supporting the insurgency. The designations ensure the companies will not be eligible for U.S. Government contracts in the future. During the 2 nd quarter of FY19, the Vendor Vetting Decision Board considered 198 companies, resulting in 167 “Acceptable” rated companies (84.3%), and 31 were rated “Unacceptable without Mitigation” (15.7%).

 USCENTCOM Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC). The OCSIC participated in the USCENTCOM J4 (CCJ4) Joint Strategic Support Board, injecting Operational Contract Support (OCS) scenarios to inform planning efforts. USCENTCOM continues to work with the Service components and Joint Task Forces to refine OCS processes and procedures to improve contract support integration and contractor management.
USCENTCOM continues transitioning OCS capabilities from Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar to Headquarters USCENTCOM to improve OCS integration and synchronization across the staff. Estimated completion date of relocation, May 2019.

 Combined Joint Task Force-OIR (CJTF-OIR). The 408th Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) continues to provide contracting support for the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA) on behalf of U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT). Last quarter, the CJTF-OIR published the Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). CJTF-OIR and the 408th CSB continue to review and streamline processes to provide flexible
and agile contracting solutions in support of the CJOA. Additionally, the CJTF-OIR OCSIC is working with requirement owners to identify services for de-scoping or elimination to achieve maximum cost savings.

 U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) OCSIC. USFOR-A and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) continue to assess and right-size contracted support to provide executable options in pursuit of established strategic goals. The OCSIC implemented Contract Management Reviews to identify requirements for reduction, consolidation, elimination, or transition to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Thus far in FY19, the USFOR-A JRRB has validated 251 requirements valued at approximately $2.3B.

IMPROVEMENTS TO MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF DOD CONTRACTORS

 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ODASD) Logistics.

o 2 nd Quarter FY19 OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB). The Department’s senior executive OCS governance forum held its 2nd quarterly meeting on February 28, 2019 to review status of OCS integration initiatives and challenges. A key topic of discussion included revision of the board’s 2014 charter to better align with National Defense Strategy objectives and emerging requirements. Board members and other senior leaders were asked to provide suggested changes for review at the next quarterly meeting. The first annual report to Congress on OCS capability of the Armed Forces is in final coordination and will be delivered to congress by May 30, 2019. This recurring annual reporting requirement will be compiled by ODASD(Logistics) in collaboration with the OCS FCIB and other stakeholders. The next quarterly FCIB principal’s meeting will be held on May 28, 2019.

o Implementation Update: OCS Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities-Policy (DOTmLPF-P) Change Recommendation (DCR). On January 24, 2019, ODASD(Logistics) presented the first semi-annual progress update to the Logistics Functional Capabilities Board (FCB). The presentation was well received and the FCB requested expansion of applicable DCR tasks to
Headquarters Defense Logistics Agency and select Functional Combatant Commands. During February-March, a series of focus group meetings were held to review strategies for development of OCS planning factors, integration of OCS enabling capabilities in DoD Expeditionary Civilian program requirements, and integration of OCS in service force structure analyses. Currently, 32 of the 54 required draft implementation plans have been submitted and a few actions may be recommended for closure within the next 30-60 days. The Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service also initiated the first in a series of subject matter expert panels to develop an OCS competency model for DoD civilian personnel, as required by the OCS Joint DCR. This model will serve as a foundation for OCS human capital requirements and resourcing actions. The next DCR working group meeting will be held on April 19, 2019.

o Defense Standards for Security Services.

 All DoD contracts for private security services require compliance with American National Standard Institute (ANSI) PSC.1-2012 (R2017), “Quality Management Standard for Private Security Company Operations” or ISO 18788-2015 “Management Systems for Private Security Operations.” All private security companies at any tier are certified to one or both of these standards.

 A total of 77 private security companies from 21 different countries have achieved independent third party certification to one or both of these standards. Another 28 private security companies from 17 countries are known to have begun the certification process. This is an increase of 12% since the last report.

 Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). JCASO continues to provide Combatant Commands a joint enabling capability to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize OCS during peacetime, contingency operations, and post-conflict operations. JCASO provides fulltime deliberate OCS planning support to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) via two embedded JCASO OCS Planners at each staff. Specific GCC support activities include:

o USCENTCOM Support:

 OCS Planning: OCS planning support included development of the OCS Plans Dashboard, Annual Joint Assessment, and continued to support USCENTCOM’s OCSIC optimization and re-posturing from Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar to Headquarters USCENTCOM. Additional support was provided to Exercise INTERNAL LOOK-20 (IL ‘20) Initial Planning Event (IPE), Joint Strategic Sustainment Board (JSSB) Wargame and Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE) MRX.

 OCS Tutor Pilot Program: OCS Tutors remained embedded with the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command to assist in developing and implementing OCS programs, including training and product/tool development. At USARCENT, the tutor provided targeted, mission specific OCS tutoring/training to multiple echelon-above-brigade units scheduled to rotate into the AOR during the next cycle.

o U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and the OCS Rapid Enhancement Initiative (REI). JCASO Mission Support Teams (MSTs) continued to provide support to USEUCOM and Service Components to develop a process to evaluate operational risks associated with use of commercial support within the CCMD’s major plans.

 The Joint Staff (JS), J4, Operational Contract Support Division (OCSD).

o OCS Reporting. Combatant Command, Service, and Agency quarterly reporting have been adjusted to annual in accordance with changes in law regarding Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Risk Assessments on Contract Support. The OCS Reporting Working Group updated the reporting template to focus reporting at the beginning of each fiscal year on risk
and highlighted guidance and products to improve military planning. JS J4 provided input to the Joint Military Net Assessment and the Annual Joint Assessment products to integrate commercial capabilities into strategic processes. JS J4 identified requirements for future studies to inform use of commercial capabilities.

o OCS Education. OCSD, in cooperation with JS J7, completed the OCS portion of the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education assessment of the National War College at Ft. McNair, Washington DC. To date, 6 of 29 assessed Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programs have achieved their OCS joint learning objectives in accordance with law
and Chairman’s policy for OCS in JPME.

o OCS Planning. In February, the JS published an updated CJCS Manual 3130.03A, Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance. The revised manual integrates OCS and commercial capabilities throughout—facilitating identification of requirements for commercial capabilities and consideration of contractor personnel in planning. OCSD also coordinated revised OCS content in the Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, which guides logistics planning across commands.

o Individual Training.

 Joint OCS Planning and Execution Courses (JOPEC). Delivered two (January and February) JOPECs to 53 students. Since the course’s founding in 2013, 1,427 students have been trained.

 Joint Knowledge On-line (JKO). During the 2nd quarter FY19, 503 personnel completed the Joint OCS Essentials for Commanders and Staff (JOECS) Phase 1 and 83 personnel completed the Phase 2 online course. As of March 24, 2019, 13,923 personnel have completed an OCS introductory online course.

o Staff Joint Training. Supported USEUCOM on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Table Top Exercise (TTX) OCS series of events. TTX #1, on February 14, 2019, familiarized both USEUCOM and NATO on their respective logistics and contracting equities in USEUCOM’s plans. TTX #2, a U.S. event on February 20-21, 2019, advanced considering how USEUCOM and NATO nations might leverage the NATO Support Procurement Activity for mission-critical commercial support during combined operations.

 U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM). CASCOM published a white paper in January 2019, examining the potential challenges and risk associated with the reliance on commercial support in a future large scale ground combat operation. Additionally, CASCOM launched an improved Common Access Card-enabled OCS information portal, providing deployed and deploying units with OCS policy, doctrine, videos, training resources, and links to other useful information.

According to Stars & Stripes, while still battling the Taliban, over 500 bases, shuttering many and downsizing others to be given to the Afghan forces. Some $860 million in property was transferred by 2015, including four logistics hubs, 13 operating bases and hundreds of tactical outposts, the Defense Department has said. About $48 million more was destroyed or abandoned.

Today, Shank’s perimeter walls still stand, tracing a long pill-shape with the Afghan Camp Maiwand on its northern end. About five miles away, the southern tip hosts a small U.S. Special Forces camp and an American outpost called Camp Dahlke West that’s been built up recently.

In between is a vast swath of deserted buildings and ruined tent villages that U.S. troops have dubbed “Zombieland.”

Afghan troops use a similar term: “Houses for demons.” It describes several former coalition facilities “because no one is using them,” said Atiqullah Amarkhail, a retired Afghan general.

Shank’s dilapidation was the result of resource limitations, claimed Safi, who heads a brigade in the army’s 203rd Corps. He has been fighting in Logar province for about 10 years and was posted at Shank in its prime.

Back then, its population of U.S. and coalition troops, civilians and contractors topped 8,000. Today, Safi’s troops here number one-fifth that, he said.

“We do not have the people to maintain the base — we have almost no people here,” Safi said via translator. “The rest are out at checkpoints.”

Even with a base full of troops, Safi couldn’t afford to maintain it, he said, claiming the facilities are too costly to run. Everything the Americans left requires power, he said, even bathroom door locks his troops have replaced with ordinary padlocks.

Despite $2 billion in U.S.-funded power projects, Afghanistan’s grid remains underdeveloped and unreliable, and bases often depend on electric generators to power lights, heaters and other equipment.

For just one of the big tents now rotting in Zombieland, the Americans would burn about 80 gallons of fuel a night, said Safi, who spent hours one January morning searching room to room in his headquarters for a working heater.

“Where are Afghans supposed to get that much fuel?” Safi asked. He said later: “The Americans, money has no value for them.”

In a tent on the nearby snow-covered U.S. camp that same weekend, the Americans cranked the heat so high that one soldier wore shorts and another offered guests cold drinks to cool off.

While DOD provides the Afghans more than a million gallons of fuel a year, Kabul often struggles with logistics challenges, as well as frequent theft of gas and other property.