The 3 entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the federal government in which they admitted their conduct and agreed to give up $1.7 million and U.S. security clearances, restrict their future employment and “cooperate fully” with investigators.

In addition, they will also force the men to cooperate with the Justice Department's investigation and to sever any ties with any UAE intelligence or law enforcement agencies. If they comply with those terms for three years, the Justice Department will not move forward with any prosecution.

Hackers-for-hire and those who otherwise support such activities in violation of U.S. law should fully expect to be prosecuted for their criminal conduct," Mark Lesko, acting assistant attorney general of the Justice Department's national security division, said in a statement.

Quincy further admitted that to effectuate the theft of the generators, she used her position as a security badging and escort pass supervisor to create or cause to be made false official documents. The false official documents facilitated both the entry of unknown and unvetted Afghan nationals and their vehicles onto the military installation and effectuated the removal of the stolen property from the installation. The falsified documents were used to deceive security officers and gate guards and compromised the security of U.S. military and civilian personnel on the military installation.

Green pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and commit theft of property of value to the United States; one count of theft of property of value to the United States; and one count of aiding and abetting the submission of false statements, and was sentenced on Nov. 19, 2020, to 41 months in prison and ordered to pay $179,708 in restitution.

Quincy also was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $179,708. Further, Quincy’s sentence reflected her fraudulent post-trial conduct of submitting altered documents to the court on her behalf in advance of sentencing.

Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicholas L. McQuaid of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; Acting U.S. Attorney Raj Parekh of the Eastern District of Virginia; and Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F. Sopko made the announcement.

SIGAR investigated the case with help from the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) and the 939th Military Police Detachment of the Indiana Army National Guard.

Trial Attorneys Sasha N. Rutizer of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section, Rosaleen O’Gara of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Kosky of the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case.

In an interview with Inside Defense last year, George Krivo, DynCorp's chief executive, called the program a must-win. In a new report, Moody's Investors Service called DynCorp's failure to win a spot “the worst possible outcome for the company.”

It “was also unexpected based on the level of mission support tasks the Army had been steering toward DI's areas of responsibility under LOGCAP IV,” the report added, noting DynCorp generated about 20 percent of its annual sales from the program.

Fluor has until early March to respond, but a company spokesman in Greenville, Brett Turner, said Fluor believes the case has no merit.

"We have cooperated extensively with the government regarding these allegations and have provided substantial proof that they are false and misguided," Turner said in an email to The Greenville News.

Among the allegations in the suit are that Fluor:

• billed the government for work it was never supposed to do and work it didn't do;
• hired thousands more employees than necessary;
• overcharged the government by inflating its performance and compliance figures in mandatory reports related to health and safety; and
• falsified its inventory records, which concealed millions of dollars in inventory shortages and property loss in the war zone, and then charged a commission to replace the materials.

It is a significant challenge to Fluor, which employs about 2,400 people in Greenville and nearly 57,000 worldwide. The plaintiffs are seeking damages and civil penalties under the False Claims Act, a federal law that lets private plaintiffs file whistleblower cases on behalf of the United States government.

Fluor has been performing work for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan since 2009 under the so-called "LOGCAP IV" contract, which stands for  "Logistics Civil Augmentation Program."

"Fluor profited greatly from its fraud, from the very beginning of its involvement in the LOGCAP and throughout," the lawsuit says.

Civil penalties under federal law could be as high as $11,000 per violation. The plaintiffs are asking the court to collect three times the amount of any damages — not specifically itemized — that the U.S. government sustained. They are also asking to receive 30 percent of the government's recovery, as allowed under the law, plus attorneys fees.

The whistleblowers, all former military officers and soldiers, have filed five separate lawsuits in the case, but their attorneys are working together with federal investigators and have consolidated their efforts under one lead case.

Among the plaintiffs is a retired officer and Simpsonville resident, Jeffery Nix, who spent 23 years in the Army and did tours in Afghanistan and Iraq before joining Fluor as a compliance manager in 2011.

The other five plaintiffs, led by former Fluor contractors Charles Shepherd and Danny Rude, live out of state. Shepherd and Rude state in their lawsuit that Nix and the other complainants "were all victims of retaliatory terminations of their employment" after filing suit.

The plaintiffs and their attorneys declined to comment for the story.

The case dates back to 2009, when Fluor took on the non-combat, logistics U.S. Army contract to run 74 military bases in northern Afghanistan. This work included building housing, installing power and water lines and transporting military materials and personnel. At the time, the then five-year contract was estimated to be worth $7 billion.

Fluor, which 10 years later remains under that contract after it was extended a couple of times, has billed the government for a total of $12.76 billion, according to a News review of Federal Procurement Data System records. The contract ends in April.

The lawsuit alleges, essentially, that Fluor overbilled the federal government.

No criminal charges have been filed against Fluor, and the U.S. Attorney's Office of South Carolina has declined to join the case.

"After a five-year investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice has decided not to pursue this matter," Fluor's Turner said. "We are pleased with this outcome."

Still, several federal agencies have investigated the allegations and issued reports acknowledging insufficient oversight over contractors in Afghanistan.

Without naming Fluor specifically, the federal Defense Criminal Investigative Service issued a report in December 2017 saying the U.S. Army did not "perform effective oversight" of government-furnished property handled by logistics contractors in Afghanistan.

"LOGCAP contractors have self-reported more than $9.7 million in GFP losses since 2012," the report said. "However, without maintaining an accurate list of all GFP, Army officials cannot be certain that all contractor GFP losses have been identified, investigated, and reported."

The Inspector General of the Department of Defense issued a similar, 51-page report in May 2018 that found the U.S. Army had paid every LOGCAP voucher between 2015 and 2017, worth $2.4 billion, "with little or no examination of the supporting
documentation." The inspector general found about 10 percent of vouchers, worth $536 million, "did not contain sufficient detail for us to determine how the contractor calculated costs."

The case will continue through the whistleblowers and their private attorneys, armed with the testimony of witnesses who served in the Afghan theater and the results of multiple federal investigations.

OTHER NEWS: Greenville Co. to hire 30 medics at cost of $1.3M in response to overtaxed EMS system

Former U.S. Attorney Bill Nettles said the justice department's decision not to join the case does not mean it is without merit. The government often declines to join good cases if, for instance, it deems it does not have the resources to participate, Nettles said.

"This is a really, really, really effective way for the government to police fraud," said Nettles, who added five lawyers to False Claim Act cases while he headed up the U.S. Attorney's office in Columbia. "It incentivizes people to help the government to police fraud."

Meanwhile, a who's who of local and state attorneys — Beattie Ashmore, Frank Eppes, and Dick Harpootlian, among others — are attached to the case, taking on court duties here for the plaintiffs while a slew of whistleblower specialists with firms in Chicago, Houston, Birmingham, Alabama, and Washington, D.C., are leading the complaints.

Nexsen Pruet's Mark Moore is representing Fluor.

Lance Crick with the U.S. Attorney's office in Columbia declined to comment, but Nettles, who entered private practice in 2016, said the Fluor case was under active investigation while he was with the South Carolina office.

"It was pretty bad," he said.

KBR-Fluor transition

Problems emerged at the outset of Fluor's contract with the U.S. Army, the lawsuits allege, with Fluor failing to undertake facility and inventory inspections as the previous contractor — Kellogg, Brown and Root (a subsidiary of Halliburton) — handed over operations between 2009 and 2011.

Fluor, the lawsuit alleges, had certified to the government that it had done the inspections.

The U.S. Army had discontinued Kellogg, Brown and Root's work for the military after government audits, heavily covered in the media, revealed their billing had reached $37 billion under essentially open-ended terms. In other words, the contract in place since 2001 had allowed Kellogg "to decide what work needed to be done, determine the cost, and bill it to the Government, without any competition with regard to the ultimate cost of performance," according to Rude and Shepherd's lawsuit.

Before handing the contract over to Fluor, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) was supposed to inspect its facilities for any safety problems and fix them, the lawsuit says, but didn't do so. Having claimed the inspections were finished and the facilities were in good shape, Fluor then spent "tens of millions of dollars in labor and materials" to fix those that were not, the lawsuit claims.

"The result is that the government, in unknowingly paying Fluor for work that KBR was contracted for and paid to complete, was deceived into paying twice for work that it should only have paid for one time," the lawsuit states.

KBR was also supposed to inventory and document any previously unreported property as well as any lost, damaged and destroyed property before handing the operation over to Fluor, the lawsuit says, and Fluor was supposed to check this documentation against the materials it received.

"Unfortunately, Fluor later determined that there was tens of millions of dollars of inventory that KBR (and Fluor) could not physically account for to the government," the lawsuit says.

Having ducked the inspections, the lawsuit says, KBR had collected a commission to obtain these materials which were now missing and avoided reimbursing the government for the lost materials. Fluor then was able to replace the missing materials, charging the government a fee for the service, the lawsuit says.

"Put simply, Fluor defrauded the government into letting KBR off the hook for, at minimum,tens of millions of dollars of inventory it could not account for and then Fluor billed the government for much of this same material when it eventually determined that KBR’s inventory list was grossly inaccurate," the lawsuit says.

Under its contract, Fluor has continued to be responsible for managing the government’s property and materials in Afghanistan, but inventory problems continued for years after Fluor took over the contract, the lawsuit claims.

When Nix worked as a Fluor compliance manager in Afghanistan from December 2012 to April 2014, he observed massive inventory shortages, the lawsuit says.

Nix undertook a random sampling of 236 items from 168,868 inventory transactions worth $386 million between January 2010 and February 2013, the lawsuit said. He found that 80 percent of them had been adjusted down with no audit trail.

"This meant that in the vast majority of instances when a shortage was discovered in inventory, Fluor personnel simply papered over the shortage by adjusting the Maximo records downward," the lawsuit said.

At an 80 percent shortage rate,  as much as $310 million in government materials were missing or unaccounted for on Fluor's watch, according to the lawsuit.

Performance bonuses

The lawsuit claims that in an effort to collect bonus payments from the federal government for good performance, Fluor under-reported workplace injuries and also found ways to make its response times on work orders look shorter.

For the first six months of 2012, according to the lawsuit, Fluor claimed an accident rate of 0.19 percent.

Fluor did this from 2008 to 2013, according to the lawsuit, by not reporting injuries that happened outside of work shifts "despite the fact that the reporting requirement is continuous and incidents are to be recorded 24 hours per day." Fluor also didn't report injuries suffered by subcontractors, the lawsuit claims, despite contract rules requiring it do so.

Under its contract, according to the lawsuit, Fluor had to respond to "emergency," or "Priority 1," work-order calls within two hours and mitigate any threats. Such calls might include exposed wiring, the lawsuit said. The lawsuit claims that Fluor reported 100 percent compliance with these response deadlines even though the company rarely met them.

"Fluor routinely recorded the time of its response immediately when the emergency was called in; even though at that point no Fluor technician had even laid eyes on the problem," the lawsuit claims. "Even more egregious is that Fluor would leave the life, health, and safety issue unmitigated until it could schedule a technician to repair it, which was almost always far longer than the two hour response time requirement."

Poorly documented inventory shortages made making repairs within the required time difficult, the lawsuit claims, and the company would get around that by closing service orders and then re-opening them when needed materials came in.

The company also reclassified emergency calls down if it couldn't make deadlines, the lawsuit claims. Urgent calls (Priority 2) needed a response within a day and routine Priority 3 calls were supposed to be answered within three days. The company also created a secret "off the books" classification (Priority 4) where it could shelve service requests until personnel could deal with them, the lawsuit claims.

The plaintiffs estimate Fluor met its service compliance rate about 27 percent of the time, but the company reported 77 percent compliance to the federal government — in the process collecting bonuses (dubbed "award fees"). The threshold for bonuses was 70 percent.

"Fluor was awarded millions of dollars in award fees for the first half of 2012 based in part on the government’s belief that 'emergency response continued to be an area of strength for Fluor,'" the lawsuit alleges.

From mid-2009 to mid-2012, Fluor collected more than $100 million in base and bonus fees for service compliance, the lawsuit says.

Fluffing the contract

The lawsuit claims in several places that Fluor expanded the terms of its contract without getting the federal government's approval.

One way Fluor did this was by evading change orders, the lawsuit alleges. Off-contract work under $5,000 was allowed, but Fluor often took jobs that it knew would cost more than $5,000, later getting them added to the government's scope of work.

Fluor also hired "thousands" of "redundant, unnecessary" people, according to the lawsuit.

"Over the course of its LOGCAP IV contract performance, Fluor systematically inflated its billings to the United States by hundreds of millions of dollars through the deployment of unnecessary and redundant personnel," the lawsuit says.

One of the whistleblowers, West Point graduate Scott Dillard, recorded a phone conversation with supervisors who shared the same concerns.

Paul Gentry, Fluor’s deputy project manager for site management and construction, was recorded saying he added 800 people in 2012 with no job to do. He'd received 2,000 people the year before for jobs that he estimated needed about 200 people total.

"The same number of buildings on the density list, the same meals served, the same mission, the same this, same, same, same, same. An extra 1,800 people," the lawsuit quotes Gentry saying. "The next year, extra 800 ... people. What ... were they for?"

"Who’s pushing that, (Fluor management in) Greenville?" the lawsuit quotes Dillard asking.

"Yeah. Just maximize billing, maximize billing. That’s all," Gentry answers.

At an average salary and expenses of $170,000 per employee, not including recruitment, travel and medical exams, the total cost of 2,600 unnecessary people for the 12-month period described in this phone call would have been$442 million, according to the lawsuit.

According to the lawsuit, Dillard and his supervisor tried to reduce the workforce in their area in 2012 but managers in Greenville overruled the decision.

"Fit for Duty" exams were another way that Fluor boosted its billing to the federal government, the lawsuit claims. The Defense Department required employees to undergo an annual health screening on-site in Afghanistan, but Fluor instead paid every employee to travel to Dubai, stay in a hotel, eat several meals there and undergo a comprehensive physical exam at a medical clinic it subcontracted with there.

At its peak, 30,000 Fluor employees a year would have been taking these exams in Dubai, supported by a medical records staff in Greenville, according to the lawsuit.

Dillard estimates in the lawsuit that Fluor billed the United States about $91.1 million for "unnecessary, annual, comprehensive physical exams performed in Dubai."

The lawsuit also claims Fluor overbilled the government for vehicles and fuel, at times running them in neutral to burn fuel and clock hours.

According to Military Times The high court let stand an appellate court ruling that decided more than 60 separate lawsuits could not move forward.

“For nearly a decade, we have been working in the court system to secure justice for our veterans who have come home and suffered from debilitating diseases as a result of their exposure to burn pits in Iraq and Afghanistan," the statement said. "Over and over, KBR, a military contractor with the duty to handle waste on bases, did not do so with care. KBR operated burn pits that burned everything from plastics and human waste to car parts. We are disappointed that the Supreme Court declined to hear this case. We encourage all of those impacted and those who care about our veterans to contact their local representatives to push for change.”

What happened next isn’t entirely clear. But the conversation ended with a bang and Woods dropped to the floor with a gunshot wound in his torso.

Woods filed a lawsuit this summer in Illinois’ Cook County circuit court, claiming that “horseplay with a loaded firearm” caused him serious and permanent injuries and pain. The suit alleges that Barrett and his employer, Triple Canopy, were negligent. Woods is seeking more than $100,000.

Triple Canopy’s lawyers say that the company and Barrett were under the Army’s “operational control,” which grants them protection under federal laws, including one that shields the military from state civil suits arising out of wartime activities. However, Woods wants to sue at the state level, where courts wouldn’t consider Triple Canopy’s arguments under federal law.

In August, Woods’ case went to federal court to decide whether he can sue at the state level. Woods’ lawyers have argued that Triple Canopy’s interpretation of federal law shielding the company and Barrett is too broad and doesn’t protect against claims of simple negligence.

Triple Canopy is part of Constellis, formerly Blackwater, which is also named in Woods’ lawsuit. A status hearing will be held next month.

An Army investigation obtained by Stars and Stripes provides more details of the incident, minus names. Court documents Woods filed about the same time included an unredacted section identifying him and Barrett.

The shooting, which officials believe was a negligent discharge, occurred Dec. 19, 2016, on Bagram’s Camp Alpha, an area of the base largely reserved for special operations personnel.

Woods, Barrett and two others — an enlisted soldier and a contractor — were on shift inside the camp’s Base Defense Operations Center, or BDOC, a hub for monitoring security systems, camera feeds and radio traffic.

Investigators found no evidence of foul play, and Woods and Barrett were said to get along like brothers. But witness accounts suggest the shooting was the result of carelessness following high jinks by those charged with overseeing the base’s security.

‘Culture of complacency’

The shooting came at a grim time on the sprawling U.S. base, as officials faced questions about a suicide bombing weeks earlier, the first to strike the heart of the heavily fortified base. Five Americans were killed and 17 others were wounded in the blast near a Veterans Day gathering.

An Army inquiry into the attack found officials had struggled for months against a “pervasive ‘culture of complacency’ and indiscipline … that permeated the forward operating base,” which at the time was home to over 15,000 troops, contractors and civilians.

Woods’ initial lawsuit seized upon that complacency, citing Barrett’s actions as part of larger security lapses at the base.

“After an inordinate delay in the furnishing of weapons necessary for the provision of static security … in protection of the air base, U.S military personnel and others at Bagram Air Field, the Defendant Triple Canopy and/or the Constellis Defendants failed to provide the necessary and proper training, instruction and/or guidance concerning firearm use and safety … specifically including the Defendant Barrett.”

Woods had arrived there in August 2016 as a platoon leader in Bandit Troop, 1st Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment. A West Point graduate and son of a retired Air Force fighter pilot, he’d joined the unit earlier that year after completing Ranger School.

Barrett began working the afternoon security shift sometime after training in October 2016 at a Triple Canopy facility in Moyock, N.C., said the second contractor, an employee of the same firm.

Earlier in the day, the infantry officer and the former Marine grunt had been debating the “21-foot rule,” a theory about the range from which a knife-wielding assailant can fatally attack someone before the victim can draw and fire a holstered sidearm.

Woods demonstrated rapidly closing such a distance in the office, which measured about 23 feet, advancing on Barrett. The contractor stepped aside without drawing on him.

Debates and boasts about shooting were common, Barrett said, but they were not testing the theory when Woods was shot, he said.

Rather, the Marine vet had bragged that he could shoot better because of the superiority of his Glock 17 — his off-duty weapon while a stateside police officer — compared to the soldier’s Beretta M9, he said.

The lieutenant asked him to hand it over.

‘Piercing gunshot’

Though it held a loaded 17-round magazine, Barrett’s gun should have had an empty chamber. It’s common safety practice to clear a firearm before handing it off.

For the semiautomatic Glock, that would mean dropping the magazine out, locking back the slide and inspecting the chamber and magazine to ensure no round is present.

Barrett recounted performing these steps in a different order, starting by drawing back the slide. This could have chambered a round, making the handgun ready to fire with a pull of the trigger, which is where a Glock’s safety lever is located. The M9’s safety is near its hammer.

Next, while removing the magazine, Barrett said he fumbled the weapon. He and Woods reached out to catch it. Barrett recalled grabbing the magazine in one hand, pistol in the other. He didn’t recall hearing the shot.

“Woods fell into him in almost a hug and (slid) down to the floor,” the investigators wrote, based on Barrett’s sworn statement. “He then noticed blood and asked if (Woods) was hit.”

The next moments were a blur as the other men in the room leapt up to help. More people arrived. Someone ran for a medic.

Barrett opened the soldier’s shirt and held a plastic sheet protector over his chest wound, he said. Woods was rushed to a clinic, then to the base hospital. He underwent surgery and was medically evacuated before dawn for further treatment in Germany.

The enlisted soldier and the second contractor weren’t sure later what their colleagues had been discussing right before the shooting. They’d been facing away, doing paperwork and watching TVs and security camera feeds, until hearing what the soldier called a “piercing gunshot.”

After Woods was carried away, the second contractor gathered the firearm, casing and spent round for evidence. The magazine was in the Glock, he said. Another witness recalled him clearing it and ejecting a second round from the chamber, which suggests the magazine was in the gun when it was fired.

Clearly upset, Barrett asked to speak to Woods and blamed himself for the mishap when speaking to investigators that evening. Officials later barred him from all coalition bases in Afghanistan.

Questioned at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center days afterward, Woods had no memory of the shooting, but said it had probably been an accident and that Barrett “was a good guy and means well.”

Eighteen months later, he filed suit.

[email protected]

Twitter: @chadgarland

Sallyport employs roughly 1,850 people at Balad. Its company headquarters is in Virginia, but it also has a corporate presence in Bermuda.

What Sallyport runs in Iraq is basically a small army of private military contractors, known in the trade as PMCs, recruited from around the world. Employees are paid handsomely to survive insurgent attacks, blistering heat and crushing boredom for a few years while supporting American international military and policy objectives.

But unlike most armies, at Balad there was a distinct lack of discipline.

Poor leadership empowered different factions operating at the base, including white South African guards, a Bosnian “mafia,” and an Iranian-backed militia, who vied with other Sallyport employees and with the Iraqi Air Force for control over the sprawling facility north of Baghdad.

According to present and past employees, some security officials traded safety for corruption and a racial system influenced by Apartheid. Some of Sallyport’s employees even abused the local dogs.

This summer, the independent Government Accountability Project began an investigation of operations at Balad for The Daily Beast, contacting hundreds of current and former Sallyport employees. Days after that began, Sallyport sent an email to employees warning them against speaking to us, something several Sallyport employees cited as a reason they couldn’t talk. Others requested anonymity, even though there are enough whistleblowers to fill a choir loft.

The company declined to comment on any allegations regarding its finances and corporate structure, leadership on base, animal abuse, racism, pro-Apartheid social media posts, theft, misuse of money, security failures, rigged security inspections, the Iranian militia, procurement issues, generator explosions, confiscated passports, and HR complaints. It is also suing for defamation two former employees, who alleged Sallyport tolerated smuggling, theft, and a prostitution ring.

Boorish Boers—The Racist South Africans

Many of the complaints centered around a particular clique of a couple hundred guards and supervisors at Balad—white South Africans whose careers began in Apartheid-era military and police forces.

Thousands of ex-Apartheid soldiers are working in conflicts across North Africa and the Middle East. Many of them are angry and feel like they have no place in South Africa after Apartheid-era job reservations for whites were ended. For military contracting companies like Sallyport, who hire gun-toting mercenaries, they were available.

Many were also “very racist,” said one former Sallyport employee.

“They would walk into a room and acknowledge me and my colleague but would ignore my Iraqi interpreters,” another former Sallyport employee said.

They felt “because their skin was white, they were better," added a third employee. They were “disrespectful to [the Iraqis] about their culture and their language.”

One South African refused to eat in the dining facility with Iraqis, said a former Sallyport employee. They said they “did not feel safe,” the former Sallyport employee said. “This the Iraqis found so disrespectful.”

By the end of 2014, white South Africans had almost total authority over security operations: the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) and armory. They “controlled the weapons” said a former Sallyport employee. Their attitudes translated into action, current and former employees say. Sallyport employees said the South Africans ordered Iraqi translators to perform menial tasks like serving lunches.

Four other former employees said Central and South Americans on base weren’t treated as equals. South Africans allegedly used their influence with the base’s security director to have Central and South Americans moved to undesirable shifts. “They would take them off day-shift and put them on night and forget about them,” said a former Sallyport employee who saw HR complaints against the South Africans.

“Former Sallyport employees said some of the South Africans openly endorsed ‘Apartheid.’”

“Peruvians were on all night and white boys were on all day,” said another former employee. “It was segregated.”

To be clear, Sallyport employees said some American contractors also mistreated Iraqis and other minorities. But abuse by white South Africans appears to have been more organized.

Former Sallyport employees said some of the South Africans openly endorsed “Apartheid.”

"They didn’t care for my opinion on Apartheid,” one employee said. "I just said why do you think it's OK for the minority to rule the majority and they would just be furious."

But the South Africans at Balad weren’t just acting this way in real life. The Government Accountability Project identified Sallyport employees sharing racist and anti-Semitic Facebook videos made by American KKK Grand Wizard David Duke.

“White South Africans have nothing to be ashamed about,” said Duke, in one video shared by Sallyport employees, “The Boers created a great nation, one so good for blacks that millions came for the jobs, education, and medical care that the whites had created.” Other posts called Nelson Mandela a terrorist, justified Apartheid, celebrated white pride and even included actual Nazi propaganda purporting to tell the “untold truth about Hitler.”

One frequent share was a photo of South Africa’s Apartheid-era flag, a bloody handprint and a noose, with the caption in Afrikaans, “I’m sick of farm murders,” a reference to a debunked conspiracy, promoted by South Africa’s extreme right—and, recently, by President Donald Trump—that white farmers are facing “genocide,” as some of the propaganda puts it.

To be fair, racist contractors aren’t limited to Sallyport.

The Government Accountability Project identified pro-Apartheid social media posts from contractors who work, or worked, for other companies including DynCorp, GardaWorld, Constellis, including a photo of a South African contractor wearing an Apartheid flag on a base, but didn’t hear specific stories about abuse.

When asked about racism and endorsement of Apartheid on base, one white South African former employee of Sallyport acknowledged “things were not always kosher,” but refused to explain, citing “band of brothers” loyalty. The Government Accountability Project located a blog post from this South African employee, where, a few years before, he had advocated for “the replacement of the democratic system” with something more favorable to white South Africans.

Security Leadership?

Former Sallyport employees blamed the base’s American security director, Steve Asher, for many of the problems at the base. “There was an acceptance of mediocrity,” a former employee said.

Asher previously faced questions about security at an Air Force nuclear facility in Montana he managed. Five months after he left his position as group commander and chief of police for the 341st Space Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, in 2008, the base failed a Nuclear Surety Inspection. The Project on Government Oversight said this was “indicative of how Asher managed the security forces” at Malmstrom, because “proper security readiness would not have deteriorated that quickly.”

At Balad, Sallyport employees said guard forces at the base frequently responded late to security breaches, or went to the wrong place. One former employee described an incident when an Iraqi Air Force general called in a perimeter breach as a test. “It took security 45 minutes to get a quick response team to that location,” they said. Another former employee described being called to respond to a security breach kilometers away from his area of responsibility.

“No one knew what was going on,” said a former Sallyport employee.

This issue was amplified because, at times, the outer perimeter of the base had holes. “The fence-line was nonexistent in some areas,” said a former Sallyport employee.

“Security assessments were rigged, three former employees said.”

Security assessments were rigged, three former employees said. One former employee said Asher was angry when he wasn’t given times and locations of security inspections beforehand. “Security had to be notified of everything and when they were not, they failed,” said another.

Most of the time, security did get a heads-up. “We almost always knew when [inspectors] were coming,” because they controlled the airport, said a different former employee. “We prepped ahead of time, paperwork was tidied up.” Sallyport employees described moving around guard forces in order to create an “A-team” for inspections, including adding more experienced supervisors. They also inflated the number of guards. Sallyport “pulled us to 12-hour shifts to beef up the numbers,” said the former employee. When inspectors left, “we went back to normal procedures.”

Multiple former Sallyport employees said they feared for their safety while working at Balad because of security failures.

Former Sallyport employees also said Asher was the person who created the cabal of white South Africans.

In July 2014, a little over six months after Sallyport took over, the Islamic State attacked Balad, nearly overrunning the base. During the attack, Sallyport evacuated Americans, but left other employees behind. Because the South Africans stayed Asher felt they had shown him loyalty, former Sallyport employees said. He returned the favor, systematically replacing Americans with South Africans. Sallyport employees said South Africans worked in restricted areas, like the airfield, where they weren’t allowed, because there weren’t enough Americans.

“If there was a security breach, then they’d switch to Afrikaans,” said another former Sallyport employee. “So the clients don’t hear what’s going on.” By clients, they didn’t mean their actual clients, the Iraqi and American governments, they meant Lockheed Martin, who provided F-16s for the base, and whose employees had influence at Balad.

Lockheed referred all questions about security failures on base to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

Asher did not respond to a request for comment.

Don’t Forget, We’re Still in Iraq

The Iraqi military was the ultimate authority at Balad. While Sallyport provided security for the entire base, within the base they only directly controlled two compounds and the airfield; the rest was Iraqi or abandoned.

Sallyport employees worked with, and trained, Iraqi Air Force personnel. But Sallyport employees said they had their own security problems.

One former Sallyport employee who dealt with Iraqi Air Force guards said they regularly slept on the job, made phone calls on duty, and failed to respond properly when approached.

Iraqi military intelligence units were worse, said several former employees. They used their unquestioned authority to search people on base in order to steal property, like cell phones, to resell, employees said.

Intelligence personnel “would come into the restricted areas without clearance,” said a former employee. “They would threaten to murder people and their families if you tried to stop them.” The Iraqi military “made it clear they owned their people,” meaning Iraqis in general, said another employee.

One former employee described an incident where an Iraqi guard stopped intelligence personnel at a checkpoint and tried prevent them from entering a restricted area, near the F-16s. In retaliation, the guard was kidnapped and beaten, said the former employee.

“Asher refused to go to the [Iraqi] general” to control intelligence personnel, they said.

The Iraqi embassy in Washington, D.C., passed questions to the authorities at Balad, who did not respond to them.

All Your Base are Belong to an Iranian Proxy

Other problems came from outside. The Kataib al-Imam Ali, an Iranian-backed Shia militia, fought off the Islamic State during the 2014 attack. After that, Sallyport employees said the militia did whatever they wanted and moved into a building in the Iraqi section of the base.

Militia members refused to be searched and brought unregistered weapons onto base. When Sallyport guards tried to stop them, they frequently broke through walls of the base, using cranes to smash them to pieces.

“We had to bring more T-Walls in,” said one former employee. “They just got bigger cranes.”

“They could have brought a nitrogen bomb and no one would know or stop them,” said another former Sallyport employee. In one instance militia members allegedly shot at a bomb-sniffing dog after it flagged their vehicle, according to a former Sallyport security employee.

Disagreements between Sallyport employees and militia members nearly came to violence. Former Sallyport employees described three separate incidents during which the militia threatened contractors.

One Sallyport employee got in a fight with a militia member over what former Sallyport employees said was a cultural misunderstanding, and had a gun pulled on him. “Ninety-five percent chance he dies,” said a former Sallyport employee, but “somehow they made an agreement” with a militia leader, and no shots were fired.

“‘Never say you are American’ around the militia, a former Sallyport employee said.”

A different contractor had an AK-47 waved in his face. A third said a militia leader threatened to cut his head off—and the Sallyport security leadership had told him to keep the incident quiet.

“Never say you are American” around the militia, a former Sallyport employee said.

The militia may have saved the base from the Islamic State, but the the constant threat of violence didn’t endear them to Americans. “The enemy was living on our base,” one former employee said.

Asher convinced the militia to leave the base in late 2016 by building them a base outside with electricity and water. Sallyport employees said it took three tries to build a base the militia accepted. They rejected earlier attempts by breaking down walls and moving back into Balad.

A former Sallyport employee said it was wise to build a base for the militia: “In the scheme of things, it was a better idea because they were crazy.”

A base for Iranian-backed militia wasn’t the only questionable use of American money.

Militia members stole or were given military hardware, including armored cars, originally paid for by the U.S. government. Even if stolen equipment was recovered, “parts were missing,” said another Sallyport employee who recalled tracking down a stolen Mitsubishi.

One blatant theft was exposed by the Associated Press in March 2017. The militia drove onto the base with a flatbed truck and a 60-foot crane, held the guards at gunpoint, and according to Sallyport, picked up three of the base’s generators and drove off. Sallyport employees made it clear they would have liked to prevent the theft of the generators, but said they were stolen from a part of the base under Iraqi military control and Sallyport had no authority. All they could do is make sure the theft happened without violence or accidents.

Nothing Personal, Just Business for the ‘Bosnian Mafia’

Rampant theft and fraud were variously blamed on the Iraqi military, the Shiite militia, South Africans, and what several former Sallyport employees called “the Bosnian Mafia.”

Former Sallyport employees explained that Bosnians, and employees from other Eastern European countries, ran the IT department, the motor pool and the television warehouse. “The Bosnians control things like TV, internet and even who gets a certain room or furniture,” said one Sallyport employee. Other Sallyport employees described spare rooms filled with withheld televisions and furniture. “They had it set up to get whatever they want first.”

“You couldnʼt get anything you didnʼt get off the black market or find in the trash,” said another employee.

Procurement problems weren’t limited to the Bosnian-controlled TVs, but also safety equipment. Sallyport security employees said they weren’t issued proper protective gear like personal first aid kits, helmets and boots. “The gear was stuck in Dubai. We didn’t even have anything to hold our ammunition,” said one former employee. “We were putting mags in our pockets.”

There were also corrupt vendors, separate from the Bosnian mafia. At one point, a vendor tried to rip off Sallyport by providing an order of televisions without wiring. After his order was rejected, one Sallyport employee said the vendor was caught selling junk TVs on base.

And if you were lucky enough to have anything valuable, someone might steal it, said Sallyport employees. After the 2014 evacuation, the rooms of American employees who were evacuated were raided. “Everything that wasn’t bolted to the floor was gone,” said a former employee.

Things that weren’t stolen were broken instead.

In one case Sallyport was warned generators were overdue for refurbishing, risking explosions and hundreds of thousands of dollars of damage, according to a former Sallyport employee. They said Sallyport didn’t act and a generator exploded.

“Builders aren’t good at paperwork,” said one former Sallyport employee, justifying why things were “screwed up from the get go.” He said they were repairing a deserted desert base and they had to make do jerry-rigging scraps of stuff they already had.

There was a lot missing when Sallyport took over Balad. When the U.S. Army occupied the base there were hundreds of generators, but afterward many were stolen. “You could see them in people’s backyards if you left base and went into Baghdad,” said another Sallyport employee.

In another example of the amount of American money floating around Iraq, a former Sallyport employee tried to convince one author of this piece to go into business with them, because they needed an American to get government contracts. There’s “too much money in American contracts,” they said. “I can make you rich.”

Doggy Issues

It wasn’t just the humans who had problems on base. Animals were also abused by Sallyport employees.

Hundreds of stray dogs and cats lived around Balad, a health and safety issue. According to six current and former Sallyport employees, their coworkers allegedly captured, and starved, several animals. “I remember hearing the dogs crying,” said another Sallyport employee. “All the time.”

Sallyport allegedly fired Aaron Sosa, the company’s former “Entomology and Vector Control Superintendent” for the abuse. Sosa denied torturing animals, saying they were starving when his team found them. Captive animals “were provided food once a day,” he said. “It was not enough for some in their dire condition.”

But former Sallyport employees emphasized that animals weren’t fed while Sosa was on leave in February 2016. Sosa denied this too, saying auditors used his absence to “make it look like our section was purposefully starving animals.” But he acknowledged in an email to the Government Accountability Project his team had “a difficult time obtaining food to simply place the traps” and stole food from dining facilities.

“Animals definitely starved,” said a former Sallyport employee, but “Aaron was the fall guy.”

Sallyport employees said Skip Burton, the base’s Corporate Safety Manager, was also fired over animal abuse. Burton denied responsibility for starving animals and told the Government Accountability Project Sallyport fired him as retaliation for exposing safety violations when entering confined space manholes.

Burton blamed Sosa for the animal abuse. “He captured, caged, and rather than feed, destroyed,” said Burton. “Policy on the base was to capture stray dogs and release outside.”

But that policy had changed by October 2015. The Iraqi Air Force prohibited Sallyport from releasing animals, according to emails Sosa provided. Sosa suggested four possible responses, including euthanasia, which Sallyport’s management preferred. “Hopefully [the Iraqi general] will support us in the euthanizing of them,” responded Kim Poole, Balad’s then Project Manager. But Sallyport never paid for euthanasia drugs, Sosa said.

“I used to take a second hotplate back… and feed the dogs,” said one former Sallyport employee who thought Sallyport’s policy was to starve them.

Sallyport Prison Experiment

Worst of all at Balad, if employees wanted to leave, sometimes they couldn’t. Several former employees reported Sallyport took their passports when they landed in Iraq. One former employee said when he tried to leave, Sallyport wouldn’t let him. They refused to return his passport or tell him where in Baghdad he could find it. After attempting to get his passport from Sallyport for a month, he contacted the American consulate in Baghdad. A few days later, he was allowed to leave.

And even if you were at Balad voluntarily, it was “basically jail,” said another former Sallyport employee. Still, “we did our fucking best,” they said, a sentiment echoed by several former Sallyport employees. “You have no idea what it’s like to live two years surrounded by South African guards.”

Despite all the problems, Sallyport might be able to make them disappear with some corporate jujitsu. The company’s ultimate owner is the private equity firm D.C. Capital Partners which owns other contracting companies, including recently purchased Janus Global Operations.

Employees believe Sallyport’s contract will be passed to Janus when it ends in January 2019.

“It’s a shell game,” to get rid of bad PR and whistleblower complaints, said a former Sallyport employee. “One day employees will be wearing Sallyport shirts and the next day theyʼll put on Janus shirts and it will all be the same,” they said.

The names change, but the leadership will remain.

Zack Kopplin @ZackKopplin

Miserendino was a government contractor at MSC, an entity of the U.S. Department of the Navy that provides support and specialized services to the Navy and other U.S. military forces. According to the plea agreement, Miserendino and Joseph P. Allen, the owner of a government contracting company, conspired to use Miserendino’s position at MSC to enrich themselves through bribery.

Specifically, beginning in or around 1999, Miserendino used his position and influence at MSC to help Allen and his company obtain and expand a commission agreement with a telecommunications company that sold maritime satellite services to MSC. With that agreement in place, for more than a decade, Miserendino used his influence at MSC to take official acts to benefit the telecommunications company, which, through the commission agreement, also benefited Allen and his company.

Unknown to MSC or the telecommunications company, Allen then paid half of the commission payments from the telecommunications company to Miserendino as bribes. In total, between approximately 1999 and approximately 2014, Allen received more than $6 million from the telecommunications company, and in turn paid more than $2.8 million to Miserendino in bribes.

For his role in the scheme, Allen, 57, formerly of Panama City, Florida, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery in April 2017, and was sentenced on July 28, 2017, to five years in prison by U.S. District Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen, in Norfolk.

The FBI, DCIS, and NCIS are investigating the case. Trial Attorneys Sean Mulryne and Molly Gaston of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Steve Haynie for the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case.

The contract for worldwide aviation services — supporting the work of the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Office of Aviation — was initially awarded in September 2016. It calls for providing aviation support for the eradication and interdiction of illicit drugs along with personnel training, reconnaissance, personnel recovery, medical evacuation, security and equipment and ferrying of aircraft.

The Government Accountability Office denied DynCorp’s protest of the contract award in December 2016. DynCorp immediately took its case to the Court of Federal Claims, saying AAR purposefully poached DynCorp employees with previous experience on the contract. DynCorp had held the contract for more than two decades.

AAR, DynCorp alleged, then used those ex-DynCorp employees to obtain proprietary information to compete for, and ultimately win, the recompete of WASS in September 2016.

“While we are disappointed by the court’s decision based upon the facts and merits of the case, we are honored to have served the INL Air Wing program for more than 25 years, having a distinguished record of flight safety and operational excellence,” DynCorp said in a statement.

Don Wetekam, chairman of AAR Airlift, said in a statement that his team “is excited to begin work on this contract and deliver world-class service for this important national security program."

Iraqi government officials also have refused to issue, or have delayed, the delivery of work visas to employees of companies that won’t hand over the money.

A senior executive at a U.S. company that supports American troops in Iraq said contractor vehicles are stopped at checkpoints frequently and ordered to produce documents that certify they’ve paid the taxes or prove their company has received an extension from Iraq’s tax commission. The executive spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid retaliation from the Iraqi government for speaking out publicly.

He said the Iraqis typically calculate the tax bills by first determining the total value of the contract and then charging 20 percent of what they estimate the company’s gross revenue would be. That can lead to eye-popping yet wildly inaccurate totals as high as $20 million. The big number is really aimed at getting the company to agree on a smaller yet still substantial amount, the executive said.

Najiha Abbas Habib, director general of Iraq’s tax authority, rejected the allegation U.S. contractors are being gouged. American companies working in Iraq are not exempt from taxation, she said, adding that Iraq’s tax rates are actually lower than other Middle East countries.

“Many foreign companies operate in Iraq without paying any taxes at all,” Habib said.

Robert Mearkle, a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, denied the tax demands have undercut the counterterrorism mission. “Iraqi enforcement of tax laws has not disrupted U.S. efforts to defeat ISIS,” he said in an emailed statement, using an alternative acronym for the militant group that in 2014 burst into western and northern Iraq from Syria.

But a trade group representing a number of the contractors told Secretary of State Rex Tillerson several months ago that the tactics present a “direct threat to the U.S. government’s mission in Iraq.” The Professional Services Council also said in the previously undisclosed May 1 letter to Tillerson that the arbitrary way the Iraqis are collecting the taxes heightens the potential for fraud and waste in a country that already ranks as one of the most corrupt in the world.

David Berteau, president of the Professional Services Council, estimated in an AP interview that the Pentagon spent about $1 billion in just the last year on contracts with about 20 U.S. companies for support in Iraq. The work ranges from supplying U.S. and coalition bases to construction and weapon system maintenance.

Berteau said the companies either seek reimbursement from the U.S. government for the taxes or build the expense into the price they charge on the contract.

“Either way, U.S. taxpayers eventually foot the bill,” Berteau said.

But the Trump administration hasn’t confronted senior Iraqi officials over the matter. Tillerson, in a brief response he sent the organization in early July, said a diplomatic note between the two countries approved in 2014 during the Obama administration gave U.S. government personnel but not contractors protections from Iraqi law.

Tillerson said the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad routinely engages with the Iraqi government “to ensure fair treatment” of the U.S. contractors working there. But he also said it’s “always important that U.S. companies follow local laws,” which include the payment of taxes.

And Tillerson gave no indication the Trump administration would pursue what U.S. companies with overseas contracts really want: an agreement with the Iraqi government that gives them exemptions from the taxes and other legal protections to shield them from being prosecuted in Iraqi courts.

Iraq’s push for the taxes has coincided with a sustained drop in oil prices. Oil revenue makes up nearly 95 percent of Iraq’s budget, but the country has been reeling under an economic crisis since 2014, when prices began falling from a high of above $100 a barrel.

The seizure of territory across Iraq by the Islamic State group in 2014, including the fall of Mosul, worsened the situation. Badly needed resources have been diverted from productive investment to fight a long and costly insurgency.

U.S. Central Command, which oversees military operations in Iraq, referred questions to the State Department. The command declined to provide a list of the U.S. companies in Iraq with Defense Department contracts.

Among the companies operating in Iraq are General Dynamics Land Systems and DynCorp International. General Dynamics, which is based in Michigan, received a $65 million contract late last year to support Iraq’s fleet of M1A1 battle tanks. DynCorp, located in McLean, Virginia, won a contract in 2015 with a potential value of $139 million to school Iraqi troops in vehicle maintenance and repair. Neither company responded to requests for comment about whether they’d paid taxes to the Iraqi government.

In its version of the annual defense policy bill, the GOP-led House Armed Services Committee expressed concern over Iraq’s tax collection efforts. The legislation, approved in July, requested a briefing by the Defense and State departments on “tax collection, visa denials, and other issues that are affecting U.S. civilian contractors in Iraq.”

And Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, the Senate’s No. 2 Republican, has thrown his support to the U.S. companies, telling Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis that he’s concerned the income tax demands could lead American contractors to avoid Iraq altogether.

Cornyn wrote in early August that Iraq is “the only unstable conflict zone in the world where U.S. contractors and their employees have no legal tax protections.”

Associated Press writers Susannah George and Qassim Abdul-Zahra in Baghdad contributed to this report.

Follow Richard Lardner on Twitter at http://twitter.com/rplardner

New management was installed at Sallyport in January 2016 and immediately undertook a review of all policies and procedures at Balad. This review resulted in several changes, including the appointment of high ranking former military professionals to oversee Sallyport operations at Balad, the installation of a Corporate Ethics and Compliance Officer, and the replacement of many managers at the base.

"These enhancements were put in place to prevent the very kinds of allegations that were raised by these employees, not to conceal them. We continue to look for ways to strengthen our internal oversight capacity and regularly advise U.S. government contracting officers of our efforts, including changes in personnel as well as of any incidents that might occur at Balad," Stuckart said.

"Unfortunately, these employees presented a selective narrative when speaking to the media which resulted in the ensuing coverage omitting many key points," Stuckart added. For example:

1. The same employees quoted in the Associated Press story taking issue with how allegations of prostitution were handled signed and submitted a supplemental report last October concluding that these allegations were "UNFOUNDED" and based on rumors and innuendo.  See attached Documents #1 and #2 (names redacted for privacy and security reasons).
2. Sallyport's new management issued a policy expressly banning alcohol and tobacco at Balad. The company has not received any allegation that personnel have violated that new policy.
3. When the company's new management learned that the company's own investigators were supposedly told to shut down their investigation into alcohol and prostitution, the new Corporate Ethics and Compliance Officer instructed the investigators to complete those investigations. The new company management would never shut down an internal investigation into serious allegations like prostitution. As noted above, the renewed inquiry by the former employees handling those inquiries found that the allegations of prostitution were unsubstantiated.
4. An internal investigation into a claim that a vehicle breached the airfield at Balad showed that the breach took place on a service road outside of the airfield, well away from any Iraqi F-16.  Sallyport submitted its investigation report to the Base Commander. See attached Document #3 (names redacted for privacy and security reasons).
5. The article reported on an aircraft being affected in operation, allegedly due to a large amount of smuggled alcohol in water bottles. Standing alone, the allegation that such a large number of water bottles were being smuggled such that it affected the operation of the aircraft is improbable. The company did not receive any reports that an aircraft was compromised.
6. The article blamed the company for failing to prevent the removal of Iraqi-owned generators from a location on the Balad base that Sallyport does not control or is assigned to protect.  The incident was promptly reported to both the Iraqi Base Commander and US government contracting officials. See attached Document #4 (names redacted for privacy and security reasons).
7. Sallyport never instructed the dismissed investigators to keep two sets of books in order to deceive auditors. The investigators were specifically told to continue keeping a log, available to the U.S. government, of every investigation but not to include any attorney-client privilege information on that log – a standard practice. The dismissed investigators incorrectly interpreted this directive as an attempt to deceive the government.

"Sallyport stands by its security procedures and it efforts to help Balad Air Force Base play a significant role in the fight against ISIS. The fact that two former employees gave media interviews providing a factually-incomplete and selective narrative should not be allowed to obscure the vital work of our team at Balad," Stuckart said.

INVESTIGATION DOCUMENTS 

CALL FOR SERVICE INCIDENT REPORT 1 »

CALL FOR SERVICE INCIDENT REPORT 2 »

INVESTIGATION REPORT (traffic accident) »

INVESTIGATION REPORT (generator theft) »

:

• "Billing the DOD for hours never worked. The focus is ANA or Iraq army contractor-trainer, a convoy security contractor, or private security force contractor that overbilled the DOD for significant hours never worked by their employees.
• "A DOD contractor billing for completed construction projects that were in fact never completed-and or never met the specifications of the project (Iraq or Afghanistan)
• "Transportation or logistics contractors working for the DOD in Iraq or Afghanistan that failed to report theft of material in their custody, overbilled for services never rendered or for inflated costs associated to fuel, maintenance or security." http://CorporateWhistleblower.Com

A Harvard Political Review report dated February 6th, 2016 stated, "With its blank checks, lack of oversight, and belief that no one should question those contractors and companies that protect the nation, the government has allowed the defense system and contractors to act wastefully and fraudulent, has permitted companies and contractors to take advantage of government spending, and has cleared the way for the industry to exercise its influence over the nation's politics in the pursuit of greater profit."

The Corporate Whistleblower Center is appealing to employees of corporations providing contract services to the Department of Defense in Iraq or Afghanistan to call them at 866-714-6466 if they have documented proof or an eyewitness account of substantial overbilling or fraud on the part of a DOD contractor. "Why sit on a potentially winning lotto ticket without ever discovering what it could be worth?" http://CorporateWhistleblower.Com

Simple rules for a whistleblower from the Corporate Whistleblower Center: Do not go to the government first if you want to become a whistleblower: The Corporate Whistleblower Center says, "Major whistleblowers frequently go to the government thinking they will help. It's a huge mistake. Do not go to the news media with your whistleblower information either. Any type of public revelation of a whistleblower's information could destroy the prospect for a reward. Do not try to force a government contractor or individual to come clean about overbilling the federal government out of millions of dollars."

The Corporate Whistleblower is the premier advocate for whistleblowers in the United States. Unlike any group in the US, they assist potential whistleblowers with packaging their information and providing the whistleblower with access to the most accomplished whistleblower attorneys in the nation. For more information a potential whistleblowers in any state can contact the Corporate Whistleblower anytime at 866-714-6466 or visit http://CorporateWhistleblower.Com