The Army had decided to send DLA home in August 2013, six months before the warehouses were completed. The project, however, “continued uninterrupted,” without any attempts to reevaluate or downsize it, according to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR. Instead, the military added $400,000 of modifications to the buildings — knowing DLA would never use it, SIGAR wrote in a report released today.

In the end, the facility finished two years behind schedule and cost $1.2 million more than anticipated.

As combat operations in Afghanistan concluded in 2014, a familiar pattern emerged with the military’s construction projects: They were routinely over budget, past deadline and often never used.

ProPublica previously reported on the $25 million, 64,000-square-foot headquarters built for the U.S. Marines in Helmand province. That building, tricked out with luxe modifications, went unused for similar reasons, but the military has nonetheless deemed its construction “prudent.” The military declined to discipline anyone involved with what came to be called “64K.”

This type of wasteful spending and the military’s seeming nonchalance about it came up this month as part of Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford’s confirmation as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top position in the military. Dunford, while in charge of Afghanistan operations in 2013, ordered and signed off on an investigation into the 64K building that SIGAR said was shallow, flawed and remiss in not holding anyone accountable.

Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., asked Dunford in writing whether, given SIGAR’s findings, he is “concerned that the investigation into this matter was inadequate.”

Dunford must respond to written questions from McCaskill and the rest of the Senate Armed Services Committee before his confirmation is approved.

Meanwhile, by December, the Kandahar warehouse complex will be turned over to the Afghan government with air conditioning and fire suppression systems that, like 64K, are too sophisticated for them to use. And it’s unclear whether the Afghans want or have the money to make use of it.

Source: ProPublica

President Obama said, "The United States -- along with our allies and partners -- will maintain a limited military presence in Afghanistan to train, advise and assist Afghan forces and to conduct counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaida."

Contractors answer to a firm contracted by a federal agency. They can serve a variety of purposes: combat, security, logistics, health services, transportation, food service; hence the tongue-in-cheek "private army" label for the private military contractor industry.

"The military is unable to effectively execute many operations, particularly those that are large-scale and long-term in nature, without extensive operational contract support," according to a 2013 Library of Congress report.

More than 3,000 contractors remained in Iraq last year. A DOD contractor census shows that 39,609 contractors are still in Afghanistan alongside 10,000 troops. "Those numbers are way too low," said Chip Hauss, government liaison for the Alliance for Peacebuilding, who also is a professor at George Mason University and Oberlin College graduate. He agrees the true numbers are hidden by the "black budget." Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich told us the best way to fight al-Qaida and ISIS, given Americans' reticence about using our troops, is "by mercenaries," and it seems we are now doing so.

According to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, private military contractors were used "without any supervision." Although the Department of Defense has taken steps to better regulate private military contractors, oversight is still lacking. The Library of Congress reported in 2013 that "lack of data makes it difficult to determine to what extent the billions of dollars spent [on contractors] ... have contributed to achieving the mission."

While we may be saving face by troop withdrawal, we are not saving money. At least $200 billion was officially awarded in contracts during the Iraq war in addition to nonpublic "black" budgets. According to the Pentagon's Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military compensation, private military contractors made higher salaries ($165,000 per year, excluding benefits) than sergeants in the military ($63,340 a year, excluding benefits).

Iraqis tortured by contractors at the Abu Ghraib prison with electric shock, sexual violence and broken bones are still in court for compensation from a company, CACI International, which continues to receive government contracts.

Private military contractors are the "military-industrial complex" Eisenhower warned about back in 1961. Contractors serving in Iraq and Afghanistan are paid with U.S. government funds, but the law hides them and their money. If we're leaving, whether for moral reasons or to free funds for domestic programs, that has to include contractors. If we are staying, we have a right to oversight against unjust murder and torture, to know what we are paying for, and to see where the money goes.

BY: Robert Weiner, an Oberlin College graduate, is former spokesman for the White House and for the House Government Operations Committee. Daniel Wallace is a policy analyst in Washington, D.C., at Robert Weiner Associates and Solutions for Change.