A newly surfaced federal lawsuit is reigniting one of the most controversial allegations to emerge from the war in Yemen—that a team of American military veterans was recruited to carry out targeted assassinations on behalf of the United Arab Emirates.
At the center of the case is Anssaf Ali Mayo, a Yemeni politician who claims he was the target of a December 2015 assassination attempt in Aden. His lawsuit alleges that a privately run U.S. team—made up of former elite operators—was deployed to eliminate political figures under the guise of counterterrorism.
According to court filings, the American team was handed a “23-man hit list” shortly after arriving in Yemen. The list reportedly included names and photographs of individuals identified as targets.
The lawsuit claims the list was provided by a uniformed Emirati officer, suggesting direct state involvement. Earlier investigative reporting—most notably by BuzzFeed News—described a nearly identical detail: a set of “23 cards,” each containing a face, name, and limited intelligence on the target.
While the exact circumstances of the handoff differ between accounts, the consistency of the “23 targets” claim across sources has become a focal point of the case.
The Team Behind the Operation
The lawsuit names several former U.S. servicemen, including Abraham Golan, Isaac Gilmore, and Dale Comstock. The group is alleged to have operated under a private entity known as Spear Operations Group.
According to the complaint, the operation was structured as a paid contract, with the team receiving roughly $1.5 million per month, plus bonuses tied to successful killings.
Golan has previously been quoted in media reports acknowledging the existence of a “targeted assassination program” in Yemen, though the legal implications of those statements remain unresolved.
The Attempt in Aden
The first mission, according to the lawsuit, targeted Mayo at a political party office in Aden. The plan allegedly involved detonating explosives to kill everyone inside, followed by small-arms fire to eliminate survivors.
Mayo survived the attack and later fled the country.
His legal team argues the operation was not a lawful military action but an attempted extrajudicial killing—potentially constituting a war crime under international law.
A War Within a War
The allegations unfold against the backdrop of Yemen’s complex civil war, where regional powers—including the UAE—have conducted counterterrorism operations against extremist groups.
The UAE has denied wrongdoing, maintaining that its actions in Yemen were conducted legally and in coordination with allied governments. Officials have consistently framed their role as part of broader counterterrorism efforts, not political repression.
However, human rights organizations and investigative reports have long raised concerns about the use of proxy forces, secret detention sites, and targeted killings in southern Yemen.
Legal and Strategic Implications
The lawsuit, filed in a U.S. federal court, raises serious legal questions:
Can U.S. citizens be held liable for participating in foreign-directed assassination programs?
Did the operation violate U.S. laws governing military services abroad?
Were the targets legitimate combatants—or political opponents?
If proven, the case could expose a gray zone in modern warfare: the outsourcing of lethal operations to private actors operating across national lines.
It also underscores a broader trend in global conflict—the increasing role of private military contractors in missions that blur the line between warfare, intelligence, and covert action.
What Comes Next
For now, the allegations remain just that—claims laid out in a civil complaint, not yet tested in court. The defendants are expected to challenge both the facts and the jurisdiction of the case.
But regardless of the legal outcome, the story has already reopened a deeper conversation about accountability in modern conflict—particularly when state power, private contractors, and covert operations intersect.
In Yemen, where the lines of war have long been blurred, this lawsuit suggests there may have been another layer entirely: a shadow campaign where names were handed over, and missions began before the world ever knew they existed.
IRAN — The U.S. Department of Defense is urgently searching for private contractors capable of delivering prefabricated, hardened shelter systems to protect American personnel as operations against Iran intensify. The request, issued through a “sources sought” notice, highlights the Pentagon’s need for transportable bunkers designed to withstand blast, fragmentation, and ballistic threats.
Contractors are being asked to submit delivery timelines for 3, 15, and 30 days, signaling a strong push for rapid deployment. The shelters must be ready-made and capable of immediate transport to the Aqaba Air Cargo Terminal in Jordan, a key logistics hub supporting U.S. operations in the region.
This move comes as recent attacks—including drone and missile strikes—have exposed vulnerabilities in existing infrastructure, much of which still relies on outdated T-wall barriers and temporary structures. Defense officials and analysts note that many current shelters offer limited protection against modern threats, particularly top-down drone attacks and ballistic missiles.
The notice itself does not guarantee a contract award but is designed to assess industry capability. However, it clearly reflects a broader shift toward faster procurement and improved force protection, as the Pentagon looks to quickly adapt to evolving battlefield threats across the Middle East.
UKRAINE — When former U.S. Marine officer Andrew Milburn arrived in Ukraine in the early stages of the war, his role was not to fight on the frontlines, but to prepare others for it. As the founder of The Mozart Group, Milburn assembled a small team of Western military veterans focused on training Ukrainian forces under rapidly evolving battlefield conditions.
Unlike traditional contractor environments seen in Iraq or Afghanistan, Ukraine offered no structured framework for private military support. There were no large operating bases, no extended training cycles, and no clear separation between frontline and rear areas. Ukrainian units often rotated in for only short periods, requiring Milburn’s team to compress weeks of instruction into just a few days. Training typically focused on small-unit tactics, weapons handling, and battlefield medical care—skills that could immediately impact survivability.
Milburn was also deliberate in positioning his organization. The Mozart Group avoided direct participation in combat operations, distinguishing itself from entities such as the Wagner Group. Its personnel were not deployed as assault elements but rather as force multipliers, providing instruction and limited support functions such as civilian evacuations and aid delivery in contested areas. This distinction was not only philosophical but also legal, as operating too close to combat roles could shift perception toward mercenary activity under international and domestic law.
Despite its mission clarity, the operating environment presented ongoing challenges. Ukraine attracted a wide range of foreign volunteers, many of whom arrived without the experience required for high-intensity conflict. This created additional risk for both trainers and Ukrainian units, forcing teams like Milburn’s to balance instruction with assessment and the management of expectations. The battlefield itself added further complexity, with training often conducted within range of artillery and under constant surveillance from drones.
While the Mozart Group gained attention as a Western counterpart to Russian private military elements, it remained a relatively small and resource-intensive organization. Reports indicate that the group operated with a limited number of personnel and relied heavily on external funding to sustain its activities. Over time, internal disagreements and leadership disputes began to impact cohesion, ultimately contributing to the organization’s dissolution. The group’s end was not driven by operational failure on the ground, but by structural and managerial challenges behind the scenes.
Milburn’s experience highlights a broader shift in how contractor roles are evolving in modern conflict zones. In Ukraine, the traditional model of large-scale contractor support has been replaced by smaller, adaptive teams operating in proximity to active combat. These roles blur the lines between training, advisory support, and humanitarian assistance, requiring a level of flexibility not typically seen in previous theaters.
The story of the Mozart Group reflects both the potential and the limitations of this model. While its impact on Ukrainian training efforts was notable, its short lifespan underscores the difficulty of sustaining independent contractor operations in a high-intensity, politically sensitive environment.
