Private Military Contractors

Contractor Life: What’s it like working in Iraq?

October 7, 2016 | Contractor Life

By Ed O'Keefe — Interested in working for the U.S. government in Iraq? Though the dangers are obvious, the pay and perks can be pretty good.

Federal employees and contractors serving here face an almost-daily barrage of rocket attacks, the inability to travel freely, scorching hot temperatures and other cultural and linguistic limitations. But workers with the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development and other federal agencies keep on coming, especially as the U.S. presence here becomes more of a civilian affair.

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Despite the violence, harsh temperatures and separation from family, serving the U.S. government in a war zone often guarantees promotions and ultimately can lead to assignments at the most coveted diplomatic outposts, according to current and former officials who’ve served time in Iraq.

So how much can a typical federal worker in Iraq anticipate earning?

Let’s use a current State Department job posting as an example: Foggy Bottom is seeking a new “monitoring and evaluation advisor” to oversee Iraq-based projects of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs – the entity responsible for conducting high-level Iraqi police training (more on this in the coming weeks).

For our purposes, let’s say the eventual job winner (we’ll call him “Frank the Foreign Service Officer”) earns an annual salary of $100,000 plus traditional federal benefits (annual leave, sick leave, federal health and life insurance plans, 10 paid federal holidays and normal vacation accrual.)

Frank’s Iraq assignment includes danger pay and “post differential pay” (the global equivalent of locality pay), each equaling 35 percent of his base salary. This means Frank will earn an additional $70,000 for working in Iraq. ($100,000 base salary x .70 = $70,000 more.)

If Frank speaks Arabic, he can also earn a prorated language credit, ranging from 5 to 15 percent of base pay depending on his level of skill. ($100,000 x .15 = $15,000 more.)

Though the compensation can add up fast, no pay package in Iraq this year will exceed $227,300 annually, according to State Department rules.

Once hired, Frank is expected to work in Iraq for one year and isn’t officially guaranteed two-day weekends. (After all, diplomacy doesn’t stop on Saturdays and Sundays.) To make up for seven-day work weeks, less experienced Foreign Service officers earn overtime pay for working nights, holidays and Sundays, while senior FSOs earn a 20 percent pay bump over the course of the year (based on the assumption that they work at least 55 hours per week).

Once he’s ready to recharge his batteries, Frank will be eligible for “rest and recuperation breaks” back in the U.S., or “regional rest breaks” in other Middle Eastern countries.

Each “R&R” lasts 22 days, including travel to and from Baghdad (which the State Department pays for.) Depending on Frank’s orders, he might be required to visit headquarters in Washington during an R&R.

“RRBs” last for seven days, including travel time. The State Department pays for round-trip air travel to Amman or Kuwait, but Frank will have to pay to get to his final Mideast destination. (The Eye heartily recommends going north to Istanbul.)

Over the course of his year-long assignment, Frank can take either three “R&Rs” or a combination of two “R&Rs” and three “RRBs.”

Though the pay and benefits for working in Iraq seem nice, remember that unlike other diplomatic assignments, Frank’s family cannot come with him. And while the embassy in London or the consulate in Osaka might be located near choice pubs and hibachi tables, most meals in Baghdad come from the embassy cafeteria, the embassy coffee shop, or Subway and Pizza Hut.

Still, working in Iraq and Afghanistan comes with long-term career benefits. Employees who apply early enough in the process can sign up for “linked assignments” that require one year of service in a war zone followed by a guaranteed posting in the city of their choice.

So if Frank is willing to do time in Baghdad, his dream assignment in Rome could conceivably become a reality.

The scenario above is just one example of what Americans working in a war zone might expect. By no means will all of the State Department and USAID workers, contractors and private security guards assigned to Iraq in the coming months be paid the same way.

And, of course, no payment or perk could match the sacrifice made by workers who choose to serve in harm’s way and never make it home.

By Ed O'Keefe of the Washington Post

Recent study shows why privatization in NATO missions backfires

September 7, 2016 | OVERSEAS INTEL

Professional Overseas Contractors

This article examines the relation between NATO member states and the deployment of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in NATO missions. The phenomenon of PMSCs and the deployment of PMSCs has been extensively researched. The deployment of PMSCs by NATO member states in NATO missions has not been researched as much.

The article provides three hypothesis to test whether the deployment of PMSCs by NATO member states should be increased. The ISAF NATO mission is analysed using an regulatory case study, in order to provide an answer to the question why NATO member states deploy PMSCs in NATO missions. Over the course of the ISAF mission, the quality and quantity of deployed PMSCs varied, making it debatable whether the deployment of PMSCs in NATO mission was beneficial.

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Research points out that NATO member states deploy PMSCs due to their financial, political, and military advantages. The deployment of PMSCs reduces the financial and the political costs of participation, but does not provide military advantages that outweigh the disadvantages.

In modern warfare not only states fight for influence in international affairs. More actors are pulled into military operations by states and military alliances to act on their behalf at the battlefield. Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are such actors which can be found in conflict areas around the world. Since the early 1960s and their presence is rapidly expanding. Member states of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a military alliance for Northern American and European states, use PMSCs in military operations as well leading to good, bad, and sometimes ugly results. In this introduction the rise of PMSCs is outlined, followed by the presentation of the research puzzle, and the associated research questions.

Private Military & Security

Since the 19th century the deployment of military forces motivated by personal gain, referred to as mercenaries, is considered illegitimate (Minow, 2005). With the emergence of the nation state, states and their military forces were assigned special status in relation to security at both the national as the international level. The special status of states in relation to war and security was formalised by various conventions, treaties, and charters such as the Montevideo Convention (1933) (Stenner, 2014) Kellog-Briand Pact (1928), the UN charter (1945), and the Geneva Conventions (Krahmann, 2013). At the end of the 20th century recruitment and deployment of military forces motivated by personal gains turned into the deployment of private military and security companies (PMSCs) with commercial motives. The use of PMSCs in conflict areas has expanded over the past 20 years both in numbers of company employees and in frequency of deployment (Leander, 2005). In this thesis a PMSC is defined as a non-governmental actor who offers military services such as consultancy, intelligence, logistics, or/and support to military operations. The act of deploying PMSCs in NATO missions is defined as the contracting of PMSCs by a NATO member state for the purpose of supporting that member state’s national army. Throughout the thesis, ‘national forces’ refers to the military forces of the respective NATO member state.

Research puzzle

The phenomenon of the rise and use of PMSCs by states has been topic of multiple studies. The deployment of PMSCs in NATO missions is hardly researched. NATO missions are military crisis-management operations under NATO command. The legitimate use of force is defined as proportional force used by the state. There is little known about why organisations such as NATO allow the deployment of PMSCs by NATO member states, given the clash with the state’s monopoly on violence and the great influence PMSCs have on the outcomes of military operations (Hammes, 2011). This thesis focusses on the question why NATO member states deploy PMSCs in NATO missions, and what the associated consequences are for the NATO mission.

The following answers five main questions:

What tasks do the deployed PMSCs have in NATO missions?
What military and security tasks do PMSCs take over from national armies?
What are the financial consequences of the PMSC deployment in NATO missions?
What are the political consequences of the PMSC deployment in NATO missions?
What are the military consequences of the PMSC deployment in NATO missions?

The Rise of Private Military Security Companies

History

Scholars such as Halpin (2011) and Singer (2005), explain the rise of PMSCs through the decline of the role of the nation state and the end of the Cold. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, took away a major source of military tensions across the world, leading to decreases in defence budgets and downsizing of military forces (Stenner, 2014). Together with advanced electronic military equipment replacing man power, the decline in demand for national forces can be explained through the collapse of the Soviet Union (Baum & McGahan, 2013; Halpin, 2011). Often experienced and well-trained, these redundant former soldiers turned to PMSCs, who were able to select from a worldwide pool of job seekers those with the best expertise. PMSCs thus became able to quickly mobilise high-level military forces to take over military and security tasks of national forces (Hammes, 2011). The privatisation of government tasks throughout the 1980s (Sullivan, 2010), led to the privatisation in the national military as well

Ideology

The rise of PMSCs can be explained from an ideological perspective. Liberalisation and privatisation where meant to bring efficiency to government institutions. The wave of privatisation stemming from USA president Ronald Reagan in the 1980s led to the outsourcing of government tasks such as postal services, railways, as well as the contracting of private companies. This ideology of liberalisation also lead to the outsourcing of military and security government tasks (Sullivan, 2010; Fahn & Hadjer, 2015). Influential states such as the United States of America (USA) play an important role in the emergence, deployment and legalisation of PMSCs in security situations around the world. In this thesis a norm is defined in the words of Gregory Raymond, that norms are ‘generalised standards of conduct that delineate the scope of a state’s entitlements, the extent of this obligations, and the range of its jurisdiction’ .

Market

The rise of PMSCs in contemporary politics also relates to economic principles such as market demand and supply. States deploys PMSCs because they are considered to be less expensive than national troops. The market for private military services, expanded over the years due to increased demand from various actors such as governments, NGO’s, and international organisations, and correlating increased supply of services provided by PMSCs. This lead to increased availability and competition among PMSCs, lowering prices overall, making PMSC deployment even more advantageous for states.

Mercenary

PMSCs and mercenaries share characteristics. There is no fully agreed upon definition of ‘mercenary’ (Bures, 2005; Petersohn, 2014) nor ‘PMSC’ (Bures, 2005; Minow, 2005). Various scholars have nevertheless differentiated both concepts based on their tasks in combat situations (Petersohn, 2014). A mercenary is often defined as a fighter ‘participating in combat for pay’ (Petersohn, 2014, p.476), and has three characteristics (Bures, 2005):

- mercenaries are external to the military conflict

- the motivation for participating in the conflict are private gains

- mercenaries participate in combat situations.

The Geneva Conventions prohibit the deployment and use of mercenaries under the rule of Additional Protocol 1 (1977) (Krahmann, 2013). A precise definition of a PMSC is difficult due to differences in corporate structure, goals, and services (Stenner, 2014). Just like mercenaries, PMSCs are often foreign to the conflict, and are motivated by private gains. Under current norms and regulations private military contractors are not allowed to engage in combat situations, except in self-defence cases such as ambushes (Leander, 2005).

Hypotheses

In the article of Fahn & Hadjer (2015) is stated that financial, political, and military factors are the three parameters determining whether states will deploy PMSCs. Financial, political, and military factors help to break down the motivations of states for deploying PMSCs. These three parameters, are used to generate hypothesis related to the motivations of member states to deploy PMSCs in NATO missions.

Financial factors

The financial advantages of PMSC deployment for military purposes in the short and long run are widely proclaimed by scholars and government institutions (Fahn & Hadjer, 2015; Pattison, 2008; Halpin, 2011). The quality of PMSCs can be equal to that of national armies, and PMSCs are able to perform the tasks of national armies for less in the short run (Fahn & Hadjer, 2015; Sullivan, 2010). Contrary to national forces, PMSCs are subject to the competition and bidding of other PMSCs. In order to be awarded a contract by a state (or another actor), PMSCs have to offer the lowest price possible. National forces are not subject to this competition against other military actors, and thus have less incentive to reduce the costs of their deployment. This basic functioning of the market for force leads to lower prices (Leander, 2005). In the long run PMSCs are financially beneficial as well. National armies are expensive. The average training costs of a UK infantry soldier are £ 34.000 (UK army secretariat, personal communication, January 21, 2015). For a USA infantry soldier that is about US$ 44,000 (Olick, 2002). This in combination with pensions and social security benefits makes national forces relatively expensive in the long run (Fallows, 2015; Giraldi, 2015). PMSCs provide a cheaper alternative: the costs of PMSC deployment are short term and the contractors do not have to receive training or benefits at the expense of the tax payer in the long run (Halpin, 2011). In times when national forces are not as much needed, it is hard to decrease the amount of national forces due to their contracts ensuring benefits and potential future needs (Sullivan, 2010). While the defence spending of NATO member states is steadily decreasing (Statista, 2016a), NATO member states have great military ambitions on the international stage (AIV, 2007; Mattelear, 2016). Thus member states have to find ways to perform the same tasks for less money (The American Interest, 2016).

Political factors

Fahn & Hadjer (2015) and Hammes (2011) state that PMSCs decrease the political costs of executing military actions and operations. Sometimes states pursue policies that are unpopular, leading to political opposition towards these policies. The greater the political opposition, the greater the political costs of executing this policy. The deployment of PMSCs can reduce the political costs of participation in NATO missions by reducing the amount of deployed national forces (Singer, 2005), replacing national forces in dangerous situations (AIV, 2007), and by performing tasks national forces are not mandated to execute, thus limiting public debate about the mandate of national forces (Fahn & Hadjer, 2015).

NATO member states are vulnerable to domestic political pressure to related to participation in NATO missions (Silverstone, 2002). Domestic opposition towards NATO missions increases (Saikal, 2006; Kitchen, 2010), NATO member states have to find ways to participate in NATO missions the same tasks with less political costs. By deploying PMSCs, less national army personnel is involved (Fahn & Hadjer, 2015) and shortages of national forces are filled (Singer,2005).

Military factors

Another justification of PMSC deployment by states is their military professionalism (Halpin, 2011). The professionalism of PMSCs becomes clear due to the quality of PMSCs, and the practical advantages PMSCs have over national forces. PMSCs have qualitative advantages over national armies because they tend to recruit already highly trained and experienced forces regardless of their nationality due to the higher salaries (Hammes, 2011). PMSCs can be qualitatively as good or even better than national forces (Leander, 2005). Adding to that is the fact that PMSCs have various military advantages over national forces such as rapid deployment capabilities (Hammes, 2011; Sullivan, 2010), familiarity with local population and customs (AIV, 2007), and providing and maintaining military equipment (Singer, 2005). In general PMSCs are increasingly capable of taking over military tasks of national forces.

Methodology

A qualitative analysis of existing literature is conducted and the single case study method is used to research potential changes in the amount of deployed PMSCs in the ISAF NATO mission. The time and space bound nature of a case study allows the comparison of the deployment of PMSCs throughout the period, making it possible to compare the motivations for PMSC deployment within a NATO mission. This comparison within the case helps to better test the constructed hypotheses. This research is explanatory in nature as it explains how motivations for PMSC deployment in NATO missions (independent variable), change the number of deployed PMSCs (dependent variable) during the ISAF mission. Results from the analysis of the case study are gathered and structured in order to either reject or accept the hypotheses.

Case selection

Since the end of the Cold War, NATOs military operations and missions have expanded to non-NATO territories (Kitchen, 2010), such as Afghanistan. The globalisation of security threats to NATO member states and the financial constraints for defence expenditures of NATO member states challenge the NATO alliance to find ways to conduct military missions with less resources (Wittmann, 2010). The ISAF mission is one of the recent NATO missions in which new tactics to coop with these challenges have been implemented, such as the deployment of PMSCs.

The ISAF is a revelatory case because it is one of the NATO missions taking place during the rise of PMSCs, thus being one of the few cases in which the phenomenon of PMSC deployment in NATO missions can be found. The selected NATO mission is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (2001 - 2014) (NATO, 2015a). The majority of NATO member states participated in the ISAF mission and due to the fact that the mission has ended recently, the contemporary status of PMSC deployment in NATO missions can be analysed.

A qualitative content analysis of written sources is the best methodology to analyse the phenomenon of PMSC deployment by NATO member states. This qualitative analysis provides the opportunity to merge the findings of multiple scholars into objective answers to the research questions.

The used literature can be researched by other scholars, increasing the dependability of this research.

The credibility of this research is based on primary sources such as rapports of governmental organisations, news articles, and datasets related to the deployment of PMSCs in the ISAF mission, and secondary sources such as peer-reviewed articles of scholars.

The transferability of the findings towards other NATO missions is good, given that the presented hypotheses will help to develop a method or model structuring the motivations for PMSC deployment by NATO member states.

What about ISAF

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a military mission from 2001 – 2014 issued by United Nations Security Council resolution 1386, which came under full NATO command in 2003. The main objective of the ISAF mission was to support the Afghan government, by setting up an effective internal security system, to prevent insurgents from uprising, and to eliminate international terrorist threats. During the ISAF mission 51 nation states participated, leading to a 130,000 strong force at its peak. The ISAF mission steadily expanded its reach from the surroundings of Kabul in 2001 to Afghanistan as a whole in 2006. ISAF forces were met with fierce resistance from insurgents especially in the East and South of Afghanistan (NATO, 2015a). In the ISAF case study PMSCs were used by NATO member states (Hammes, 2011)

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State Department leaves contractors in Afghanistan without escape plan

August 31, 2016 | The Danger Zone

By Sara A. Carter — Surrounded by increasing violence and instability, U.S. contractors left behind in Afghanistan are raising alarm about the potential for another Benghazi tragedy, saying the State Department isn't sharing with them a plan to evacuate if insurgents launch a debilitating attack.

The concerns are heightened by the fact that many of those civilians doing the security and nation-building work of the U.S. government hold sensitive security clearances, making them an attractive target for the enemy.

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And the situation could become even more precarious after the U.S. military in Afghanistan draws down to just 8,400 troops by year's end.

"It's not just a political nightmare for somebody, it's people's lives at stake," said Kevin Ofchus, head of Georgia-based firm Host Nations Perspectives Southwest Asia (HNPSWA) that has security contracts in Afghanistan.

The current situation

"The State Department says there's a lack of infrastructure to support an emergency response after we've spent 15 years and billions of dollars on infrastructure," he added.

Ofchus's company is a member of the State Department's Overseas Security Advisory Committee, and it chairs the Crisis Management Advisory Subcommittee in Kabul, which advises companies about security working in hot-zones.

And his sentiments are widely shared by a dozen other federal contractors in theater interviewed by Circa, some of whom would only talk on condition of anonymity because they feared reprisal from Washington.

Several said they are resigned to fight their own way out of a crisis, just like the real-life Benghazi contractors portrayed in the movie "13 Hours"

"I was told 'don't bother going to Kabul, grab your weapon and fight your way through until you can reach an aircraft' or whatever," said one contractor working in Afghanistan, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

"I don't think any of us count on State Department to have their shit together. I've never seen, heard or prepared for any evacuation plan."
— -Anonymous contractor

So is there a plan?

State Department officials told Circa that there is an evacuation plan, but they could not release any details about it because it was classified.

Mike Warren, a security director for the USAID-backed Mining Investment and Development for Afghanistan Sustainability Project, known as MIDAS, says he believes State has a very remedial plan but it fails on almost every security protocol.

"The Department of State, in close coordination with the Department of Defense, has a crisis response plan for Afghanistan that encompasses civilians and contractors. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in close coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, maintains a classified Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations plan to support the chief of mission," the department wrote in an email.

"I know the U.S. Embassy was working on a plan, but it's a shell of what they need," Warren said in a phone interview from Kabul. "There appears to be a lack of coordinated effort between the U.S. Embassy and the American companies and personnel here in Afghanistan."

"I know the U.S. Embassy was working on a plan, but it's a shell of what they need."

— Mike Warren, security director for MIDAS

Circa obtained a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the State Department and Department of Defense governing the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens and nationals from threatened areas overseas. The document specifically outlines the duties and requirements of the various agencies.

The Secretary of State "will prepare the plans for the protection and evacuation of all U.S. citizens and nationals and designated other persons abroad, including the Department of Defense (non-combatants)."

It stipulates that the agency is responsible for the welfare and protection, must have a designated safe-zone for evacuation if possible and "coordination to maximize timely use of available military transportation assets and existing host nation support infrastructure."

U.S. contractors in Afghanistan says no such formal plan has ever been shared with them. Edward McCallum, a U.S. contractor and a retired Special Forces operator whose work takes him often to Afghanistan, said if the Taliban launched a massive attack on Kabul "it's going to make Saigon '75 look like child's play, if we don't have a plan in place."

"It's going to make Saigon '75 look like child's play if we don't have a plan in place."

— Edward McCallum, U.S. contractor

Conditions continue to deteriorate

More than 1,600 contractors have been killed since the U.S. war began in Afghanistan in late 2001. And insurgent attacks on U.S. facilities, contractors, and Afghan security forces have been escalating over the past year.

Here's one example: In May 2012, employees with Ofchus' company fought off a multi-pronged suicide attack by Taliban insurgents at a compound on the outskirts of Kabul used by foreign contractors.

His security forces, made up of retired American Special Forces operators, fought the Taliban for more than three hours and kept the insurgents from entering the compound and seizing equipment and people.

It took hours before any help made it to the compound, he said.

On June 22, the State Department updated its Afghanistan travel warning, declaring that "the U.S. Embassy's ability to provide emergency consular services to U.S. citizens in Afghanistan is severely limited, particularly outside of Kabul. U.S. citizens are encouraged to defer non-essential travel within Afghanistan and note that evacuation options from Afghanistan are extremely limited due to the lack of infrastructure, geographic constraints, and other security concerns."

State Department officials referred Circa to the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program, known as STEP, that "enables all registered Americans to receive important information from the Embassy about safety conditions in Afghanistan and also helps the U.S. Embassy contact them in an emergency, whether natural disaster, civil unrest, or other crisis."

Ofchus said that the STEP program "does not fulfill the requirements of the MOU (Memorandum of Agreement) nor does it address the Benghazi scenario," in which, three contractors and U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens were killed in a stand-off that lasted 13-hours. The families of the victims and some employees of the State Department criticized the agency for lack of security and planning.

"The travel warning on the website is not solved by the STEP program," Ofchus said.

James Pitchford is a retired Navy Reserve commander and founder of Pinchas Ltd., a national security consulting firm in Washington.

He told Circa warnings of the dire situation have been ignored.

"U.S. officials risk Benghazi 2.0 by not preparing a Non-Combatant Evacuation Order plan," Pitchfork said, adding that "U.S. Embassy officials are telling anyone who will listen that in the event of a crisis the plan is to lock down the U.S. Embassy compound."

"US officials risk Benghazi 2.0 by not preparing a Non-Combatant Evacuation Order plan."

— James Pitchford, former Navy Reserve commander

"This means that any Americans not already in place at a US military site, such as Bagram, or on the U.S. Embassy compound will have to fare for themselves and will be at the mercy of insurgents who will be seeking any Americans they can find," he added.

Pitchford, who also served as a senior aide in the Senate for nine years, overseeing the military and national security, said U.S. armored vehicles, weapons and other gear could be used against the people of Afghanistan, "if it falls into the hands of insurgents."

The contradiction, say contractors working in the region, is that the U.S. and Afghanistan government continue to push for more stability and security programs in the country, which require more trainers and other foreign employees.

Many of these workers conduct business outside more secured areas in Kabul, like the U.S. Embassy and established military bases, like Bagram Air Field, they said.

The history and what's next

In February, 1998, then President Bill Clinton, amended Presidential Executive Order 12656, which requires the State Department to have a prepared plan of action.

The Clinton amendment went further, saying State Department and Defense Department must "be responsible for the deployment and use of military forces for the protection of United States citizens and nationals in support of their evacuation from threatened areas overseas."

In Benghazi, Libya the situation quickly deteriorated on Sept. 11, 2012 when the CIA Annex and consulate was attacked by the al-Qaeda arm known as Ansar Al-Sharia.

In 2014, when the State Department had to evacuate in Tripoli the Office of Inspector General concluded the embassy "did not adequately prepare for or execute all aspects of its July 2014 evacuation."

Ofchus said he has presented plans and briefed OSAC and government officials in the past six months several times.

"Department of Defense and Department of State own it, and if anything happens it will be up to them but no one could provide a copy or any set information on a plan, and any plan they have is one-hundred percent reactive," Ofchus said.

"Any plan they have is 100 percent reactive."

— Kevin Ofchus

The State Department was chastised in 2013 by its Inspector General for lacking a stringent plan to evacuate the U.S. Embassy and secure classified documents. The Inspector General warned that failure to secure U.S. compounds throughout the region placed "unnecessary risk to staff" and "classified documents" were at risk of being confiscated by the enemy.

The Inspector General launched the investigation after an eight-hour Taliban attack on the embassy in September, 2013.

Ofchus warned the current crisis "is a bad, bad recipe but we have a solution to address the problem and the Executive order."

"Afghanistan is demonstrably unstable. It isn't a matter of if, only a matter of when."

— Kevin Ofchus

CIRCA - http://circa.com/ by Sara A. Carter

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