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After $18M, U.S. Halts Work on Half-Renovated Prison in Afghanistan

November 5, 2014 | The Danger Zone

A five-year-old State Department effort to upgrade Afghanistan’s largest prison has been halted with only half the contracted work performed, a watchdog found. The Pol-i-Charkhi facility in Kabul Province — designed in the early 1970s for 5,000 prisoners — currently holds 7,400, according to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

And though overcrowding has forced prisoners out into the halls, it appears to be well maintained, SIGAR determined, despite some “defective workmanship” performed under the $20.2 million contract with the Al-Watan Construction Co.

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States’ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs paid out $18 million to the contractor before terminating it “for convenience,” with only half the work executed. “A corrupt contracting officer’s representative … was a factor in the oversight breakdown of the renovation work,” SIGAR John Sopko wrote, “and another COR who resigned his position was a factor in the financial settlement.”

The purpose of the renovation was to replace prison block holding areas with individual cells and improve the prison’s plumbing, electrical and septic systems. In a report to Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham, SIGAR cited an independent firm that identified shoddy workmanship, “including soil settlement issues and failure to connect back-up generators to the prison’s power grid.”

The contractor “substituted wood for metal roof trusses without authorization and covered 30-year old wood trusses with new roofing material, rather than replacing them as required under the contract,” SIGAR determined in a probe from April to September. The renovation work was overseen by a contracting officer’s representative—a State employee—who was later convicted in the United States of improperly accepting gratuities from a bureau of narcotics contractor.

Three related projects that State funded at a cost of $5.3 million — a potable water tower, a commercial power upgrade, and a new staff barracks — were completed successfully, the IG reported.

State, after reviewing a draft of the report, said it is committed to completing the renovations, which might cost $11 million and another $5 million to construct a wastewater treatment plant to remedy wastewater pooling on the surface of the two septic/leach fields, the report said. State noted, however, that deteriorating security conditions in war-torn Afghanistan have hindered official travel to the site. (U.S. troops this week prepared to end operations in the country after a 13-year stay.)

SIGAR recommended that Kerry direct the bureau to determine the extent of the use of lesser-quality building materials, monitor future renovation costs, re-think the prison’s wastewater management needs and investigate how the contracting officer arrived at the final payment amounts to the terminated contractor before the contract was fulfilled.

State agreed with all recommendations except the one on probing the contractor, arguing that its own inspector general investigated the incident and applied discipline in 2010, when the contract was halted.

Original Article found at Defense One

Iraq – Afghanistan Contractor Census, 4th quarter (July – Oct 2014)

October 31, 2014 | OVERSEAS INTEL, The Danger Zone

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

BACKGROUND: This report updates DoD contractor personnel numbers in theater and outlines DoD efforts to improve management of contractors accompanying U.S. forces. It covers DoD contractor personnel deployed in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)) and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

KEY POINTS: In 4th quarter FY 2014, USCENTCOM reported approximately 60,860 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR. This total reflects a decrease of approximately 5.3K from the previous quarter. A breakdown of DoD contractor personnel is provided below

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Afghanistan Summary

The distribution of contractors in Afghanistan by mission category are:

Base Support: 5,340 (12%)
Commo Support 1,794 ( 4%)
Construction: 5,725 (13%)
Logistics/Maintenance 16,441 (36%)
Security 2,472 ( 5%)
Training 1,199 ( 3%)
Translator/Interpreter 3,611 ( 8%)
Transportation 3,100 ( 7%)
Medical/Dental/Social Services 212 ( 0%)
Management/Administrative 4,118 ( 9%)
Other* 1,337 ( 3%)

Total: 45,349

*Includes Defense Logistics Agency, Army Materiel Command, Air Force External and Systems Support contracts, Special Operations Command and INSCOM.

OEF Contractor Posture Highlights:

o In 4th quarter FY14 there were approximately 45.3K DoD contractors in Afghanistan. The overall contractor footprint in Afghanistan decreased by 12% from 3rd quarter FY14.
o US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) continues to conduct portfolio reviews which serve to synchronize and reduce requirements.
o There will continue to be a decline in the contractor population as a result of reduced requirements.

Operation Inherent Resolve Contractor Posture. We will resume reporting on contractors supporting DoD operations in Iraq in next quarter’s update.

General Data on DoD Private Security Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan

Private security contractors (PSC) perform personal security, convoy security, and static security missions.
USCENTCOM reports, as of 4th quarter FY 2014, the following distribution of PSCs in Afghanistan:

In Afghanistan, the mobile security functions of the APPF are being transferred to the Ministry of Interior under a convoy protection brigade. Site protection previously under APPF is also under transition. Contracting and payment protocols are still under development.

Improvements to Management and Oversight of DoD Contractors

Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC). The USFOR-A OCSIC (formerly the OCS Drawdown Cell) was established in August 2012 with a mission to manage the programmatic drawdown of contracts, the contractor workforce and associated equipment in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A). Through the efforts of its Program Management Integration and Regional Teams, the OCSIC influenced requirements reduction in the CJOA-A resulting in a decrease of boots on ground contractors. Lessons learned from implementation of the OCSIC informed recent revision of doctrine (JP 4-10) on the OCS Integration Cell.
CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command. C-JTSCC has centralized oversight and authority to ensure all contracts executed in Afghanistan are visible and in compliance with contracting policy and procedures. JTSCC is evaluating local vendor capability to perform critically needed services previously provided by LOGCAP, but on a much smaller scale. This will ensure support to the warfighter continues while simultaneously reducing the number of US and other country national contractors. Addtionally, to facilitate drawdown, the OCSIC recently was fully subsumed by the C-JTSCC under one commander whose staff serves as both OCSIC and JTSCC. This will facilitate eventual transition from a JTSCC to a lead service for contracting (LSC) construct.
JP 4-10 (Operational Contract Support). The Joint Staff J4 has updated JP 4-10 Operational Contract Support, which serves as the doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing OCS integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations. This update to OCS doctrine was published on 16 July 2014.
Defense Standards for Security Services.

o Business and operational standards for PSCs (which were required by Section 833 of the FY2011 NDAA) are now complete and were validated by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in early March 2012. The associated conformity assessment to enable third party certification was published in April 2012. A maturity model, allowing companies and contract management to assess the degree of conformity with the standard, was approved by ANSI in January 2012. Under sponsorship by DoD, the ANSI standard is now being developed as an international standard to be published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).

o On May 22, 2012, DoD issued procedures, guidance and information (PGI) to the DFARS requiring compliance with the ANSI PSC standard for combat operations and other contingency operations. Standards and provision for third party certification in Section 833 of the FY 2011 NDAA will facilitate identifying technically acceptable contractors and best value. This will enable expedited contract award; mitigate risk of delay of services due to contract award protests; and mitigate risk of contractor non-performance or misconduct in critical early phases of contingency operations. Conformity assessment standards and the associated maturity model also provide valuable tools for DoD contract oversight.

o The United Kingdom has adopted the PSC ANSI standards as their national standard ensuring continuity between the key allies.

Operational Contract Support (OCS) Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB). This senior executive–level governance forum was chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) in March 2010 to provide strategic leadership to multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize OCS. Co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support) and Joint Staff, Vice Director J-4, the FCIB convenes quarterly (or as required). On August 26, 2014 , the Board convened the 4th Quarter FY14 Principals meeting in the Secretary of the Army Conference Center. Key topics reviewed by the Board included:
1. OCS Joint Proponent Implementation Update
2. OCS Knowledge Integration & Solutions (KIS) Working Group Update
3. Army Contingency Contracting Administration Services (CCAS) Mission Transfer in Current Operations

The 1st Quarter FY15 Principals meeting will be held on Nov 25, 2014 @ 1000-1200 hours in the Pentagon Conference Center.

Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). Planning, implementation, and oversight of OCS are Commander's responsibilities and are essential to establishing a strategy for managing contractors on the battlefield as part of the DoD Total Force. JCASO provides the Combatant Commands a joint enabling capability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize OCS during peacetime, contingency operations, and post-conflict operations. JCASO is an essential part of DLA's combat support agency (CSA) role to support the mission objectives of the combatant commands, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Title 10 responsibilities, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense for OCS policy and joint doctrine development and implementation. Examples of current JCASO engagements include:

o Deploying teams for 6-month rotations to support the OCS Integration Cell (OCSIC) and provide expertise in the drawdown efforts;
o Leading and managing the economic development initiative (i.e., local procurements) in the Central Asian States in support of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) strategy in the USCENTCOM AOR;
o Establishing the Afghanistan Contract Transition Workgroup (ACTW) to facilitate the interagency coordination for planning and transitioning OCS from DoD to DOS; and
o Participating in joint exercises in 2014 (e.g., PANAMAX, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN) to integrate OCS in training and assess the effectiveness of OCS plans;
o Assessing the JCASO mission and organization to validate support effectiveness and alignment with DOD OCS Action Plan 2014-2017;
o Supporting ARCENT in establishing and developing an OCS cell, related policy, processes and products;
o Providing OCS Program Management support as requested or directed to CCMDs, Service components, and others, including HA/DR such as Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE;
o Developing the way ahead for collecting and advancing OCS joint lessons learned;
o Assessing OCS integration with non-DoD partners to identify gaps and propose concepts or solutions for improvement to better align with JF 2020;
o Working with OCS peers to draft procedures and policy for the joint planning areas to identify how OCS transitions from contingency operations to steady state and redployment;
o Delivering the OCS module in the Joint Logistics Course and the Army Logistics University;
o Participating in GAO interviews to share information on JCASO enabling capability relative to OCS lessons learned and OCS planning and execution in USAFRICOM;
o Developing a manpower strategy to fulfill a demand for OCS-skills at the combatant commands and Service components.

JCASO Contingency Contracting Office (CCO): The JCASO CCO provides a joint contingency contracting capability by extending and leveraging DLA’s extensive contracting capabilities while simultaneously complementing the Services’ capacities. It furthers best practices through a programmatic approach, and is expected to focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contract support. The CCO responds to demand signals from Combatant
Commands and deployed forces, such as providing CCO support in Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE, the USCENTCOM Central Asia States (CAS) local sourcing procurement initiative, and the DLA-E/A and AFRICOM initiative to help leverage existing DLA contracts and develop new contract solutions that address AFRICOM’s evolving mission.
JCASO Planners. Seventeen (17) JCASO planners are allocated among the Unified Combatant Commands to assist the commander in identifying gaps where contractor support capability may be required. Planners integrate contractor support into operational plans and synchronize requirements with subordinate commands, the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, other USG Agencies, and coalition partners. The planners have been instrumental in integrating OCS into Combatant Command plans. Based on demonstrated need for additional OCS planning capability in USPACOM, JCASO also established OCS planners at forward locations in USFK and USFJ.
SPOT Configuration Control Board (CCB). ODASD(PS), as the functional sponsor for SPOT, co-chairs a quarterly CCB. This Board evaluates proposed enhancements to SPOT and prioritizes implementation to ensure consistency within funding parameters. Membership includes participants from across the DoD OCS community, DOS, and U.S. Agency for International Development.
Operational Contract Support (OCS) Learning Framework. The Department continues to make progress on the Secretary’s and the Chairman's vision for OCS education and training. Several parallel efforts are underway to incorporate OCS into a holistic learning framework that includes education, individual and collective training, exercises, and lessons learned primarily aimed at non-acquisition personnel.

o OCS in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). As reported, OCS has been a Chairman’s JPME Special Area of Emphasis each year since 2009. A 2012 study on OCS education and training observed a general lack of uniformity and depth in OCS content. To rectify this, Joint Staff (J4) OCS and Services Division (OCSSD) developed an OCS Curriculum Development Guide (CDG) to provide specific OCS learning objectives to help JPME faculty create and integrate effective OCS learning into all five JPME levels. Version 2.0 of the CDG, which was completed in October 2012, included authoritative reference material, was distributed to JPME institutions in December 2012. The OCS CDG incorporates distance learning through three Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) OCS courses. The Joint Staff (J4) briefed the faculty of the JPME schools on the FY2013 NDAA language requiring OCS as part of JPME in June 2013 at the Joint Faculty Education Conference. At this point, JPME faculty need time to incorporate OCS into their curricula. The Joint Staff (J4) is reviewing the Joint Combined Warfare School curriculum to make specific recommendations on OCS content needed to meet the CDG’s intent.

o Lessons Learned. The Department has submitted a comprehensive lessons learned report to the House Armed Services Committee. For tactical and operational lessons learned, the Joint Staff (J4), OCSSD, is the focal point for documenting and processing lessons through the Joint Lessons Learned Program.

o Exercises. The first ever OCS Joint Exercise (OCSJX-14) was held in January 2014 at Ft. Bliss, Texas. The exercise trained over 500 participants on the OCS tasks for Contract Support Integration, Contracting Support, and Contractor Management. The OCSJX-14 scenario was based on a complex catastrophe in the US NORTHCOM area of responsibility. The training audience included OCS staff members from USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH, US Army Expeditionary Contracting Command's 412th Contract Support Brigade, US Air Force and Navy contracting personnel. Other key DOD stakeholders that participated were; FEMA, USACE, DLA JCASO, DASD-PS, DPAP and NGB. Planning for OCSJX-15 at
USPACOM is underway, and OCSJX-16 is tentatively planned for USAFRICOM.

o Collective and Staff Training. The Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance Notice (CJCSN 3500.01) provides annual guidance to all DOD Components for planning, executing, and assessing joint training for three consecutive years. It includes High Interest Training Issues (HITIs) which are CJCS special-interest items that CCDRs should consider for emphasis in their training and exercise programs. OCS will be part of the Joint Logistics Enterprise HITI in this year’s notice. In December 2013, the Joint Staff (J4) released the Joint Metrics and Readiness (JMR) Guide to assist planners in integrating OCS into joint training and exercises to help ensure realistic readiness assessments for OCS and compliance with Joint Training Guidance.

o Individual Training. DoD created three joint OCS courses in a computer-based training format in 2009. The three courses were “joint training certified” in 2013 and are hosted on JKO, the joint community’s web portal for providing key joint training. As of 4 September 2013, 608 personnel have completed these joint certified OCS courses. In addition to the JKO courses and Contracting Officer’s Representative training, the Joint Staff (J4) OCSSD is teaching a Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) at the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) via mobile training teams (MTTs). JOPEC has since been taught at every GCC in FY14, a cycle that will continue in FY15. 231 Students have been trained to-date. The JS J4 is seeking to permanently establish JOPEC at a JPME institution

OCS Planning. On October 18, 2012, the Joint Staff published the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03 Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance. The CJCSM 3130.03 sets forth administrative instructions for joint operation plan formats. Specific to OCS planning, CJCSM 3130.03 details where OCS requirements will be identified and by whom. The Joint Staff (J4) is developing a separate manual, CJCSM 4301.01A, Planning OCS, to assist OCS planners in developing procedures and guidance that integrate, synchronize, prioritize, and focus OCS capabilities on achieving a supported Prepared by: DASD (Program Support) October, 2014
commander’s operational objectives and desired effects for various types of plans, including contingency plans.
OCS Joint Concept. JROC Memorandum 159-13, approved the OCS Joint Concept, and JROCM 060-14 approved implementation thereof as part of the OCS Action Plan. This concept envisions that contracted support for military operations will be an interdependent capability of Joint Force 2020 (JF 2020). This concept addresses how JF 2020 can operationalize OCS to optimize contracted support capabilities of the total force partners to achieve operational effects across the range of military operations within acceptable and manageable risk levels. It builds upon ongoing efforts to institutionalize OCS in the present force and proposes a full spectrum doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and personnel capability solution framework to deliver more responsive and accountable OCS. The OCS Joint Concept implementation tasks were incorporated into the OCS Action Plan by the FCIB in February 2014.

Private Military Contractors: Why the Blackwater convictions won’t slow America’s ‘shadow armies’

October 25, 2014 | The Danger Zone

Absent on Wednesday in a Washington courtroom, where a federal jury entered guilty verdicts of murder and manslaughter against four Blackwater Worldwide guards in the killings of 14 Iraqi civilians, was a man synonymous with the United States’s infatuation with contractors. He is Erik Prince — billionaire, former Navy Seal, ex-CIA spy — the founder of Blackwater.

Prince is a man accustomed to drama. Numerous agencies have interrogated him. Members of Congress and reporters have hurled accusations against his company: murder, wrongful death, prostitution, negligence, weapons smuggling and racial discrimination. He has been called a “war profiteer,” a “mercenary” and a “right-wing crusader.” He sold the company and started a new one under a different name.

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But he has never had to deal with something like this: four guilty verdicts against Backwater guards now facing decades, if not life, in prison — and a “stunned” team of defense attorneys.

Erik Prince, however, has never shed the ethos of a military contractor. Even now he thinks the United States should start enlisting contractors in the fight against the Islamic State. “If the Administration cannot rally the political nerve or funding to send adequate active duty ground forces to answer the call,” he wrote in a blog post this month, “let the private sector finish the job.”

Such commitment to contract warriors, despite a sketchy history of questionable behavior, underscores the stubborn reality of today’s wars. Despite the convictions of four Blackwater operatives, lawmakers have not moved on legislation that would provide clearer jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by private contractors or pushed for industry reform. With an army staffed by volunteers, contract firms such as Blackwater are an ingrained aspect of the American warrior class — whether there’s peace or not.

“When the military had to leave, it made us even more dependent on contractors for security,” former U.S. Rep. Chris Shays (R-Conn.) told Foreign Policy, commenting earlier this year on Iraq’s security. “The one thing that’s a given: We can’t go to war without contractors and we can’t go to peace without contractors.”

And now, with a renewed push to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, analysts say President Obama is confronted with hard circumstances that may force a wider deployment of contractors to a region still haunted by the scandal. How can he dislodge the Islamic State without contractors if airstrikes don’t work and he won’t deploy American soldiers? Will he need to summon what ProPublica called the “shadow armies?”

“Iraq this time around is not going to be as big as it was before,” Roger Carstens, who has done contract stints in Somalia and Afghanistan, told the Daily Beast last month. “That said, this new war will present an opportunity for the companies that have a resident train and advising capability to contribute to this new effort.” Another U.S. military contractor in Iraq added: “I can tell you the contractor-expat community is abuzz thinking this will lead to more work. We expect a much larger footprint than [Obama] is showing right now.”

P.W. Singer, in an analysis in Foreign Affairs, tracked the birth of the modern private military industry back to the beginning of the 1990s. It owes its existence to three elements, he wrote: “The end of the Cold War, transformations in the nature of warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, and a general trend toward privatization. … When the face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union ended, professional armies around the world were downsized. At the same time, increasing global instability created a demand for more troops.”

That global insecurity ultimately left the United States stretched between two protracted wars, forced to employ — at inordinate expense — hundreds of thousands of contractors in conflict zones across the globe. Foreign Affairs said it wasn’t a “coalition of the willing,” but a “coalition of the billing.”

In 2008, a year after the Blackwater fighters killed 14 unarmed Iraqis, the Pentagon employed 242,558 contractors in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan and Yemen, according to official estimates reported by the Daily Beast. In the past decade, the Wall Street Journal reported, the United States spent more than $200 billion on private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. And Mother Jones put the global sum even higher — at $385 billion since 2001 in contractor fees.

In all, it’s become something an addiction, analysts said. “You have a situation where the government has become dependent on contractors,” Allison Stanger, a political science professor at Middlebury College, told the Journal. “It’s a real quantum shift.” As of February, more than 5,000 contractors were operating in Iraq. “The traditional U.S. military role has been supplanted by civilians who are training and equipping the Iraqi military,” the Journal reported in February.

Though it’s unclear what role contractors will play in the war against the Islamic State, there’s a general consensus they will ultimately be in the fight. “There is going to be business,” one expert told the Daily Beast. “You could say these are shoes instead of boots on the ground.”

By: Terrence McCoy is a foreign affairs writer at the Washington Post.

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After $18M, U.S. Halts Work on Half-Renovated Prison in Afghanistan

Iraq – Afghanistan Contractor Census, 4th quarter (July – Oct 2014)

Private Military Contractors: Why the Blackwater convictions won’t slow America’s ‘shadow armies’

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