Towards a Second Contractors’ War in Iraq?

The retreat of American forces from Iraq in 2011 and relative security stability in following years have questioned again the status and role of foreign private security companies in the new context. Both Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have conducted a massive recruiting policy, as per 2014 the total number of employees exceeded 600’000. From another perspective, the American Department of State – that still used more than 5’000 private contractors for security services and other American or foreign civil companies, especially in oil industry, continued to utilize PMSC.

CENTCOM AOR (Central Command’s Area of Responsibility) have continued to work with companies like DynCorp International, Vectrus Systems Corp, Constellis Group and so on, contracts ranging often up to hundreds of millions of dollars, for different specific operations: technical and logistical support, training, maintenance, security. However, Iraqi government’s policy after 2011 was to try exerting effectively its security attributions; the negative image attached to PMSC in previous years imposed less visibility and activity (of PMSC) outside highly specialised domains of action.

However, as tragically proved in June 2014 by Mosul’s fall, real Iraqi military potential was not only exaggerated but disastrous. Lack of experience and motivation concerning both troops and officers, cumulative to recent discoveries of massive funds defalcation within military and security institutions, largely spread corruption, have all resulted in a catastrophic situation regarding real capability of Iraqi military structures, despite training programs carried out by the United States, NATO or different European states, before and after 2011. The fall of Iraqi military and security forces after 2014, in terms of image and efficacy, the necessity to block Islamic State’s offensive towards main city and other regions, as well as the project meant to regain territories occupied by militant jihadi structures, have determined the apparition of parallel structures that would assume the tasks of defense and protection. Firstly, there are Shi’a militias created by Shi’a political forces, that recruit massively and are supported by Iran. They have supported official Iraqi troops and sometimes have conducted operations exclusively/with Peshmerga troops, in order to repel the Islamic State or even retake territories like Tikrit.

The reticence of United States and European powers to directly involve, on the field, against Daesh, has reopened the discussion on using PMSC as alternative option to support Iraqi forces on the ground, since operations against Daesh require experience and equipment that the Iraqi army does not possess. Consequently, DoD and other American officials have considered the idea of an increased re-implication in Iraq, not directly but through a relaunch of PMSCs system. Without the ability to mobilize like in previous decade, “America’s Second Contractors’ War” Iraq is discussed intensively. If American participation in the form of financed PMSCs is privileged, it is this time integrated in a larger frame, i.e. the “private Muslim Expeditionary Force”, comprising former members of military and security services from Arab and Muslim states, instrumentalized as ground force against the Islamic State.

Until now, such an organized structure has not been implemented, due to both Iraqi opposition and the difficulty in overcoming numerous rivalries and particular policies of the Arab states. Furthermore, as legitimacy and authority of the Iraqi state was fragile during previous decade, the massive reactivation of PMSCs raises a series of practical and juridical problems. Which authority should assume decisions and attribution of actions? The Iraqi one, leadership of the company, United States, another foreign state authority or a unified command center? Then, taking into consideration recent history marked by abuses, excesses, breach of national Iraqi jurisdiction, etc., the issue of legality regarding contractor’s status and responsibility is raised. Finally, what should be the role of regular military forces in the context of reactivated military operations carried out by PMSCs? How compatible are the two types of structure, is it possible to conduct joint missions and especially, what is the financial status of regular troops when compared to contractors, whose resources are far superior? Motivation is strictly dependent on received retribution especially in nowadays Iraq, as fidelity to nation and state becomes relatively fragile. Perpetuation and accentuation of ethnical, sectarian, tribal fidelity, encouraged by the fact that even the Islamic State claims to be the protector of Sunnis and forces a sectarian narrative on the Iraqi society, limits the authority of Iraqi state. A military and security support granted through reactivation of PMSCs could be efficient on short term in countering the Sunni insurrection, but it contains implicitly the seeds of pronounced political instability. A foreign intervention would certify security limits and incapacity of the Iraqi state and would force it to manage the complex situation of foreign troops on its soil, financial consequences it involves and the possible reactivation of armed confrontation between population and contractors.

As new threats arise and the PMSCs are already in place in the Middle East, despite their documented abuse on human rights and the negative stress on the local judiciary in the countries they operate, their role as private security providers will be preserved. On a larger scale, from corporate perspective, the continuous presence in hostile environments of the PMSCs grant them an undisputed role in military and reconstruction operations and now they are part of the extremely influential military-industrial complex with tight connections to some of the highest senior army officers and intelligence directors on the globe. Their methods are adapting very quickly to the new threats and vulnerabilities of the new way of waging war. Nonetheless, in the endeavor to rebuild a country and create a climate of sustainability in the strategic sectors, their approach is inflicting harm and loss. This also had an effect on the task of reestablishing from scratch the Iraqi army, the funds designated for training new security forces that should have been absorbed by the Iraqi government were regurgitated by the PMSCs back into the US economy or in off-shore private accounts. The immense impact that these organizations had on foreign policy of powerful countries in the last decade will not fade off. Their know-how is spreading and the modus operandi is getting better as they also invest in their image as lawful actors in the security industry.

BY: Ecaterina MAȚOI — SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY